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Confidential

September 1, 1939

To the Board of Trustees:

This is our official day for the beginning of the new session, and on the whole the outlook is auspicious. The disastrous Tientsin flood is delaying the arrival alike of faculty and students. It may be noted in passing that evidence points quite conclusively to the opening of dikes upstream from Tientsin by the Japanese military in an effort to flood guerrilla-ridden farming areas and divert the flood from their own stronghold, whereas actually they have brought added misery to an already afflicted country-side and failed to prevent the damage - running according to their estimate into hundreds of millions of dollars - to the city of Tientsin, including their own concession and military headquarters. This natural calamity, following upon the destructiveness of the Japanese armies and the very much increased living costs due to the war, will do much to aggravate the wretched plight of the people of this province.

For ourselves the very abnormal exchange gives of course a certain advantage, U.S.\$1.00 being equal now to about Local Currency \$16.00. But because of mounting commodity prices we are giving a bonus which for the past month averaged 30% on salaries, with corresponding increases on many other budget items. The figures we are charging for student board is double that of last session which was already considerably over normal.

This leads to our heaviest feature of increased expenditure in emergency aid to students. All of them are in varying degrees affected by these economic consequences of the Japanese invasion, large numbers being unable to continue their studies without special financial assistance. Not a few have indescribably pathetic personal tragedies, - one or more members of the family slaughtered, homes looted or property destroyed by Japanese savagery, cut off for months without any word from home, etc. We are continuing the policy again this year of giving emergency aid to all such victims of the hostilities who in character and quality of academic work seem to be worthy of it. We are thus sharing with them our good fortune in American exchange, and taking it as one of the most useful things that we can do in the national struggle. Except for this one extravagance - in which we feel confident of your approval - we are storing up all that we can of savings in American currency and drawing upon our liquid assets in local funds. The currency we are forced to use is wholly worthless except where and as long as Japanese bayonets compel its circulation, and the national currency will rise or fall in value with confidence in the ability of the country to continue its resistance.

The drain upon our reserves in thus aiding needy students is accentuated by the larger number we feel it our duty to accept. We and the Catholic University in the city are the only institutions of

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higher learning in all this region except those sponsored by the Japanese which of course no decent Chinese desires to attend. Both of us are trying therefore to take in as many as we can accommodate. In our own case this means providing for some 700 boys and 270 girls (hoping that 20 or 30 of the former may not show up) instead of our usual limit of 800. Even so we have accepted about 1 in 9 for undergraduate and 1 in 16 for graduate study. We have, however, the satisfaction of securing the choicest young people of this region and of giving them a refuge for which they and their parents as well as the National Government give ample evidence of their gratitude.

Of new members on the Faculty the most significant feature is the number of our own graduates, including four men and one woman returning from the States with their doctorates. We are especially glad to welcome Mr. Brank Fulton whose strengthening of our religious activities is made possible through the McBrier Foundation.

Developments in international affairs and in China's resistance to Japanese aggression continue to concern us as being literally a matter of life or death to Yenching. It is too early to write with any confidence as yet of the bearing on Eastern Asia of the German-Soviet pact, but it must have come as a disillusioning shock to Japan. The immediate fall of a Cabinet whose policy was based upon friendship with the Axis countries in support of imperialistic conquest on the mainland, and the rather neutral complexion of the new Cabinet, reflect the dismayed perplexity in Tokyo. Violent partisan groupings for or against the anti-Comintern Axis were already disrupting internal solidarity and these will probably be intensified. The effect on popular morale, notably that of the common soldiers, must be fairly serious, as they had been led to believe in Germany as their powerful ally against their Communist enemy, Russia. Not only are the highly-placed advocates of this policy now discredited, but the anti-Communist propaganda upon which Japan has relied so largely both at home and abroad is now at one stroke made absurdly meaningless or even dangerous.

Chinese opinion is that Russia, now freed from fear on her western front, will begin large-scale operations in Manchuria, or even in the direction of Korea, and this is supported by prominent Chinese residents of Manchuria who are secretly slipping away and bringing tales of heavy fighting in which Russia seems to be aggressive and Japanese losses considerable. Foreign views, however, are still to the effect that Russia has no intention of doing more than aiding China by keeping Japan worried and a substantial proportion of her troops immobilized on the Mongolian border. General Chiang Kai-shek will undoubtedly take full advantage of any such weakening of Japanese forces in China where even as it is they have been barely holding their own for months past. Some thoughtful Chinese even fear that Russian aid might lead to an extension of her influence in this country, stimulated further by a natural sense of gratitude, and that this would be almost as undesirable alike from the standpoint of in-



telligent Chinese patriotism and of American concern for a stable peace in the Pacific area as for Japan to achieve her aims.

The appointment of the Japanese Ambassador in London as Foreign Minister is said to be conditional upon securing guarantees from England for winding up the "China affair" in order that Japan may be more free to deal with Russia. The assumption is that, with the complexity of British problems in Europe and elsewhere, and the tendency of her present Cabinet to compromise, England and France having been recently rebuffed by Russia would be in a peculiarly receptive mood to salvage what they can of their interests in China and prevent Japan from becoming too completely weakened to preserve the "balance of power" against Russia and an allied, victorious China. More specifically, this would take the form of some vague recognition of Japan's special relationships in North China (including continued garrisoning of troops though this would not be mentioned) in exchange for British pressure on the National Government to come to terms with Japan and the restoration of England's enormous interests in other parts of the country. My Chinese friends who are in closest touch with Japanese trends think that while the new Cabinet will try to avoid an open break with Germany, and may even play with the idea of a non-aggression pact with Russia, yet they will concentrate on America, England, and France in an effort to effect a settlement with China on the best terms they can. They feel that the United States has a superlative opportunity to insist on the withdrawal of all Japanese military and naval forces from all of China within the Great Wall as the essential pre-requisite to any settlement we can approve.

Most of these speculations will have been proven right or wrong long before you read these lines. But at the risk of wearying you with repetitious comments, certain conclusions will hold whatever shifting of events may occur in Europe or out here.

(1) Japanese policy stands revealed as aiming at the virtual conquest and monopolistic commercial exploitation of all China in such stages as may be safely undertaken, with the complete elimination of all other foreign interests regardless of treaties or elemental human decencies. The abortive anti-British agitation gives ample evidence of this. Crudely childish and in many respects comical, it carries a sinister warning of a state of mind long fostered among their populace. Whatever assurances they may blandly make to the contrary, our turn will come whenever they feel strong enough to let loose their own hired ruffians and the Chinese riff-raff they employ.

(2) The Japanese have proven themselves utterly unfit for ruling another people. Lacking the moral and cultural qualities to do this by more humane methods, they have recourse only to terrorization, torture and petty tyranny, duplicity and control of all sources of information or education. Anything conceivable would be better for China - and for the world as affected by China - than to come under Japanese militarized domination.



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(3) The United States, without the slightest danger of becoming involved in war, and with at most only temporary and limited commercial losses, could easily bring enough pressure on Japan to help forward the awakening which has already begun and thus aid the liberal elements in the country to expose the grandiose delusions of its dominant military group. More than any other country do Chinese trust us and seek our friendship. My strong impression is that England and France, harassed by anxieties from which we are free, would welcome and follow our lead. The two essential points are: first, we must not be misled during the remaining months, before the abrogation of the 1911 treaty is to take effect, by any apparent changes in Japanese policy; and secondly, "the administrative and territorial integrity of China" to which we are committed can only be implemented by insisting on the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from all of China, with North China especially in mind.

More narrowly with reference to our own institution, but with passionate concern for its fate as well as for the vastly greater moral and material values involved, the finest service the Trustees and all American friends of Yenching University can render these next few critical months is to exert all possible influence upon our Government to act firmly and fearlessly according to its own wholly adequate understanding of the gravity of these issues. Damage to Yenching and other American institutions or individuals in this area becomes relatively unimportant as being less in any case than the far more thorough and enduring destruction if Japan is allowed to achieve her undeniably evil designs.

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Confidential

Somewhere in Shansi  
September 2, 1939

See stencilled copy which follows

We have been now nearly eight weeks in this Border District, and as we have everywhere been very kindly treated and well informed by our hosts, we have come to know quite a lot about the local political and military situation.

The area (bounded by the four railways and containing nearly forty hsien together with a large part of mid-Hopei (again nearly forty hsien) has been organized at the Border District of Shansi, Charhar, and Hopei, (平绥冀察边区), and presents a very remarkable experiment in democracy in extremely difficult conditions. For all hsien cities but one, and most of the big towns throughout the district, are garrisoned by the Japanese, who also control the railways and the main roads of communication. The government was elected at a delegates' conference in January 1938 when delegates of every group in society, military, tradesmen, farmers, gentry, and even monks from Wu Tai Shan came together on the simple basis of Resistance to Japan. It is a true United Front Government. 80% of its officers are non-party men, 12% Kuo Min Tang, and the remaining 8% all other parties, presumably mostly communist. In the government, parties are forgotten in doing the work which is urgently necessary. We talked with General Sung Shao Wen, head of the government. I was very much impressed with him. He is a quiet man with a wise square face and very sincere and friendly expression. He lives on the same standard as his ma-fu or hostler (马夫), receiving a salary of \$16 per month from which he must pay \$6 for food. He is experienced in administration, having worked for Governor Yen Hsi Shan in Shansi, and his workers obviously have very great confidence in his wisdom and effective action. Not that the government is a one-man show; around Sung are many competent and enthusiastic young men, working as hsien chang or magistrate (县长) or chuan yuan (专员) (a chuan yuan is head over six hsien, and in case the place is cut off from the government he takes full initiative and responsibility). We were able to meet many of them, as the government was in session when we arrived. A beginning of democracy has been made by electing village councils by popular vote. In some cases there has been a vote of 80%, and even women, who previously took no political responsibility, have registered as much as 60% vote. The Ts'un chang or village head (村长) is elected by this council, which also allots shares of the village tax. So far Ch'u chang or district head (区长) have not been elected, though they have been chosen lately purely for executive capacity, but the next step to be taken immediately, is the organization of election of ch'u chang, and after that will come the election of hsien chang or magistrates (县长). The people of every village are now organized - the men serve as guards in turn, and provide transport of military provisions and government supplies (i.e. paper), also send letters and entertain guests. The women, where soldiers are quartered, grind meal and wash and mend clothes. Everywhere there is an attempt to teach the people to read, and to become conscious of the war. Children are organized into hsiao nien t'uan or children's groups (少年团). They learn songs and slogans, act as servants to the soldiers, help to educate their elders, and prepare to be soldiers later on.

In this district there are 12,000,000 people. They are rapidly learning to cooperate effectively with the government because they trust it. They can see the sincerity of the men with whom they deal. They trust the Government bank, so that Pien ch'u money is thoroughly stable on a level with legal tender. Government power is steadily extending. Their agents

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operate almost up to the walls of towns occupied by the Japanese. In P'ing Shan hsien (平山縣) in a normal year, 90% of the land tax can be collected. This year in spite of Japanese occupation of four points in the hsien over 80% of the tax has been collected. Taxes throughout the whole region have been greatly simplified. Now there are only land tax, import tax, and export tax. The land tax is less than before and the other taxes are minor ones, for control rather than income. In addition the farmers contribute grain for feeding the army. This is their biggest burden, and they bear it because they are convinced that their government by the Japanese would be far worse. The peasants say that their burden is now heavier than in normal years, but less heavy than in previous years of war (i.e. civil war).

There are two factors which have made the anti-Japanese movement a real mass movement here. One is the excellence of the work and propaganda of the Pien Ch'iu Cheng Fu or Border Government (邊區政府), the other is the behaviour of the Japanese army. We have during most of our travels been passing through villages visited by Japanese troops. It is easy to distinguish them. They are practically destroyed by burning. Wherever the Japanese soldiers go, they burn the village, (and sometimes the crops, too), trample the fields, kill the livestock, and perhaps villagers, too, and rape any women they can find. This last action makes the Chinese hate them worst of all and regard them as beasts. In consequence of this disastrous behaviour, the Japanese are everywhere called Kuei tsu or demons (鬼子) and feared and hated. So the work of the Border Government has been made easier. The peasants willingly cooperate in a way that would perhaps normally be impossible. They spy for the Chinese, carry wounded, join the army (80% of the army is composed of local men). When the Japanese come now, the people completely evacuate the village, burying food and taking away all animals, utensils, etc. into the hills, and all the people leave. So the Japanese must bring with them all their necessities. One magistrate put in by the Japanese complained "my citizens are only beggars and rascals!" For when the Japanese arrived the people fled, and so the magistrate offered free relief (food, and money) to those who came back. But the patriots still did not come. Only the beggars and rascals came. Nowadays the Chinese farmers will sometimes let the Japanese kill them rather than act as guides. There is a story of a simple farmer on Wu Tai Shan who remembered the twelve points of the People's Compact (十二條) and so when the Japanese put him to guide them he ran away. They caught him and took off his shoes to prevent him running. But he got away again. This time they took away his stockings and forced him to go barefoot, and even then he tried to escape, and so the Japanese finally shot him. There is another story of a man who was employed to lead the Japanese to the Chinese rear, but actually led them into an ambush. And so on. It is clear that as time goes on there are more and more difficulties for the Japanese, as they act in a country strongly organized against them.

The Eighth Route Army is very strong here - probably a quarter million men - and is really a "people's army". The nucleus, and the commanders, are old Red Army men of ten or more years of experience in guerrilla fighting. We have met many of the officers and very many ordinary soldiers in the army, and have formed a very high opinion of them. The behaviour of the ordinary soldiers is in remarkable contrast to that of the Japanese. They treat the farmers everywhere with the utmost consideration and kindness. I have not heard any complaints that they take food or goods without payment. They behave quietly. They take no notice of the women at all: one would think that they have no emotions of sex, for neither in recreation nor reading do they seem to have any outlet. Perhaps they are so given up to the ideal of fighting for China that there is emotional harmony. Perhaps the



poor food and hard life leave no spare energy. For their food must be on one of the lowest standards in the world, costing about \$5.00 a month (in time of high prices), restricted to millet (小米) and one vegetable. Sometimes they have corn, and in good districts, flour. Very little vegetables, no meat or eggs. They have had clothes and equipment, poor lodgings, no comforts except occasional cigarettes. Yet they remain cheerful, loyal, and enthusiastic. Their officers live on almost the same scale as the men, only their equipment is rather better, for they have more captured Japanese material. The cooperation of army and government is good, but the government is not controlled by the army.

So you can see that in social, political, and military organization this region is making rapid advances, and even if the Japanese occupy more roads and towns they cannot solve the problem of pacification of the countryside. Methods of severe repressions such as they used with success in East Hopei this year cannot be effective here, where there is much more powerful organization against them, unless they have enough men to occupy the majority of the villages! - a hopeless task!

Japanese have realized the danger to them, and so while they talked of "mopping up bandits" they have actually made campaigns in an endeavour to cut up the border district into small parts, and break their connection.

In the autumn, 1938, the drive on Wu Tai was made from about ten directions, and Wu Tai itself was occupied. Some of the attacks succeeded and many cities were captured, but the government moved off into the mountains and continued to function, and the Japanese were left with longer communications lines to guard. Chinese communications were made more difficult, but not too difficult to use.

This summer in June, there were other Japanese drives, in an attempt to cut up the Border District by lines from I Chou to Lai Yuan and other such places. This campaign completely failed and the Japanese had to retreat to their starting point. In future it is quite likely that such campaigns may succeed, and so the government ~~here~~ is so organized that even if cut up into smaller units it can still continue to work effectively. Most important is the close organization of the people, and elimination of traitors.

While the good points of this administration have been noted above, there remain some points where improvement is urgently needed. They can be summed up by saying that there is no scientific spirit. (I can best show the need by examples. For instance, nowhere is there any serious attempt to be punctual and work to time. Military engagements fail through lack of care there, and life is inefficient everywhere. Ching Yan (程彦) told me that the time of a meeting was announced as afternoon (下午), and that people wasted as much as two hours in coming early! Everywhere we have been held up by inefficient people who were incapable of thinking ahead and planning even such a simple thing as a meal. Partly as a result of this lack of punctuality the radio is very inefficient and batteries are wasted and run down, so that, for example, now in an important centre there is no working radio. Another example of the lack of scientific spirit is carelessness of elementary rules of health. Flies flourish unrestricted because of insanitary habits, and malaria is very common. The government workers, who have education, are no better than the farmers who believe that flies eat the poison of the mant'ou or bread (馒头). Many other examples could be given.

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I am very glad that Ching Yun is here. He is well and happy, although he has not yet enough to do. He lost all his belongings when the Japanese burned a village. So if you have any way to help him by sending simple things - clothes, pen, watch, etc., it would be very valuable. More scientists are urgently needed, for the faults I have pointed out above are not fundamental. They can be put right by the introduction of people of scientific education and spirit, who would put telephone, radio, industry, onto a sound basis. Ching Yun told me that at present the paper and soap factories are controlled by men who know nothing of the process of manufacture! ..... can supply experts in radio, chemistry, etc., but it is extremely important that they have a thorough grasp of fundamentals and can utilize the very simple materials which are available here. For instance, it is no use knowing only the modern methods of leather tanning. They are too expensive to use here. Something appropriate to the district must be worked out. There are minerals such as mica and asbestos in the hills here but no one knows how to get them and how to use them. There is no hope for industrial development to make the region independent of Japanese goods until more skilled workers come in. They must come from Peking and Tientsin where there are plenty of such. The rest of China has such urgent need of them that they cannot be spared to come here from the interior. Doctors also are urgently needed. Until recently there was only one doctor in the whole region who could perform operations! Now he has about four good doctors assisting, but there are still far too few, and they are only able to look after wounded soldiers. Public health has no one responsible.

In agricultural plans the government is better equipped, but here again they need technical men to put the plans into effective action.

Education here does not exist in the sense we mean at ..... Here everything is subservient to the plan of anti-Japanese activity, and what they call "education" is simply propaganda. "History" means the story of China's oppression by Japan, "Geography" the account of battles, "common knowledge" means how to help the army, "reading" means learning slogans. It may be that this is all necessary and that anything further would be wrong use of energy, but as I see this "education", I wonder about the future. What happens after the war?

This leads on to the general question which seems to me to be of very great importance, though people here deliberately ignore it. Now there is being built up a democratic system not based on law or obedience to the government, but on willing cooperation for a common purpose, a common motivating force. The purpose is to drive out the Japanese and the motive is hatred, or self-interest. For the people believe that self-preservation means that they must cooperate in resistance. What will happen when the war ends, the purpose is achieved, or partially achieved, and the hatred and self-preservation no longer force the members of the community into co-operative action? Good democratic habits may survive, but they are not enough to build the good society that is our ideal.

It seems to me of the very greatest importance that this single motive of hatred of Japan should be replaced by a higher motive of the service of mankind and the building of a new China and new world. In that new world China and Japan must cooperate; there is no alternative. In the future lies the immensely difficult task of healing the material and spiritual ravages of war and making this cooperation possible. So that even as I admire the singlemindedness and devotion of the people here, it seems to me essential that something further be added: the contribution which a

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vital Christianity can give, of self-sacrifice and love and forgiveness. I do not mean that fighting should stop. It is unfortunately a necessary evil. But I do mean that an unbreakable foundation of future peace should now be built, by replacing the motive of hatred even while the external actions may have to remain the same, or may by choice remain the same.

At present these people suffer more for their ideal than we do for ours, - their self-sacrifice is more complete, and all the time there must be vital connection between their beliefs and actions. The demand made by nationalism or communism is very strong and complete in this part of China it gets the response of the best spirits. In ..... we have had little competition of this kind: it remains to be seen what happens when students in the south are faced with the alternatives of Marxism and Christianity - for it seems impossible truly to combine them. Can we show a kind of patriotism more strenuous than that of the communists, and at the same time keep our clear challenge to be citizens of a new world where national barriers, prejudices, and hatred are completely transcended?

War means that for the time being all efforts at the improvement of social structure must be postponed; there is no chance to make the change till the war is ended. But the work of life-changing - that is, preparing men and women fit for the new society, - must go on, and even faster than before. It can, because now people are forced to face the realities of life in a new way.

People all over the world will be subject to a one-sided propaganda and emotional stress. But it is essential that we determine to find the truth and live by reason, not emotion. In ..... you have a splendid opportunity for this, which I am sure you will not waste. So as we have learned to face the truth about ourselves we must face the truth about our nation, and recognizing sin, see how God can change us as a nation - England or China.

Your friend and comrade

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Confidential

Somewhere in Shansi  
September 2, 1939

We have been now nearly eight weeks in this Border District, and as we have everywhere been very kindly treated and well informed by our hosts, we have come to know quite a lot about the local political and military situation.

This area - organized as the Border District of Shansi, Chahar, and Hopei - presents a very remarkable experiment in democracy in extremely difficult conditions. For all hsien cities but one, and most of the big towns throughout the district, are garrisoned by the Japanese, who also control the railways and the main roads of communication. The government was elected at a delegates' conference in January, 1938, when delegates of every group in society, military, tradesmen, farmers, gentry, and even monks from Wu Tai Shan came together on the simple basis of Resistance to Japan. It is a true United Front Government. 80% of its officers are non-party men, 12% Kuo Min Tang, and the remaining 8% all other parties, presumably mostly Communist. In the government, parties are forgotten in doing the work which is urgently necessary.

We talked with General Sung Shao Wen, head of the government. I was very much impressed with him. He is a quiet man with a wise square face and very sincere and friendly expression. He lives on the same standard as his hostler, receiving a salary of \$16 per month from which he must pay \$6 for food. He is experienced in administration, having worked for Governor Yen Hsi Shan in Shansi, and his workers obviously have very great confidence in his wisdom and effective action. Not that the government is a one man show, around Sung are many competent and enthusiastic young men, working as magistrates. We were able to meet many of them, as the government was in session when we arrived.

A beginning of democracy has been made by electing village councils by popular vote. In some cases there has been a vote of 80%, and even women, who previously took no political responsibility, have registered as much as 60% vote. The village head is elected by this council, which also allots shares of the village tax. So far district heads have not been elected, though they have been chosen lately purely for executive capacity, but the next step to be taken immediately is the organization of their election.

The people of every village are now organized. The men serve as guards in turn, and provide transport of military provisions and government supplies (i. e. paper). They also send letters and entertain guests. The women, where soldiers are quartered, grind meal and wash and mend clothes. Everywhere there is an attempt to teach the people to read, and to become conscious of the war. Children are organized into groups. They learn songs and slogans, act as servants to the soldiers, help to educate their elders, and prepare to be soldiers later on.

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the Government bank, so that Border District money is thoroughly stable on a level with legal tender. Government power is steadily extending. Their agents operate almost up to the walls of towns occupied by the Japanese. Taxes throughout the whole region have been greatly simplified. Now there are only land tax, import tax, and export tax. The land tax is less than before and the other taxes are minor ones, for control rather than income. In addition the farmers contribute grain for feeding the army. This is their biggest burden, and they bear it because they are convinced that their government by the Japanese would be far worse. The peasants say that their burden is now heavier than in normal years, but less heavy than in previous years of war (i. e. civil war).

There are two factors which have made the anti-Japanese movement a real mass movement here. One is the excellence of the work and propaganda of the Border Government, the other is the behaviour of the Japanese army. We have during most of our travels been passing through villages visited by Japanese troops. It is easy to distinguish them. They are practically destroyed by burning. Wherever the Japanese soldiers go, they burn the village, (and sometimes the crops, too), trample the fields, kill the livestock, and perhaps villagers, too, and rape any women they can find. This last action makes the Chinese hate them worst of all and regard them as beasts. In consequence of this disastrous behaviour, the Japanese are everywhere called kuei tze or demons and feared and hated. So the work of the Border Government has been made easier.

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restricted to millet and one vegetable. Sometimes they have corn, and in good districts, flour. They have had clothes and equipment, poor lodgings, no comforts except occasional cigarettes. Yet they remain cheerful, loyal, and enthusiastic. Their officers live on almost the same scale as the men, only their equipment is rather better, for they have more captured Japanese material. The cooperation of army and government is good, but the government is not controlled by the army.

So you can see that in social, political, and military organization this region is making rapid advances, and even if the Japanese occupy more roads and towns they cannot solve the problem of pacification of the countryside. Methods of severe repressions such as they used with success in East Hopei this year cannot be effective here, where there is much more powerful organization against them, unless they have enough men to occupy the majority of the villages - a hopeless task!

While the good points of this administration have been noted above, there remain some points where improvement is urgently needed. They can be summed up by saying that there is no scientific spirit. More scientists are urgently needed, for the faults are not fundamental. They can be put right by the introduction of people of scientific education and spirit, who would put telephone, radio, industry, onto a sound basis. It is extremely important, however, that those who go have a thorough grasp of fundamentals and can utilize the very simple materials which are available here. For instance, it is no use knowing only the modern methods of leather tanning. They are too expensive to use here. Something appropriate to the district must be worked out. There are minerals such as mica and asbestos in the hills here, but no one knows how to get them and how to use them.

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September 2, 1939

This leads on to the general question which seems to me to be of very great importance, though people here deliberately ignore it. Now there is being built up a democratic system not based on law or obedience to the government, but on willing cooperation for a common purpose, a common motivating force. The purpose is to drive out the Japanese and the motive is hatred, or self-interest. For the people believe that self-preservation means that they must cooperate in resistance. What will happen when the war ends, the purpose is achieved, or partially achieved, and the hatred and self-preservation no longer force the members of the community into cooperative action? Good democratic habits may survive, but they are not enough to build the good society that is our ideal.

It seems to me of the very greatest importance that this single motive of hatred of Japan should be replaced by a higher motive of the service of mankind and the building of a new China and new world. In that new world China and Japan must cooperate; there is no alternative. In the future lies the immensely difficult task of healing the material and spiritual ravages of war and making this cooperation possible. So that even as I admire the singlemindedness and devotion of the people here, it seems to me essential that something further be added: the contribution which a vital Christianity can give, of self-sacrifice and love and forgiveness. I do not mean that fighting should stop. It is unfortunately a necessary evil. But I do mean that an unbreakable foundation of future peace should now be built, by replacing the motive of hatred even while the external actions may have to remain the same, or may by choice remain the same.

At present these people suffer more for their ideal than we do for ours, - their self-sacrifice is more complete, and all the time there must be vital connection between their beliefs and actions. The demand made by nationalism or communism is very strong and complete; in this part of China it gets the response of the best spirits. In ..... we have had little competition of this kind; it remains to be seen what happens when students in the south are faced with the alternatives of Marxism and Christianity - for it seems impossible truly to combine them. Can we show a kind of patriotism more strenuous than that of the communists, and at the same time keep our clear challenge to be citizens of a new world where national barriers, prejudices, and hatred are completely transcended?

War means that for the time being all efforts at the improvement of social structure must be postponed; there is no chance to make the change till the war is ended. But the work of life-changing - that is, preparing men and women fit for the new society - must go on, and even faster than before. It can, because now people are forced to face the realities of life in a new way.

People all over the world will be subject to a one-sided propaganda and emotional stress. But it is essential that we determine to find the truth and live by reason, not emotion. In ..... you have a splendid opportunity for this, which I am sure you will not waste. So as we have learned to face the truth about ourselves we must face the truth about our nation, and recognizing sin, see how God can change us as a nation - England or China.

*Your friend & comrade*

*R*

0940



學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

September 6, 1939

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"

Ack. 10/14/39  
Dr. B. A. Garside  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y.

My dear Garside:

This letter was written in the morning of the day during which the outbreak of war took place in Europe. As the American mail leaves to-morrow, I had thought of adding a sort of postscript, but the rush of other claims during these first few days of our new session has made this difficult. Nor is there very much to add that would not either be obvious to those who read it at the other end, or may become obsolete within a month. At present the enigma seems to be Russia. Anyone who knows what is in the mind of Stalin could predict with some attempt at accuracy what Russia will do to help her new ally in Europe, or to fight Japan, or to withdraw into herself, and let other nations weaken one another, or surprise the world even more than in the alliance with Germany, by making one with Japan.

Very sincerely yours,

*Chaipen Stewart*

jls c

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*Copied & attached  
to docket of Yen-ching  
Com. on Promotion of  
11/15/39. VW*

學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

September 15, 1939

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"

*File 11/15/39*

Dr. B. A. Garside  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y.

INDEXED

My dear Dr. Garside:

We have recently sent you the audited accounts for the past fiscal year. You will have discovered that we have substantial reserves either in American or Chinese currency in each of our financial units. It is best to consider these as separate items because in general, as you are well aware, they cannot be diverted to other features. The total amount is, therefore, irrelevant.

I am writing especially to comment upon the plans for securing additional funds for us under the A D C C C emergency campaign for the coming season. We want to be absolutely honest with prospective donors and in our relationships with other institutions - in short, with our entire constituency. I should like, therefore, to bring such points as follows to the consideration of the Trustees.

We are living in a time of world-wide instability, in the midst of which money itself ceases to be of any dependable value and is subject to fluctuations due to political or military rather than monetary factors. An instance of this is the violent and entirely unpredictable exchange rates for American currency in the present Chinese market. In a certain sense there can scarcely be said to be any market. What the exchange rate might be next year cannot, therefore, be even guessed. It is conceivable that our holdings in Chinese currency will cease to have any value. This uncertainty applies also to emergency needs of ours that unforeseen developments may precipitate at any time, calling for more or less of these reserves. In America also internal conditions in the country or the consequences of events in Europe may affect either investments or promotional results. We would seem justified, therefore, in continuing the policy of several years past in practicing all possible economies, guarding against any expansion, and hoarding benefits from present exchange, except in so far as we draw upon these to provide for those who need additional help. In this last, I refer both to the fairly large bonus we are giving faculty and employees because of the much increased cost of living, and the emergency aid to students who are suffering from the abnormal conditions.

A more hopeful aspect of the matter is the possibility of enlarged usefulness when hostilities cease. As far as we can judge by present indications, there will be need for additional construction and equipment in accommodating an increased enrollment, together with faculty and other budget requirements, that would be called for. Even with only slight expansion, there would be improvements of various kinds which have been held back until the outlook becomes more settled.

The College of Public Affairs has been maintained thus far from the wholly inadequate Princeton income supplemented by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation

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and with the British Indemnity Fund for Oxford Modern Greats, leaving this last as something that will probably be continued, but would be cancelled if the special source of support ceased. We have recently had a visit from Dr. Balfour, the new representative of the R F in China. He apparently had been advised to include us as one of the worthwhile elements in what they call their China program, and his attitude was thoroughly sympathetic. The details for the present year, both in the academic budget and in our field training were happily worked out together. He also gave us to understand that the R F would probably continue its China program for a limited number of years on a reducing scale, in harmony with their general policy. This period might be extended if war conditions or other factors seemed to justify this. But we ought to look forward to building up other stable sources of support. Mr. Gunn was to have come here this winter to confirm the general policy, but may be prevented by the war. In any case, it would seem that we now have a fairly reliable indication of what we can expect hereafter from the R F. With this knowledge, I venture to urge a far more intensive and carefully planned cultivation of our Princeton constituency, and an acceptance by our own Trustees of a share in the support of this College. Dr. Balfour hinted that the social science section of the R F might possibly consider an endowment conditional upon its being matched by others, although he advised us not to be too hopeful. He stated, however, that the China program was now being financed from capital sources, and it is not impossible that the R F would include us in other forms of liquidating, or at least reducing its own funds. We have estimated that with an endowment of half a million dollars and the present Princeton annual income slightly increased, we could carry on about as we are. Mr. Carble and the other P Y F Trustees would doubtless be quite ready to confer with our own Trustees on this whole matter. In general, it might be added that the training in which we have specialized can be of benefit to this country in the post-war rehabilitation on a scale greater than anything we have thought of in the past. There could be few forms of creative human service where less money can have a wider range of usefulness. //

The College of Natural Sciences continues to operate on a basis which should have had ~~the~~ million dollar endowment projected by the Trustees. We have been fortunate in the annual grants from the Ministry of Education and the China Foundation in supplementing this deficiency. The changed conditions will probably reduce or make impossible the former of these; and the latter must definitely be no longer counted on. This unit also calls, therefore, for additional endowment or increased annual income.

It has always been understood that Yenching would be one of the two centers for graduate study among the Christian colleges. We are ready to perform this function and feel encouraged in our progress thus far. But this again, will call for additional resources.

It would be possible to argue the case for needed construction, Library, and other equipment, and increased efficiency in annual operation, but the Trustees are already sufficiently familiar with all such needs. There is the further possible suggestion that beginning with this year we aim to secure in our annual solicitation the funds for a year following after the next one, and thus have a full year's interval between. In any case, these comments, reinforced by aspects of the matter with which the Trustees themselves are more familiar, will doubtless justify the



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continuance of efforts on our behalf already undertaken.

As I have urged before, we can meanwhile be building up a constituency of permanent donors on a basis which does not make it essential that immediate contributions be sought.

With this opening up of the subject there can be further correspondence between us.

Very sincerely yours,

*Leighton Stuart*

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學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

September 18, 1939

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"

Dr. B. A. Garside  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y.

*Acch 11/11/39*

INDEXED

My dear Dr. Garside:

I have your letter of August 15 regarding the Harvard-Yenching Institute Executive Committee action with its enclosure supplying the text of that action. I am disappointed that the Director has felt it necessary to follow this somewhat circuitous method of dealing with the special issues, whereas he might have written directly to our Executive Secretary, making his criticisms and indicating the decision that he had made.

I feel compelled also to take exception to the reason he has given to the charge he has made against us, that our "policy has been to try to have different people put on the budget regardless of whether or not their interests were in Chinese studies". The two examples he has cited to support this unfair charge will illustrate the weakness of his method of trying to control our affairs and to make assertions on insufficient evidence.

Mr. Yen Chün, one of our graduates who had majored in Philosophy and spent four years of graduate work with us in both Chinese and western Philosophy, is a grandnephew of one of the most distinguished contemporary Chinese philosophers and, therefore, comes naturally by this special interest in Chinese Philosophy. He became convinced, however, that any other further research in Chinese philosophical thinking could best be undertaken with the help of comparative study of Philosophy with the western critical technique. With this in mind, he went to Columbia and then to Yale University to study among other things, Greek Philosophy. It would have been absurd to expect any Chinese, especially one with his attainments, to go to any western university to specialize in Chinese studies. As a matter of fact, we have always had him in mind as one who gave promise of supplying the need we have for a teacher of Chinese Philosophy according to modern standards. It was with this in view that he was listed in our Harvard-Yenching budget. So with Mr. Wang Ching-ju. That he has been chiefly distinguished for his Hsi-hsia studies for which he received the Prix Stanislas Julien from the French Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, is scarcely conclusive evidence for assuming that he is not interested either in general linguistics or in the study of the Chinese language. The truth is that Mr. Wang has given special attention to the study of the interrelationships between Chinese and neighboring languages, both ancient and modern, such as Jüchen, Khitan, Mongolian, Hsi Hsia, Oigur, Tai, Burmese, Tibetan, etc. He has given us to understand that he wishes to continue this form of research from the standpoint of the science of linguistics in which he has had some training in both France and Germany. Our people here feel sufficiently convinced of his ability to be willing to try him out as a teacher

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of two courses, one in general linguistics and the other in phonology. The main point in his case, as in the other, is that we have been quite aware of the impropriety of exploiting this fund for the teaching of subjects other than Chinese and those related to it.

My complaint goes considerably deeper than any attempt to pass judgment at long distance on individuals whom we may recommend for the Harvard-Yenching budget. I had looked forward to the advantage this whole enterprise would have from securing a competent director, and have more than once urged on Mr. Elisseeff our desire that he spend as large a part of his time as he could with us here. In so far as he found it possible to do so, would he come to understand our aims and get acquainted with our personnel. We are more than ready to have the full benefit of his guidance and to submit to his authority. We have much enjoyed the two brief visits during which his contacts and impressions were necessarily superficial. We have also been happy to note his increasing interest in the details of our curriculum and of our plans for research work, but his dealing with these items of our proposed budget savour of absentee over-lordship of a subsidiary unit rather than sympathetic direction of two centres of Chinese studies, each with its own points of superiority as well as its limitations.

I have coveted Mr. Elisseeff's skilled leadership in improving the concept as well as the procedure of our Chinese studies and have tried in every way to recognize Mr. Elisseeff's authority and to defer to his judgment. As an instance of this, it might not be out of place to mention the change in our Executive Secretary. Lucius Porter has been associated with Yenching even before it came into existence in its present form, born in China, with rare appreciation of Chinese life and culture, on easy terms with Chinese scholars as he meets with them, invited to be Dean Lang professor of Chinese at Columbia, first for a two-year period and then on a more permanent basis, having had a year at Harvard, he seemed the natural person to fill this post during the initial period of the Institute's development. While I am quite conscious of the force of Mr. Elisseeff's strictures both as to Mr. Porter's scholarship and his official administrative shortcomings, yet there were many considerations of sentiment and of more practical values which made me quite reluctant to make a change which would have come more naturally one or two years later. It also took some insistence to induce Mr. Hung to give up his own scholarly plans and productive program to the extent of taking over the to him the somewhat irksome duties of this office. However, in an effort to be as cooperative as possible, all three of us cheerfully made the change. Because of the freely expressed opinion the Director has of our new Executive Secretary, I am the more pained at the rebuff contained in these criticisms about Messrs. Yen and Wang. Since the man of his own choice had been appointed Executive Secretary, it would have seemed reasonable to defer to his judgment in regard to the appointment of Chinese unknown to himself. It reveals a lack of confidence in our sincerity of purpose and of our capacity to pass judgement on matters of Chinese attainments which does not augur hopefully for the integration of the work at these two centres, as it had been originally conceived by the executives of the Hall Estate and accepted by those of us who had part in its inception. In fact, it raises the disturbing question in our minds as to whether it is not the Director's aim to relegate Yenching to quite a



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secondary place in the scheme. I am writing thus frankly in order that our own members on the Harvard-Yenching Board of Trustees may keep in mind these possibly needless anxieties of ours, and may help those at both ends to come into the thorough understanding which I am sure we all want in this common task.

Very sincerely yours,

jls c

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(copy)

September 19, 1939

Mr. Serge Elisseeff  
Harvard-Yenching Institute  
19 Boylston Hall  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

My dear Mr. Elisseeff:

I am sending you a copy of the enclosed in reply to a letter from Dr. Garside, for I deem it only fair that you should be kept fully informed of any correspondence of this nature with our own Trustees. It is scarcely necessary to add that we think so highly of you and are so anxious for the utmost measure of mutual confidence, good will, and effective cooperation, that we have taken up this matter thus promptly and vigorously. An institution which began as unknown, with as limited resources, and with the hindrances inherent in its racial and other complications, has undoubtedly during these years of early struggle been guilty of blundering at times, and has been under the constant temptation to strain its funds to meet pressing exigencies. We have never, however, been consciously guilty of exploiting the funds of the Harvard-Yenching Institute for any purpose other than that for which they were intended. In fact, neither you nor anyone who had not been through the experience can quite appreciate the immense satisfaction which has come to us from being able to develop Chinese studies even to the present extent of ours. Schools in China, established by foreigners have always been under the odium of inferiority in this respect, due either to supposed indifference or incompetence, or both. The distinction that has come to Yenching from even such limited progress as we have made and the appreciation of our desires to emphasize Chinese subjects has been extremely encouraging, while at the same time making us all the more desirous of not diverting these funds.

As I have said or written to you more than once, and have brought out in the enclosed letter, the ideal solution from our standpoint would be for you to spend much more time here as our Director, and assume active leadership in helping us plan and improve our work, so that the two centres at Harvard and Yenching can each supplement the other, and be in its own way the best that our combined efforts can make it. We venture to feel that not only would we be greatly benefitted by your presence here, but that you would understand some of the special problems affecting us, as could only thus be possible. In any case, I hope that the present correspondence will encourage you to deal frankly with us, free from embarrassment, and in the assurance that we want to cooperate with you and the Trustees to the best of our ability.

Very sincerely yours,

jls c

0951



September 19, 1939

Mr. Serge Eliazeff  
Harvard-Yenching Institute  
19 Boylston Hall  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

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Very sincerely yours,

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PERSONAL

September 26, 1939

Dear Dr. Stuart,

On July 9, when I acknowledged receipt of your handwritten letter of April 25 from Hongkong, I promised that I would later write you in fuller detail with regard to the change in the Presidency of our Yenching Board of Trustees. Since then I have made one or two attempts to write you such a letter, but for some reason never finished it. So I will attempt now to summarize briefly just what has happened, and what we are planning for the future. If you should find it possible to come to America this autumn we can talk these matters over in fuller detail. If not, you will have the essential facts in your mind.

About sixteen months ago, the former President of the Yenching Board of Trustees told us that he was working as a member of a group of financiers who were planning to make available a large loan along the lines described in your letter of April 25. At that time he raised with us the question of whether such a loan might have political implications which would make it desirable that he retire from the Presidency of the Yenching Board, and his other connection with our China Colleges. We replied that, while our Boards of Trustees and other organizations related to the China Colleges were trying to avoid any political activities, we did not think that at that early stage it would be necessary for him to present his resignation from these various connections. We expressed the hope that if the plan on which he was working was successful, the beneficial results would more than outweigh any of the problems that might be created.

For some months following this initial conversation, we had almost daily very optimistic reports as to the progress of negotiations. Assurances were given that within a few days at most the negotiations would be successfully completed. Then there began to come rumors of delays of one kind and another, and each described as temporary and trivial, but each postponing the final completion of negotiations a little bit longer. In the late summer and the autumn of 1938, we began to hear rumors of serious criticisms of the scheme. At about that time the change in diplomatic circles to which you refer took place, and we understand that

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the failure to complete this undertaking was one of the primary causes. Our good friend L. H. had been counting from the beginning on the success of the negotiations, and had a very deep sense of personal responsibility for enlisting the interest of other important individuals in the undertaking. So you may be sure that all of us were deeply troubled by the matter, and were anxious to do everything possible to preserve the standing of the individuals involved, and also to protect the good name of the Trustees and the other groups.

During the late fall and early winter, I had a number of conferences with Dr. Eric North, Mr. McBrier, Sidney Gamble, and some of the other Trustees. All of us talked more or less with the former President of the Board, and with others in a position to know the facts. So far as we could find out, the intentions of our former President were good, but he made some serious mistakes, either in judging the character of individuals with whom he was associated, or in the possibilities of carrying through the plan on which they were working. The more we investigated, the more pessimistic we became of any possibility that the undertaking would succeed. On the other hand, our former President continued to insist that the negotiations would soon be successfully completed, and that there were only minor delays which would soon be cleared up. All of us admire tenacity of purpose, and know quite well that seemingly impossible things can be accomplished if only an individual drives ahead on a task with sufficient determination. But such success can be attained only if one faces realistically the actual facts of the case; and in this instance we felt that our former President was not doing that.

The conclusion at which we arrived as a result of our conferences was that we should move quietly in the direction of making a change in the Presidency of the Board of Trustees, and also relieving our former President of some of the other prominent posts he held in other China Colleges connections. We felt it would do a great deal of harm in many directions, and would accomplish nothing of any value, to give the affair any public airing. So the whole matter was kept as confidential as possible, and only a few individuals were taken into our confidence -- including, of course, such men as Dean Donham. I believe that even now at least half of the members of the Yenching Board of Trustees do not know just why the change was made, though of course some of them have suspicions.

In advance of the annual meeting of the Yenching Trustees Dr. North, who was Chairman of the Committee on Nominations, had a



9/26/39

frank talk with our former President, and suggested to him that we invite Mr. Davis to take the Presidency of the Board. Our former President took the matter in a fine spirit, and himself took the initiative in urging Mr. Davis to accept this position. Dr. North then had a long talk with Mr. Davis, whom he found to be already acquainted with some aspects of our particular problem, as well as some other problems of which we had not previously heard. He agreed to accept the Presidency of the Board of Trustees, with the understanding that Dr. North would take the Chairmanship of the Executive Committee and would be responsible for such details as Mr. Davis himself could not give personal attention to. These nominations were presented as a part of the set-up of the new slate of officers, and were adopted by the Trustees with a fine spirit all around. In the annual meeting of the Associated Boards certain changes in the set-up were made very quietly with the net result that some others were placed in prominent positions which our former President had occupied.

That is the way the situation stands at the present time. Our former President continues to insist that the negotiations on which he has been working so long will ultimately work out successfully. We earnestly hope that he is correct, though we see less and less prospect of such an outcome. We believe that he is quite sincere in hoping for the outcome of these negotiations, not only as a service to China but also to enable him to give very substantial assistance to the work of Yenching University and to some of the other Colleges. We are of course <sup>concerned</sup> lest there be some public, or widespread private, criticism of these negotiations which will be injurious to any organization with which our former President may have any connections whatever.

We are facing therefore one further difficult problem. Next year brings the expiration of our former President's term as a representative of the Presbyterian Board on the Yenching Board of Trustees. Should we drop some <sup>intimations</sup> information to the Presbyterian Board that someone else be appointed as his successor? Of course we are hoping that this particular problem may be avoided by the creation of a United Board of Trustees, that necessitating a re-study of the representation of all the cooperating Boards of Foreign Missions. But, though the committees working on this problem of unifying our Boards of Trustees are making substantial progress, such a reorganization may not be completed quickly enough to forestall the necessity for any decision on this particular question. In this same connection, the question of continuing our former President as one of Yenching's three representatives on the Harvard-Yenching Institute has of course been very much in our thinking.

I need not add that all of us feel very badly about this

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whole matter from a personal standpoint. Our former President has certainly rendered some very valuable and unselfish service to Yenching and to the other Colleges, and has shown many kindnesses to all of us. But for a number of years we have recognized a growing unreliability here -- which you yourself pointed out to us some years ago. We must of necessity act in the way that seems best to safeguard the interests of the institution.

Meanwhile, we are all delighted to have Mr. Davis's increased interest and leadership in the affairs of Yenching and the other Colleges. He has mellowed greatly in recent years, and for some time has been showing increasing and kindlier interest in Yenching and all the other Colleges. We hope that during the years just ahead he will give us very valuable leadership and support. But we must always be on guard at two points: - First, he is still very busy with the affairs of his Company, and we must not call on him for too many detailed services; second, he does not have time to give detailed study to all the intricacies of the problems with which we must deal, and is apt to jump to hasty and sometimes ill-advised conclusions. He has complete confidence in Eric North, so our strategy is to deal as far as possible through Eric North in bringing up matters which require tactful handling. Of course he has the very highest admiration for you, and the most complete confidence in your ability and leadership. As you know, he is apt to follow only the second half of Theodore Roosevelt's dictum, "Tread softly and carry a big stick."

We hope that this gives you a fairly clear picture of the situation we have been facing, and of our steps to meet it. Sorry that I have necessarily had to present it with so many circumlocutions.

Very cordially yours,

President J. Leighton Stuart  
Yenching University  
Peking, China

0956



學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

September 28, 1939

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"

Memo to Mr. Arthur Rugh

The enclosed copy of a letter more or less explains itself. Miss Robertson was originally interested in China through one of our girls now in the Y W C A, and because of this contact, she considered, according to K. A. Wee, a gift of some \$50,000 to us. There were difficulties, however, in the complicated ABCCC arrangements. Those in charge of these seem to have decided that she should be cultivated for some other institution. No reply has come from my letter to her. She may, therefore, not be alive, or have had her interest diverted elsewhere, or the matter may be simply hanging in suspense. I suggest that you learn what you can at headquarters and make a trip to see her if possible. If things are still as K. A. described them, the rest ought to follow quite easily. You could arrange to have Yü-shan visit her. Use your own discretion as to the form in which any gift she might be induced to make, should take.

J L S

0957



October 2, 1939

President J. Leighton Stuart  
Mr. Stephen Tsai  
Princeton-Yenching Foundation  
Peking, China

Dear Friends;

Enclosed find two copies of the Annual Report of the Treasurer of Princeton-Yenching Foundation. This is for the closing of the year 1938-39 and, even though there was a shrinkage of income, the foundation closed the year in a better condition than during the past ten years.

There have been times when more money came in, when larger budgets were appropriated to Yenching University, but this past year there has been a cleaning up process which permits the foundation to use all of its income for the purpose which it is intended - namely, the carrying on of the propaganda here in America for the work of Yenching University.

Endowment Funds increased through the transferring of the Lockhart Funds to the trustees of the foundation.

In the Current Section the decrease in gifts from "alumni and friends" is due largely to the pressure exerted a year ago in an effort to raise funds to clear up the indebtedness at the bank. To that end, several donations which might have been considered as a part of this year's budget was included a year ago. Emergency Funds fell off naturally under the lack of pressure, and all income, aside from that received from the Associated Boards, was credited to "alumni and friends." It is a natural thing, following the universal experience, that income should fall off. All things considered the situation is as healthy as one can expect under prevailing conditions. We are hoping that additional interest will be aroused in the near future and that larger gifts for the College of Public Affairs will be forthcoming.

Very truly yours,

C. A. EVANS

CAE/B  
ENCS.

0958



學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

October 9, 1939  
Ack. 11/8/39

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"

Dr. B. A. Garside  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y.

My dear Garside:

I am writing to ask that the Trustees send a cablegram or/and a letter, if there is time, for a special celebration we are planning to commemorate the forty years since Dr. and Mrs. H. S. Galt arrived in Peking, December 8, 1899. I need not remind you of the devoted and efficient service he has rendered since the union resulting in the present Yenching, over a wide range of activities. He was Chairman of the Grounds and Buildings Committee through most of the period of our search for a suitable site, and of the new construction work, and was throughout the member of the committee upon whom perhaps we depended most. In general administrative affairs, especially financial, in his own subject of Education, in religious activities he has been looked to for the wise restraint which has kept a growing institution from doing so too rashly or one in the midst of constant political changes, from taking hasty action. While always progressive in spirit, yet he has been especially useful as a complement to my more adventurous tendencies. He was President of the North China Union College when the present union was effected, and it is easy to imagine how the same qualities were revealed during those earlier years. We plan to have a celebration with a mingling of dignified speech-making, with a dinner in one of the men's refectories, followed by lighter features, all to be planned so as to be in keeping with the abnormal conditions in the country.

While writing about him, it is fitting to comment on the History into which he has put so much effort. He has passed on to me your letter of July 13, and I am quite impressed with the reasons for making the year 1940 one of special anniversary interest. Mr. Rugh is carrying the manuscript for the History including a chapter on how it was written, and the concluding one which was intended to deal with the past two eventful years. I had hoped that when published, there could be a record of the consequences to us of the present hostilities and thus round out a period. It may be that other considerations make it desirable to stop essentially where he has, leaving the future for the beginning of the tale whenever it will be resumed, or our fate may be fairly well indicated by the trends of the next few months. In any case, we should like your judgment as to whether the printing be done in the States or out here. The latter course would be cheaper, and a number of unbound copies might be sent to you for final binding, etc.

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On the other hand, the typography and general format would unquestionably be more satisfactory if printed in America.

I am enclosing a brief report on other than the more general nature of those I have been sending. Please tell Mr. McBrier that I thought of him especially in writing the paragraph on the religious outlook.

Very sincerely yours,

*J. Leighton Stuart*

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October 9, 1939

To the Board of Trustees:

This is a brief report on some of the salient features of the new session. This began auspiciously with an unusually well-planned Freshman Week. There have been troublesome delays in the arrival alike of teachers and students, due chiefly to abnormal hindrances to travel and the unprecedented flood conditions. But the latest overdue teacher to arrive begins classes today, and one senior girl who was made an exception to our limit for late registration is about due. She was a delegate to the World Conference of Christian Youth in Amsterdam last summer and was lucky to get out of Europe before the war broke although her progress has been slowed up all along the way. Incidentally, of the 28 delegates from China to Amsterdam at least one-fourth appear to have been from Yenching and we are proud of their qualitative as well as numerical contribution.

Including this belated girl we have our record enrollment of 982, 691 men and 291 women. While approximately forty more than the figure for last year, yet actually it is larger than that as over 20 students were dropped almost immediately after the last session began because of tubercular or other hitherto undiscovered ill-health. This year with the help of fluoroscopic equipment and better organization we were able to make the physical tests more efficient before each individual registered, especially in the matter of tuberculosis which has always taken its pathetic annual toll. That this large increase has meant no little adjustment in an institution planned for a normal capacity of 800, you can easily imagine. All this was aggravated by the unavoidable delays. But compared with what other colleges have been suffering we feel extremely fortunate, and the cheerfully cooperative spirit with which all concerned have made the best of the situation has been admirable. The students have somehow all been accounted for as to living quarters or academic schedules, and homes have been found for the additional teachers. The new session can therefore be regarded as in full swing and plans are already being discussed for the next one assuming that environmental factors remain substantially unchanged.

Commodity prices, due to war conditions, are steadily mounting, and we have felt obligated to pay an additional subsidy which varies from month to month as well as according to relative need. This averages at present about 40%. It applies also to supplies and other operating expenses. Fortunately the gain on exchange from our American income is standing us in good stead in meeting this exigency.

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A special emphasis is being placed this year upon physical and health education, intramural sports and athletics, as called for in training for national service and for steadying morale in this period of severe tensions. We have the advantage of excellent leaders in both men's and women's divisions, largely from among our own choicest graduates. Their own team-work and enthusiasm are all that could be desired.

The progress in religious life is definitely encouraging. The students who have united with our Christian Fellowship number 460, or about 47% of the total, about one half of these being new members. Including those Christians who for one or another reason do not join this organization we can safely claim that more than one-half of the student-body are Christian. This is a decided improvement over several years past during which the percentage steadily if slowly dropped. It is especially heartening that the increase of new members has come in large part from this year's sophomores, the inference being that the first year of their life here led them to this decision. The form in which the students have in recent years preferred to nurture their religious interest has been chiefly through small groups, entirely under their own direction, although not a few have faculty advisors. There are 30 of these now meeting weekly, 11 of which are new, with a total membership of 370. Most of the new members have been absorbed into them. Student initiative in these and other Fellowship activities has been growing and is more pronounced this year than ever before.

Financial aid to students has been accepted as a war-time contribution of the University to the general cause. Many of them have been long out of touch with their families, or belong to homes ruined or seriously affected, or have suffered even more tragic consequences. All such emergency aid has been organized with painstaking effort to guard against abuses or unwise generosity, and we are constantly surprised at the relatively few instances of attempts at taking unfair advantage. Much of the money has been given on a self-help basis and there have been many more applications than the work that could be found for them. Last year for the first time perhaps in China's long history students served as waiters in our dining-rooms and lost nothing in the good esteem of their fellows. This year there are even more of these.

There is substantial improvement in coordination of administrative affairs and this somewhat prosaic aspect of progress has resulted in a more smoothly running machine without - as we hope - too great loss of warmly human contacts.


Except for the arrest of one graduate assistant during the summer (released after two months detention without ill-treatment) there have been in recent months no issues with the military authorities (or their minions) directed against the institution as such. Whether this is due to past experience, or to avoidance of irritation to America, or to some other obscure cause, it has been of no slight relief. How long this will continue to be true of us depends upon the course of events far vaster than this homely narrative of our internal affairs. Meanwhile we are enjoying the campus in its autumnal beauty and in its



tranquilly joyous human relationships, while endeavoring to prepare ourselves for whatever unknown fate may be awaiting us, in the confidence that God is working out His purpose even in the turmoil of our time and that we shall help to fulfil that purpose, regardless of physical disasters, if we are faithful to our present trust.

Very sincerely yours,

*J. Highton Stuart*



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October 14, 1939

President J. Leighton Stuart  
Yenching University  
Peking  
China

Dear Dr. Stuart,

Thank you for your report to the Trustees dated September 1, and for the covering note of September 6.

Both communications give us some interesting glimpses into your reactions upon the receipt of news of the beginning conflict in Europe. Events have been so kaleidoscopic during the last month that all of us have had to change our thinking and viewpoints many times. Apparently other changes are likely to take place during the weeks that this communication is going to China. It seems futile, therefore, to make any comments on the situation further than to express the hope that whatever changes may take place, the work in Yenching will continue to go ahead without serious difficulty. We are all happy that the University has gotten off to such an excellent start this fall, with the greatest enrollment in its history.

The Trustees and other Yenching friends appreciate more than we can say the reports you send from time to time telling of the work at the University. Such reports are eagerly awaited, and are read with great care and sympathetic interest. The list receiving them is being steadily extended, though we are trying always to use care and discrimination. You may be sure that these reports are doing much to advance the interests that are so close to all our hearts these days.

Activities on behalf of Yenching and the other Colleges are opening up this autumn in an encouraging way, despite the new problems created by the world situation. We are heartened to find that there seems to be no slackening of sympathy for or interest in the happenings in the Far East - and we hope that our friends will be willing to continue the support they have provided so generously in the past.

With every good wish, I am

Very sincerely yours,

BAG:ms

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Confidential

October 14, 1939  
*Sturges 11/27/39*

To the Board of Trustees:

Recent developments in the Japanese invasion of China would seem to indicate that their leaders must soon make a choice between two sharply defined alternatives: either they must conquer and control all of this vast country by sheer military force, or they must make their peace with Chiang Kai-shek more or less on his terms. The puerile attempts to faist puppet governments of their own designing upon the occupied areas have failed to win any popular response and are maintained only by armed enforcement. This has proven true even of the Wang Ching-wei movement as I predicted to you when it first appeared. Their less publicized efforts to win over influential Chinese by financial or other inducements or to achieve a compromise with the National Government through political maneuvering have proven no less futile. Not a few highly-placed Japanese, both civilian and military, are apparently becoming aware of the hopelessness of "crushing the Chiang Kai-shek regime" as they so glibly proclaimed they would, or of winning any decisive military victory, or of shattering the popular morale through their inhuman aerial bombing of almost every important city in the unoccupied provinces, or even of subduing the population of the so-called occupied areas in which they preserve a tenuous grip upon large cities and lines of communication. The Chinese give no evidence of being able to drive them out by military action alone, though they have succeeded in preventing them from making any substantial gains within the present year, and the recent Japanese repulse in North Hunan and adjacent regions may be the beginning of more effective Chinese counter-offensives. Our own military experts estimate that the Japanese casualties have been averaging about 25,000 monthly. They have not only failed politically to cause any significant defection from the National Government but also in any economic exploitation of the conquered regions at all commensurate with their expenditures or their expectations. The morale of their troops seems to be weakening whereas the opposite is generally true of the Chinese soldiers. Added to all these disappointments are the international factors none of which seems to be in their favor. In a previous communication I commented on the dismay with which they suddenly learned of the German-Russian pact. Most of all, however, do they fear the possibility of hostile action by the United States. In view of all these unfavorable trends it is not surprising that there is among them a virtually unanimous desire to conclude the "China Incident" or "China Affair" as they now describe it. This is taking the form in certain influential quarters of recognising the necessity of approaching the Chungking Government with peace proposals, and some at least among the leading militarists have come to this point-of-view. On the other hand, the loss of prestige for the army and navy is enormous, national pride, a docile and disciplined populace kept in ignorance by the strictest censorship, economic consequences and other factors will make them very, very reluctant to agree to the only conditions the Chinese Government would accept. This is the administrative and territorial integrity of all China south of the Great Wall which involves the withdrawal of all Japanese troops and the consequent collapse not only of the pretense in puppet organizations (about which they really care very little) but also of all their illicit commercial and other financial projects (about which they care a great deal). As I have

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have often pointed out before, the real issue will be over North China. Anxiously therefore as they are exploring paths to peace they are probably not willing to pay the price and it may take a long time yet, protracted suffering for both countries, and a deepening sense of frustration. Some competent foreign observers regard these factors, taken in conjunction with the physical assets which Japan still possesses, as strong enough to remove any likelihood of peace for years to come. If the extreme militarist element is able really to enforce a totalitarian nationalization of all human and material resources this is entirely possible. But as against this there is a swelling tide of war-weariness, misgivings as to the outcome, awakening as to the true conditions in China and a basis for mutually satisfactory relations. The question as to when Japan will be ready to negotiate a just peace turns perhaps therefore on when or whether the human forces of discontent with militarized mobilization of their national life can become sufficiently articulate and active to thwart the totalitarian trend.

As to China the Government is fully aware that there is nothing to be gained by a premature peace. Any compromise would be merely to legalize the spoils of aggression and to plant seeds of future strife. Not only so, but time is on their side. While morale is being severely strained in both countries yet that of Japan will probably crack first. China has the advantage in the moral support of other countries, in man-power, and in profiting by experience in the tactics of resistance. Even in regard to money and munitions the responsible heads seem confident that on neither count would they be forced to capitulate. General Chiang is thinking in terms of fighting on for three years more, and seems prepared to do so. There are not many of my acquaintance who think that Japan could continue longer unless indeed there are changes in the international scene favorable to her.

If this is at all an accurate portrayal of the stage now reached in this conflict it would seem that some constructive solution might be found instead of allowing it to drag on until one or both are exhausted. Chinese friends of mine who are in close touch with influential Japanese are my chief authority for the assertion not only that all of them are desperately eager to end the war but that unless this can be achieved they themselves fear some sort of political or economic disaster within Japan or from Russian or American action against them. They are already informed as to the only terms which China could accept and are increasingly conscious of their own difficulties. In connection with the Wang Chingwei movement they have already recognised in principle the Kuomintang as the legal governing party, its flag and other insignia, and the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen. If the Chungking authorities could be magnanimous enough - as I believe they would - to give assurance that with the withdrawal of their troops they would at once undertake to suppress all anti-Japanese sentiments or activities and to plan for "economic cooperation" on terms of real equality or mutual benefit, it would have a soothing reassurance and give "face" beyond anything non-Japanese can quite appreciate. Face is an oriental characteristic but the governmental control of anti-Japanese behavior or its removal by their own bayonets and bombings derives from a Japanese psychology as mystifying to Chinese as to any Anglo-Saxon. In this case it would also give a pretext to the military for ending the war, the removal of anti-Japanese feeling having been its ostensible cause.



I am thoroughly convinced now that American pressure - unless exerted too offensively - will strengthen the more moderate or liberal element in Japan (which includes the present and preceeding premier and not a few high military officers) against the fanatical "younger officer" groups. There has been the fear, not wholly unfounded, that our interference would play into the hands of these jingoists and be used by them to inflame the entire populace. I believe that time to have passed. But, as with the Chinese Government, America can seem to make generous concessions by pointing out that once the terms of Nine Power Pact, or of our own historic advocacy of China's independence, have been restored, the chief and almost the only source of irritation between ourselves and Japan will have been removed and the trade pact of 1911 can be cordially renewed with the economic benefits they sorely need. I have ventured to assure certain Japanese not only that I personally would like nothing better than to see Japan and China friendly and cooperating voluntarily in all mutually beneficial relations, but that I felt myself to be expressing the typical American attitude. These three countries with friendship and the easy flow of commerce thus established would constitute a natural bloc (requiring no formal pact) against excessive Russian influence in Eastern Asia and the surest guarantee of stability in the Pacific. A rational settlement along these lines would rescue the nations of the Pacific area from the exhausting effects of the recurrent wars of Europe.

Admiral Barnell remarked to me the last time I talked with him before his retirement last summer that he saw no hope of an end to this conflict until the Japanese people turned against their own military. That is probably true but if this could be speeded up and brought about by orderly processes (in which some at least among the military leaders would themselves concur) it would be a great gain. It is not easy for me to write thus for after all that the Japanese armies have perpetrated on the unoffending people of China our natural feelings are to wish them any humiliation or catastrophe. But a solution along some such procedure would certainly carry more of a guarantee and of goodwill and would be in harmony with the finest international or Christian idealism. Our local Embassy people feel that the State Department and the American people generally are so engrossed with affairs in Europe that they have forgotten about this part of our troubled world. I cannot share this pessimism. Could there not be a concerted effort among those Americans who are especially concerned with Sino-Japanese relations to make a proposal to the State Department that without needless delay some firm but friendly intimation be given to Japan of American interest in an ending of the present armed aggression? In support of my contention that this would help those in Japan who are advocating the saner course I have it from reliable sources that many among these are actually pleased by the recent Chinese gains in North Hunan as strengthening the case for a change of policy. The Japanese problem of how to make their exit with something to show for their efforts and without too much loss of dignity and material values will sooner or later be one of finding a formula. America could unquestionably aid in this by acting well before January 26, 1940, through some procedure that can be safely left to the President and Secretary Hull if they can be assured of popular support.

Very sincerely yours,

*Sheigton Stuart*

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學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

October 17, 1939

7k. 11/27/39

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"

IND

Dr. B. A. Garside  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y.

My dear Garside:

*By wire  
Dear Potter  
11/28/39*

Hartford Seminary Fellowship. This is to ask that you now make a definite application for the fellowship promised to Mr. C. S. Hsieh, but for which we asked a postponement of one year. It seems now that we can spare him and find the necessary funds to enable him to have one year of study in U S A. The intention is that he then return to our School of Religion for at least part time in teaching religious education. It may be that we shall continue to need his service in charge of our Chinese secretarial bureau, but in any case, we would see that he had sufficient time for whatever might be needed in the other position. It is scarcely necessary to cable your reply, but will you write whether or not we can count on this, as soon as you have a reply.

*By wire  
Tewkesbury  
11/28/39*

Donald G. Tewkesbury. I am enclosing a copy of a letter to him which does not cover all of the reasons. He had been my earlier preference as the one who would carry on from the American standpoint after my connection here had ceased. One of our most devoted Chinese administrative officers has been urging that this idea be taken up again. In any case, the A B C C C might find it worthwhile to have a student of educational administration, such as Donald has become, spend time out here in a careful study of the technical issues in the correlation of our Christian colleges. Thinking only in terms of my successor, there would be no need for him to spend any large amount of time here to have the question raised, so that there would be ample opportunity for him to visit the other institutions.

It may seem that this reverses my advocacy of Harry Price. Not at all. There is no assurance that either one of these would be available. Harry may prove himself so useful in the general type of work he is now doing to lead to other offers which he would feel had a stronger claim. We are still hoping that he can come out under the Presbyterian vacancy, and Yenching would be fortunate to have both of them on its staff.

Mission Board Vacancies. This leads to a general comment which might be brought to the attention of the Trustees. Most of the foreign members of this faculty happen to be more or less my contemporaries, and will be ending their connection here within not many years of one another. It would be a real loss if this element is allowed to lapse, or even to be hastily filled without due thought of maintaining continuity. Still more important it would be to find the type best suited for the conditions as they will be changing in the years that lie ahead. I mention this more to have us all keep in mind than to propose any immediate action.

Very sincerely yours,

*Heigher Stuart*

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
Mr. Donald G. Tewkesbury  
Teachers College  
Columbia University  
New York, N.Y.

My dear Donald:

My attention has been called to the fact that you are supposed to have a sabbatical year beginning next autumn. If this is correct, I am writing to raise the question of your spending it in China with Yenching as your headquarters. If Helen and the boy could come too, so much the better. Whether you come alone or with the family, I expect you all to stay in my home. The Associated Boards of Christian Colleges are continuing their inquiry as to how these institutions in China can be reorganized more effectively. This whole issue has been radically affected by recent happenings, both in regard to individual schools, and in altering perhaps permanently the human geography of the country. It is quite possible that one with your special interest in educational administration could give technical advice which would be invaluable. Your acceptance of some such responsibility on their behalf might help to solve the financial problems involved. I am, therefore, sending a copy of this letter to Dr. Carside, and suggest that if you are at all interested, you consult with him. Our own Trustees might also feel that a study of our internal administrative set-up in the light of your American experience and your share in earlier planning here, would be worth their consideration. Underlying any such more general advantages, is the narrowly selfish pleasure I would have in your return to Yenching and to China. The least that this letter ought to produce is a reply from you of personal news about all three of you, and for all three, I am

As ever, affectionately yours,

(signed) J. Leighton Stuart



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學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

October 17, 1939

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"

*Ack 11/28/39*

Dr. B. A. Garside  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y.

My dear Garside:

*miss  
date  
11/28/39*

I am enclosing herewith a report of Brank Fulton which will be of interest not only in giving the impressions of a new arrival in our midst, but also as helping the McBrier Fund Committee to observe his reactions as he starts in his new task here.

I am also sending another interpretation of mine on the Sino-Japanese war. More than once previously I have indicated my earnest hope that some of those who see these communications would find it possible to help our government toward a more positive policy. The time has now come, as it seems to me, when any such efforts should take very concrete form and be as little delayed as possible. I hesitate to make specific references, but have good reason to believe that some among the most responsible Japanese would really welcome a declaration by our government as to what it intends to do, either through act of Congress or by executive action after the expiration of the 1911 treaty next January. If church or missionary representatives could urge a form for such action which was at once a stern threat that war supplies would thereafter not be exported to Japan, and at the same time gave assurance that if this war could be ended on terms acceptable to the U.S., a commercial treaty could be renewed and a continuance of friendly relations between the two countries be encouraged, it ought to have a very decisive effect. Even the Japanese militarists would be sobered into a realization of the danger ahead, and would be given a face-saving explanation to their own people. There might conceivably be a spasm of violent indignation, and this might take the form of attacks by less responsible elements in the army on Yenching or any other American interests in China. Even so, it would hasten the final settlement, and would be a relatively small price to pay for the far greater gains. With this insistence based on the issue as it has more and more taken shape in my mind, I leave to you and the many others with whom you are in touch, the procedure, since you understand conditions at your end far better.

Very sincerely yours,

*J. Hightower*

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學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

October 18, 1939

Exk. 11/27/39

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"

Dr. B. A. Garside  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y.

My dear Garside:

I have this morning received your letter commenting on the proposal of my trip to U S A. I much appreciate the attitude taken by the Trustees and yourself and, as you will have surmised, I long since decided that unless there were very strong considerations to the contrary, developments since my letter to you have made it quite clear that I should continue here.

It is much to be regretted that the Rughs have been so long delayed in leaving here. What began because of the Tientsin flood has been continued largely perhaps by her apparently needless activities or desires. One unfortunate consequence is that he left here more nervous and tired than I have ever known him, due chiefly perhaps to her condition. It would seem essential to any successful use of him by the A B C C C that he be away from her as much as possible. I write thus after close observation, especially during the past few months since her return to China. There seems no likelihood of any change other than arranging to have him out over the country alone.

In my report about religious life here, I was in error on one point, which has been corrected by the report brought by Lily T'ang, the senior who attended the Amsterdam Conference. The Chinese delegation had 27 members, 20 of whom went from China. Of these, 8 were Yenching people, including the chairman.

Very sincerely yours,

*Sheng-tsun*

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October 19, 1939

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart  
Mr. Stephen Tsai  
Yenching University  
Peking, China

Dear Friends:

The Annual Report of the Treasurer of Yenching University is enclosed herewith. Please bear in mind that it has not been acted upon by the Board, but first will have consideration of the Auditing Committee along with the Report of the Auditors.

Two really outstanding things occurred during the year, of which you are aware, but nevertheless I like to dwell upon. One is the accomplishment of the Associated Boards' program, particularly in behalf of Yenching University. Yenching impetus and enthusiasm helped remarkably in the whole program, and it is only fitting that the major share of income should go to her. For 1939-40, we are embarked upon a program which now appears to be even more difficult, but we are facing the future hopefully trusting that out of the sympathetic interest of our constituency will arise a sufficient number to make our program worth while.

The other thing to which I allude is the clearing off of the note due on the Old City Site. Only one paragraph alludes to the part the treasurer played in this procedure, but frankly it was because of his persistency and constant work with the Methodist Board, as well as a contribution of \$10,000 which made possible this procedure. It is only another evidence of Mr. McBrier's deep abiding interest in the affairs of the University.

May I call attention to what appears to be an error at the bottom of page five in the Harvard-Yenching Agency Account. The balance on the 30th of June was \$13,517.91, but subsequently two drafts applicable to last year were received, reducing the balance to \$10,943.55. This is the amount which will be returned to the Institute.

The Report of the Treasurer for the of the College for Women is also enclosed. Here again emergency funds helped out greatly, and by their use the budget was balanced.

It is possible in reading these reports questions will arise and, if so, do not hesitate to write us. We shall be very happy indeed to answer any questions.

Very truly yours,

CAE/B  
ENCs.

C. A. EVANS

*via "President Adams" 10/23/39*

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September 20, 1939

President J. Loighton Stuart  
Yenching University  
Peking, China

Dear Dr. Stuart,

Let me acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 17. This contains a very interesting suggestion that it might be possible for you to make a quick trip to the United States this autumn.

I have shared your letter with the leaders of the Yenching Board of Trustees, particularly Mr. Davis, Dr. North, Mr. McBrier, Dr. Fairfield, and a few other members who were readily available. This morning, Mr. Davis called Eric North and me to meet him in his office primarily to talk over the suggestions in your letter.

The judgment expressed by Mr. Davis and Dr. North -- as the President of the Board and the Chairman of the Executive Committee -- is summarized below. All the other members of the Board to whom I have talked concur in this judgment: --

The Trustees are of course always eager to have you come to America at any time it is possible for you to do so. If you could come this autumn, there are many valuable services you could render in connection both with our publicity program, and also with the administrative matters with which we are dealing. On the other hand, the Trustees have a very lively appreciation of the importance of the work you are doing in Peking, particularly just at this time when the whole world situation is so disturbed, and when any day may bring developments which would make your presence on the Yenching campus urgently desirable.

As to our promotional activities here in America during the coming months, the general world situation will probably make it inadvisable for us to conduct any very wide or public campaign. We will have to work along quietly among the friends who are already interested in China, in Christian education there, and particularly in Yenching. A great many personal interviews will have to be held, and even more letters written. We will have gatherings

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of small groups, and perhaps occasionally a larger public gathering. But nearly all of our work will have to be a quiet, intensive, person to person canvass. Your presence would be invaluable in all of our personal contacts, particularly the most important ones, but we feel that it would involve more time than you could give to do enough of this work to be most effective. Undoubtedly you could be far more valuable a little later, after the first crisis has passed, and we can once more make a widespread public campaign for support of Yenching and the other Colleges.

From the administrative standpoint, one of the things we are working on most actively this fall is the effort to bring together all of our Boards of Trustees in a single Board of Trustees, and at the same time to exert such influence as is possible from North America to have the Colleges in China simplify and unify their program. Here again, most of our work must be a quiet person to person contact, getting Boards of Trustees and the Mission Boards behind them into an attitude of cooperation and agreement. A tremendous amount of time has to be spent working out detailed plans, and adjusting minor points of difference. If you were here in America, you could be of great help to us in some of our planning, and in some of our contacts, such as those with the Harvard-Yenching Institute and with Mr. Davis himself. But of course it would not be possible for you to remain here long enough to carry through all the tedious negotiations which are inevitable if we are to succeed in this undertaking.

As to administrative questions affecting the future program of Yenching University, you are best qualified to judge the necessity and the value of conferences between yourself and the Trustees. You are acquainted with their general thinking on these matters, and know that they have complete confidence in you as the leader of the University. I am sure that you can count on their backing in whatever program you and your colleagues find to be the wisest. But if it would be helpful to you and to them for you to consult with them at this time, they would be happy to sit down and talk matters over with you, individually and as a Board, to whatever extent you desire.

The other special purpose you mention which might be served by a trip to the United States at this time is one with which the Trustees have the warmest sympathy and interest. But they must of course leave to your own judgment the decision as to whether such a purpose could be served by your coming to America at this time. Many changes in the world situation have taken place since you wrote on August 17, and it is quite possible that these changes may have affected your thinking with regard to this special purpose. Over against all these considerations which make

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the Trustees eager to have you come to America at this time, they place the importance of your presence on the Yenching campus. We know how much your presence has meant to Yenching during the last two years, and believe that at many times during this period if you had been absent from the campus the institution might have suffered grave losses. So far as we can see, the need for your presence there during the months just ahead seems to be as great as during the past two years. But here, more than anywhere else, we must leave the final decision to you and your colleagues.

Following these conferences with the leaders of our Yenching Board, we are at this time sending you a cablegram in which we try to summarize briefly the above thoughts. We have cabled at greater length than the single word "Come" or "Stay" because the matter has been so evenly balanced in our minds that neither word would give the meaning the Trustees wished to convey.

If you do come, we will do everything possible in advance of your coming to arrange for meetings and personal contacts which will allow you to make the maximum use of every day that you are here in America. At the same time, we will try to avoid overburdening you with petty details which would take up your time and utilize your nervous energies without any very important results.

We are all keenly disappointed that Mr. Arthur Hugh has again had to postpone the date of his arrival in the United States. Even if he is able to adhere to his latest plan of sailing from China the first week in October, by the time he reaches Seattle and spends a little while with his family and friends there it will be too late for him to do very much before the end of the calendar year 1939. This necessitates a rather serious shift in our plans for what usually are the most active and productive months of the promotional year. But we are still counting on him to accomplish a very important work before the end of our current academic year.

World events have moved so rapidly during the last weeks that every one is in more or less of a daze. Undoubtedly there will be many other very important shifts before this letter can reach you, so I will not attempt to make any illuminating comments.

With all good wishes, I am

Very cordially yours,

BAG:MS

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
學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

October 28, 1939

Ack. 12/18/39

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"



Dr. B. A. Garside  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y.

My dear Dr. Garside:

We have had here for several years Rudolph Lowenthal, Ph.D., a German Jew who was among the first refugees to China. He is a scholar who has specialized since coming here in journalistic research and similar lines of investigation, and has taught in our Departments of Journalism, Political Science, and Western Languages. He has won the esteem and affection of our community to a remarkable degree by his unobtrusive friendliness and other fine qualities. He has come to me with a suggestion which I asked him to put in writing and am passing on to you herewith. He has an uncle, whose name is Mr. Max Loewenthal, 500 Fifth Avenue, New York City, and who seems to be a man of some wealth. He feels that members of our promotional staff might get in touch with the uncle and perhaps ask him to lead in an effort to secure funds for scholarships by which promising Jewish youth could study here with advantages which would otherwise be impossible for them. The idea has my hearty approval and it is not unthinkable that some of these Jews might be interested in this University even apart from this special form of contribution. I remember several years ago making the acquaintance of a delightful young Jew in the firm of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, whose name escapes me for the moment, but he agreed to come on our Advisory Council. Will you take this matter up with others concerned and explore its possibilities. I am sending under separate cover two reprints of an article by Lowenthal entitled Jews of China.

Very sincerely yours,

jls c

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學大京燕  
YENCHING UNIVERSITY  
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

October 30, 1939

Ack. 2/26/40

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS  
"YENTA"

Dr. B. A. Garside  
150 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y.

INDEXED

My dear Dr. Garside:

It happens that William Hung and I have been discussing with Dr. Shields who is now in the city, a matter concerning the Harvard-Yenching Institute. It is no new subject, but has become a crucial factor in any proposed reorganization involving the six institutions included in the "Restricted Fund." The fact that the Hall Estate Executors made grants to each of these, which were modified so as to entrust a portion to the H-Y-I Trustees, happens to place upon them a responsibility which was not originally intended. This circumstance also may perhaps be utilized to facilitate progress. It is somewhat ironical that this Board of Trustees has continued its renewal of a grant to the joint campaign upon evidence of actual progress toward further correlation, whereas the funds it controls are inevitably working against this objective. As long as each institution can count on this special income, and must more or less maintain its own present standards in order to do so, it could scarcely consent to any substantial alteration in its status. Most of the H-Y-I Trustees are, however, not sufficiently familiar with the China colleges to recommend any concrete changes. I have no doubt but that you and others are entirely aware of these considerations, and that they are being discussed, but not much progress can be made until this particular aspect of the problem is thoroughly recognized.

I must guard against presuming to urge any particular solution, but it may not be out of place to comment a little more in detail along the lines of previous suggestions. Assuming that territorial integrity is restored, it would seem that four strong university centres should be maintained. Very much increased emphasis should be put upon the one in the west, and there seems to be no reason why this should not be on the Chengtu campus. In order to represent adequately the Christian cause in a section which is making rapid advancement in many other ways, W C U U ought to be very much improved in administrative and teaching personnel, and in its academic standards and equipment. With the easy communications that will undoubtedly result from all that is now happening, it would seem wiser to concentrate in this one institution for that whole region. There should be a concentration in the Lower Yangtze Valley in a single centre, either in Shanghai or Nanking along some such grouping as was described to you in my letter of May 22. It takes temerity to look ahead, but in view of the possibility that whatever the outcome of the present hostilities, the special advantages Shanghai has hitherto possessed, may be lost, those that Nanking would possess, should not be overlooked. Lingnan and Yenching might continue more or less as they are at present with such additions or eliminations as the larger scheme would call for. It may make the discussion less controversial if the emphasis is put upon building up certain centres rather than upon enforced restrictions or amalgamations elsewhere. If also, thought could be focused upon the geographical

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and vocational aspects rather than those that are institutional or denominational, it might prove more constructive and, in general, forward-looking.

The present entity that is the University of Nanking might be retained as the nucleus for East China, or might be established wherever the national Christian centre of agricultural education could best be conducted, but the features that are less essential for its reorganized existence could be usefully absorbed elsewhere.

The Cheeloo problem would seem to me to be the one about which we have clear indications of what could best be done if various prejudices could be ignored. A thoroughly good middle school, with a junior college primarily with pre-medical emphasis and a medical school that prepared chiefly for mission hospitals and for public health, would put to good use the Tsinan plant. There might be an effort to bring together the St. John's and Cheeloo medical schools and if so, there may be professional or other arguments for its location in Shanghai. It would seem that China must make use of modern medicine through some socialized procedure, most probably in the form of public health units under hsien administration, together with Christian and other semi-public provision. Christian medical schools, one in East and one in West China, training graduates primarily for this type of career, would have a unique opportunity, and would supplement rather than compete with the P U M C. The H-Y-I Trustees might approve of the Restricted Fund for Cheeloo being used for junior college and medical school Chinese studies, with special emphasis on research in ancient Chinese medicine and the improvement of modern medical scholarship in Chinese. Whatever human and financial resources were not needed for the Tsinan location could be well used to strengthen that at Chengtu. Such a solution would seem to make the president no longer necessary at Tsinan. His successor ought presumably to be someone with medical qualifications, and there ought to be an integration at Chengtu of whatever remains permanently there under a single executive. From what I can learn, both Chinese and western members of that faculty, when they dare to talk in confidence, would not regard this as a loss. My own impression is that President Liu is a man of many excellent qualities and could have done as well as anyone perhaps, what was wanted in the original Cheeloo set-up, but that it would be unfair to him to expect any reorganization under his leadership. He is unfortunately forced into a position at present where he is inevitably a hindrance to the sort of planning this letter advocates. Nor is this stricture intended as in any sense a reflection upon him personally.

We at Yenching would hope that the H-Y-I Trustees will support us in a vigorous development of our plans for advanced Chinese study, making this place the centre in China for modernized scientific sinology in close association with the work done at Harvard. Professor Hung will doubtless be making proposals in further detail to Mr. Elisseeff. We desire continued emphasis in both undergraduate and graduate training for public administration in our College of Public Affairs along the lines of our present rural or social reconstruction courses. For the rest, undergraduate courses about as they are now, and selected vocational features, including graduate studies, in consultation with the East China centre, is the program that others would perhaps generally approve for us.

Whether you use this letter or not, I hope that you will call the attention of the H-Y-I Trustees to the active part they must take in any reorganization that can hope for success.

Very sincerely yours,

*Heigher Stark*

jls c





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