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
Yenching
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Stuart, J.L. 1938 Aug-Oct

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Mr. Yin Hsia, M. S.

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學大京燕
YENCHING UNIVERSITY
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

August 1, 1938

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
"YENTA"

Dr. B. A. Garside
150 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Dr. Garside:

This will introduce Mr. Y. Hsia, one of our Yenching graduates who having loyally stayed on with us as teacher in Psychology and as a leading helper in all matters of student welfare for a number of years is now continuing his studies in Columbia University. This is on the basis of an exchange fellowship between our two institutions. Any assistance you can give Mr. Hsia, especially during the newness of his first arrival in New York, or any courtesy in introducing him to friends or otherwise enabling him to derieve the utmost benefit from this experience will be much appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,

Shanghai Shiao

0617

August 2, 1938

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart
Yenching University
Peiping, China

Dear Dr. Stuart:

We cabled you this morning as follows:-

"VEGTE DETAINED AMERICA PERMANENTLY. NOBODY AVAILABLE PHYSICAL
EDUCATION. STAHL WILL CONTINUE SEARCH."

This comes as a rather sudden turn of decision which more properly might be called, "guidance," as up to July 28th Miss Veghte was making active preparations for return to China. On that day, the Presbyterian Board called me stating that Miss Veghte's doctor had recommended that she remain home because of family health. I communicated this to Miss Speer and she received the following reply:-

"Doctor urges me remain with parents. Father's state of health requires it. If I went would likely have to return within year. This earliest I have known definitely. Ready to sail and longing to help Yenching but feel certain this is my place now. Trust everyone will understand."

Miss Speer stopped to see Miss Ruth Stahl at Alliance, Ohio on her way to the coast, as two other prospects were interviewed at that time. The conference, however, between the two resulted in the decision that neither one is available at the present time for Yenching. As a consequence, the above cable was sent.

I have communicated with the Presbyterian Board as to the vacancy on the staff and find that they are presenting the case to their next meeting and undoubtedly they will vote vacancy salary in place of Miss Veghte.

If definite word comes through, I will notify you immediately.

Very truly yours,

C. A. EVANS

CAE/B

0618

August 2, 1938

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart
Fenching University
Peiping, China

Dear Dr. Stuart:

Agreeable to your letter of June 29th, we are charging the field account with \$1250.00 and bringing same back into our books to be held as suggested in your letter.

Mr. Rounds has just returned from his vacation and attended meetings yesterday, so I have not been able to secure his judgment on investment, but will pursue the matter still further.

I am writing a note to Miss Cookingham notifying her that we are reserving the action which we took in depositing this amount in the Central Hanover Bank Account.

A meeting of the Executive Committee, slim as it was, was held several days ago and the minutes are out for consideration at the present time. As soon as they are approved by a quorum of the Board copies will be forwarded to you, with due discretion being used as to the method of transportation.

Most cordially yours,

C. A. EVANS

CAE/B

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學大京燕
YENCHING UNIVERSITY
PEKING, CHINA

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8/26/38

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

August 3, 1938

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
"YENTA"

Dr. B. A. Garside
150 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Dr. Garside:

There is a chance to send a letter this morning by the Embassy pouch so that I shall rather hurriedly write what is in the nature of a P.S. to the communication to the Trustees mailed in duplicate under date of July 29.

Since then the Soviet border incident has daily assumed more threatening proportions, until what seemed at first to be only one more local affair may easily lead to war. At this writing it has already become that according all traditional standards, but nations no longer follow the old concepts. It had been generally taken for granted here that Japan would be forced to avoid military action however humiliating but that is not so certain at the present writing. That she would strongly prefer not to fight Russia till finished with China is, however, very clear. The uncertainty is as to internal conditions in Russia and their bearing on this issue.

Should there really be war between these two countries and Russia win or even further weaken Japan, Peking and Tientsin face a new danger. Those Chinese communists who are working with or under Russia - and there are such, influential though not numerous - argue that to eject the Japanese and shock the inert citizens into action there must be large scale destruction. More typically Chinese leaders of guerilla forces, or local representatives of the Central Government, urge that these two cities must in any event be preserved intact. There are rumors that the Japanese have already mined various important spots in Peking, but in so far as anything of this sort has been done or planned it is more probably under Soviet instigation. The point of my writing all this is not to be an alarmist, but to suggest a line of action in which the American Government and people can be of very practical assistance. As you watch the course of events, should these take the form of a more rapid weakening of Japanese military power, some gesture of goodwill for China or insistence on the withdrawal of Japanese troops as preliminary to a peace settlement will be of incalculable

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advantage not only to China but to all American interests in the Pacific area. England seems already to be adopting a firmer stand with French support. Looking ahead to the post-war reconstruction in this country, freed at last from this haunting menace of Japanese domination, we ought to have an active part in the approaching settlement in order to exert our influence in all that will follow. I have been convinced for many years that nothing will more happily guarantee peace in the Pacific than friendship between the United States and China, the latter tending toward the expression in forms true to her racial genius of our own democratic, freedom-loving and similar principles. This is the unquestionable preference of most of the Chinese who think at all of such matters and their most natural line of progress. For all American friends of China to encourage without further delay some concrete action that serves to carry out the principles of the Nine Power Pact and similar recognised obligations or aims of ours will be a most timely move not only for the sake of speeding up the close of the present calamitous hostilities but also for reasons much closer to our own material welfare and spiritual ideals. Joint action - on the grounds, for instance, of the "Boxer Protocol" - by England, France, America, and possibly Russia, for avoidance of lawless violence in the Peking-Tientsin area in the period of transition could be included among the objectives. Whatever form such assertion by our country of a share in responsibility for what has been or may soon be happening here does not any longer involve the slightest danger of war. On the other hand, it gives a wholesomely constructive outlet for the sympathy with China so generally felt, and would be an effective safeguard against the sovietization of this area which is not impossible if Russia alone proves to be China's friend in deed at this crucial time.

Of course all that I am writing may be rendered meaningless by a new turn of events before you read it, or at least seem wholly premature. There may be a return to the dreary continuance of Japanese military gains and moral losses. But even this could be altered by American participation in ways that involve no danger for us and relatively slight commercial loss. What we could then do to help China and humanity in general - including ourselves - thrills the imagination.

I am enclosing a few South China clippings about the policy of Yenching which have just reached me. *Also a copy of the earlier letter for safety.*

very sincerely yours,

Heighway Stuart

0621

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UNIVERSITIES
AUG 24 1938
JOINT OFFICE

0622

August 11, 1938

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart
Yenching University
Peiping, China

My dear Dr. Stuart:

We wired you yesterday as follows:

"MILDRED WIAINT JAMES DECLINES STOP MRS CARRIE McBRIER DIED SUDDENLY
YESTERDAY FUNERAL FRIDAY AFTERNOON STOP HOLLISTER RUGH LOEHR SAILING
EMPRESS JAPAN AUGUST TWENTIETH"

The first four words I am sure you will understand apply to one whom Mildred Wiant was trying to secure as a teacher. We have sent word to Mrs. Wiant quoting the letter of refusal.

The second item was a shock to all of us, as Mr. and Mrs. McBrier had just returned from a motor trip after having sponsored the conference at Silver Bay July 29 - 30. She seemed to be in good health when Mr. McBrier left for a meeting of the Rotary Club on Tuesday, but returning late in the afternoon he found her lifeless in the bathroom. It was a terrific shock to him and took all of the ingenuity and persuasion of his family to calm him down. He has now regained control of himself and is standing up bravely.

The way is now clear for William Hollister to go to China. The reservation on the 20th is the very best that could be done. It is just as well, as Dr. Loehr and Arthur Rugh are returning on the same boat. We will pay him US\$375 for travel and \$50 allowance, and send you a copy of the contract as soon as it is returned to us. He is sailing third class, while Arthur Rugh is in tourist.

I am hurrying to get this in the air mail to the Pacific, so with kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

CAE:RC

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Yenching University
Peking, China

August 11, 1938

To the Board of Trustees:

In view of your determination to provide for our financial needs through the agency of the ABCCC, and the nationwide dislocation of higher education in this country because of the present hostilities, I venture to propose the establishment of a single Board of Trustees for Christian Higher Education in China. This Board would presumably inherit the material possessions and maintain the administrative responsibilities of the institutions now represented in the ABCCC, with full authority to reorganize these according to a comprehensive plan that would aim to harmonize the facts concerning the institutions as they have happened to develop with the inducements leading to correlation as felt in all previous discussions of the problem, greatly accentuated and altered as these have been by the catastrophic changes caused by recent events and their enduring consequences when peace will have been restored.

The anomalies of the old situation were sufficiently obvious and have been often pointed out. But their hampering effects upon the institutions and the absurdities or functional weaknesses resulting therefrom are made much more glaring by the present upheaval. On the other hand, there is no evidence reaching us that the ABCCC is doing anything whatever toward the desired correlation - despite repeated assurances - or has any serious intentions of effecting significant improvements. It might even be questioned whether this is practicable in the present clumsy structure and with the inherently conflicting or competitive interests.

But of far greater cogency than any critical comments on progress thus far is the surpassing opportunity created by the national disaster. All our colleges already have been and will continue to be in various ways affected. A single Board representing the founders of the original institutions and their supporting constituencies could take advantage of the present confusion by indicating the general lines on which continuing assistance could be expected from North America and Great Britain. Such a Board would take the form more and more of a Foundation aiding institutions which become increasingly Chinese in maintenance and control. But in the present tragic disruption, the initiative and insistence much more than ever come from abroad or the opportunity will be forever lost and we supinely slip back into a status quo recognized by all disinterested and qualified observers as worse than unsatisfactory.

We are often reminded that in the ABCCC the Yenching Trustees exert a predominant influence. Insofar as this is true you and the Trustees of the Harvard-Yenching Institute have the power to remedy this unhappy state of things, or - putting it in more alluring terms - to refashion Christian education in patterns conceived with a view to rendering our fullest and finest contribution to the nationwide rebuilding that must follow the destructive effects of the present conflict.

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August 11, 1938

I cannot close without reminding you of repeated protests or appeals we of the faculty have made to you regarding a joint-financial campaign in America based upon the existing number of Christian colleges in this country and their individualistic programs. The special efforts of the past year are cordially endorsed by us because of the sudden and serious crisis. But as the emergency passes we shall feel very keenly disappointed if you continue to maintain a campaign for the colleges as they separately wish to carry on, with the additional costs forced upon them in varying degree by war conditions. Since we are providing over 37% of the total promotional budget, our convictions on this much-discussed issue ought to be given large consideration. Unless we can have confidence in your determination to exert your influence for restudying the problem and effecting the needed re-organization we shall feel compelled to raise with you again the question of our withdrawal from a joint-campaign, the old objections to which are intensified by the changed situation here and by the trend toward Christian unity and cooperation of which there are so many other encouraging signs.

Very sincerely yours,

J. Leighton Stuart

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學大京燕
YENCHING UNIVERSITY
PEKING, CHINA

Aug. 12/38

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
"YENTA"

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

My dear Garside,

Oct 9/15

Herewith another communication which may seem to you too repetitious, or too complaining, or too impractical and idealistic. In any case it will remind you of a deeply-rooted conviction among us at this end. The mutual trust and happy sense of cooperation will lose nothing by these frank exchanges but should rather be helped forward as we all earnestly desire. I can understand

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the procedure of the past season, and even
the wisdom of continuing on this basis for the
immediate future, and would not say if I could
feel that there more serious planning for the
reorganization so generally recognized as desirable.

Meanwhile your letter of July 13, and
the A.B.C.C. minutes, June 30, have
just arrived. Grateful congratulations on
the successful completion of the \$30000.
campaign - Thanks also for yours of July 18.

Yours with admiring sympathy,
Leighton

August 12, 1938

President J. Leighton Stuart,
Yenching University,
Peiping, China.

Dear Dr. Stuart:

In cleaning up a pile of partially-cleared correspondence I find three letters from you which have been dealt with in part, but which I put aside for further comment before placing in the files - your letters of April 4th, April 7th, and June 29th.

Plans of Vernon and Harry. We have written frequently concerning both these members of staff, and both Margaret Speer and Stephen Tsai will bring you reports of their negotiations with them.

Our office tried during the winter and spring to get the supporting Mission Boards, particularly the Presbyterian, to take an interest in one or the other of these men. There seemed little hope of securing support for Vernon, but a fair chance that the Presbyterians might take on Harry.

Harry, however, has been devoting himself to certain publicity work, along with his brother Frank, along lines with which you are probably familiar. For this reason he felt he could best serve China during the coming year by remaining in America. What will be his plans for the future are still uncertain. I know he has written you at length, so I need not repeat what he has already told you.

Our office will do everything possible to get support for Harry from the Presbyterian Board and to get him back to the field at the earliest feasible date, if that is what the field desires. Our ABCCC office in New York would have been happy to get Harry to help us out as a member of our staff during the coming year, but we did not urge this upon him because we are anxious to get him back to China if that be possible.

As for Vernon, he is tied up with his studies at Columbia for another four or five months at least. Beyond that, it is hard to make prediction. He and his family have always been very expensive, so for that reason and others it would be difficult to get any mission board to take on his support. Present conditions, needless to say, do not look very favorable for building up endowment or long-term support for his salary and allowances as a member of the Department of Journalism. Perhaps a little later something more encouraging may develop there.

There is one point in connection with both these men on which the Yenching Trustees have expressed their views with some vigor. That is the suggestion that the Trustees might make some provision for their support outside the regular budget. Several years ago a general principle was adopted - on the initiative of the field but with the hearty

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concurrence of the Trustees, that henceforth we would make every effort to avoid sending out any further appointees receiving support from the Board of Trustees. In other words, aside from staff members supported by the Mission Boards, all members of the University staff would receive their support from the regular university budget.

So far as the Trustees are concerned, it is always their desire to supply the University a maximum of funds with a minimum of restrictions on their use. Aside from the costs of the Trustees' activities here in America on behalf of the University, all funds are turned over to the field for such use as you wish to make of them. Some endowment income and some annual gifts have designations which must be observed. But a large and growing portion of the funds which the Trustees send out each year are sent with no strings attached to them, so far as we here in the West are concerned. It is the wish and expectation of the Trustees that all such undesignated funds will be used to equalize the program and support of every department of the University, to provide additional staff members where they are needed, and to counterbalance inequities resulting from the fact that certain colleges and departments have substantial income from endowment or annual grants while others have little or nothing from these sources.

Therefore if the best interests of the University would be served by having two or three thousand dollars of the funds the Trustees provide devoted to the support of Harry or Vernon or anyone else you might suggest, it seems to the Trustees much better that they be placed on the regular budget and their support be provided in the regular way. We realize, of course, that the administrative officers of the University are always confronted by problems of personalities and by difficulties of avoiding clashes in temperament. All departments need more funds than the budget can provide, and are apt to begrudge using any of their resources to pay the salary of a man previously supported in some special way. But in the final analysis, the field must decide who are the men they really want, and it really makes no difference in the total amount of your resources whether the Trustees take out the salary of a man here or send that same amount of money as a part of their annual appropriation for the field pay out in salary to the same man there.

We will keep you informed of developments in the cases of both Vernon and Harry. Meantime, we know you will keep us informed of the wishes of the field with respect to them.

In one of your letters you mention comments from America that sometimes the tone of your reports of conditions might tend to discourage gifts to the support of Yenching. My own attitude is always this - that not only the demands of honesty, but of good policy as well, demand that we give our American constituency the truth of the situation confronting the University from time to time, with no attempt to gloss over serious problems or to ignore unfavorable factors. Our American friends would be quick to recognize, and to resent, any attempt to paint too rosy a picture. And on the other hand, they appreciate a frank statement of the conditions as they are, and are more ready to give on that basis than one which tries to ignore unpleasant realities.

I'm sure we would all agree on those generalities. Even then, we have a wide latitude in what we write and how we write it. For instance, I often tell Ran Shields that all of his letters have a doleful and pessimistic note which makes it unnecessarily difficult to secure any support - even in comparatively peaceful and prosperous times - for the

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very fine work he is doing. Ran usually retorts that I'm too much of a habitual optimist. Probably we are both right. The ideal presentation of our case for any of the China Colleges is to present the facts frankly, but to emphasize the hopeful and constructive sides of the picture so far as the facts will justify. We need not be ashamed of possessing at least a modicum of the faith that has been the mainspring of the missionary enterprise from the beginning.

So far as I can recollect I myself have not expressed any judgment that the reports from Yenching have ever been too discouraging, and in general I have thought your letters and statements to be the finest we could have asked for. Occasionally we have taken the liberty of changing slightly the viewpoint (though never the content) of a sentence or a paragraph, but on the whole your reports go out as you write them. Of course some you intend for very limited circulation, others for wider use. Where there is room for differences in viewpoint, you always take care to see that they are fairly presented. Everyone, for instance, praised very highly your recent letter accompanied by a statement from Dr. Galt written from a somewhat different viewpoint. As you know, the general view of the Trustees on that particular question was pretty well in line with that presented by Dr. Galt, but they wanted to have all sides of the matter before them, and felt that the way in which you handled the presentation was very fine both in spirit and in procedure.

So we hope you won't worry over any occasional criticisms which may come to you. You come nearer "pleasing all the people all the time" than anybody we know among our China College leaders - and that is as near perfection as anyone can hope to get.

Cordially,

BAG/G

0630

August 26, 1938

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart
Miss Mary Cookingham
Yenching University
Peiping, China

Dear Friends:

We have delayed sending you copies of the minutes of the Executive Committee meeting held on July 21st. A call went out for the meeting, but only two people responded, all others being out of town. It was understood, therefore, that these minutes would not become definite actions until approved by other members of the committee. After circulating same, we have received approval, and send you a copy herewith.

The cablegram authorized under E-3606 went forward immediately as those present felt the urgency of such action. The stand you have taken regarding the employment of other Nationals, the participation of the student body or staff in political demonstrations of any kind, and the firm determination not to be exploited for the interest of outside forces, all met with the most hearty appreciation and enthusiastic endorsement.

At intervals the newspapers record some of these major aspects of the work at Yenching, and other times people returning from the field bring us the story; and still again letters drift through which speak more pointedly of the difficult conditions under which you work. But from all sides there comes the universal approbation for the method, technique as well as firmness with which you deal with the situation.

Continued Support of Vernon Nash. Somewhere I have a memorandum representing a basis for a letter which is to be written covering situations such as developed in the Nash case. Rather than spoil the approbatory character of the foregoing paragraph, I will save that for another time. In a sentence, however, it is to the effect that the trustees cannot undertake to secure the support for individuals. Every dollar that can be raised and appropriated for the general budget will be sent out, but it must be the field's responsibility for distribution of these funds.

The field budget will be considered just as soon as we can get a meeting of the Finance Committee early in September. Just now it is impossible.

Most cordially yours,

CAE:RC
Enc.

0631

August 26, 1938

President J. Leighton Stuart
Yenching University
Peking, China

Dear Dr. Stuart:

Your letter of July 23rd has remained unacknowledged for several weeks. It arrived at a time when most of our Yenching Trustees were occupied with summer plans, and when it would have been almost impossible to secure any committee meeting. The same is true of the leaders of the Associated Boards.

Your letter suggested the possibility that K.A. Wee might come back to America for promotional work during the coming year. The suggestion is one that appeals to all of us, for everyone is very fond of K.A., and he is unquestionably one of the ablest and most devoted promotional workers among the Chinese staff members of any of our China Colleges.

There are, however, two important obstacles. The first is that to meet the expenses of K.A. and his family would be an extremely heavy financial burden for either the Yenching Trustees or the Associated Boards. In our Associated Boards budget for 1938-39, we have been able to provide for the first time a modest amount to take care of staff members who are engaged in promotional work. Heretofore these expenses have been borne by the Board of Trustees of the institution represented. The amount, however, is not a large one, and would probably be entirely consumed by K.A. and his family alone. We cannot ask our Yenching Trustees to pay any of K.A.'s expenses under the arrangements we have made for this year, so that we should be able to have only one representative, whereas we have been hoping to finance at least two or three.

A somewhat less important problem is that of the use we could make of K.A. if he were to come during the coming year. The situation is such that for the present we can do very little in the way of securing either endowment or building funds, but must put our emphasis on the raising of current funds to meet the emergency needs of the Colleges. Last year, as you know, we were able to secure for Yenching, not only about \$31,000 in emergency funds for the current year, but also approximately \$60,000 in capital gifts. But nearly all of the capital gifts received represented gain in endowment funds and completion of projects already under way. For the year 1938-39, we will have to focus our efforts on securing the U.S.\$56,331.95 (or whatever figure is finally adopted) representing Yenching's emergency needs for that year. If we are anywhere nearly as successful in our promotional work during the coming year as we have been during the year just past, we will be able to meet these emergency needs. While it would be very fine to have K.A. help in the undertaking, I am not sure

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Dr. Stuart

-2-

August 26, 1938

whether he would be contented to devote himself to these emergency needs alone. When he was last in America, he was eager to get ahead with the task of securing special funds for the work in Physical Education, and I assume that that would be closest to his heart on his next trip. It seems, however, that we will have to postpone that particular undertaking until the present disturbed conditions in China have become more stable. This would lessen the desirability of having Dr. Wee with us until conditions are favorable for our getting endowment funds for his own department.

These are all really personal and preliminary objections. As yet we have not been able to secure a meeting of any Yenching or Associated Boards committee which can take action on your suggestion. I am hoping, however, that such a meeting can be held within the next fortnight. If it should be desirable to bring Dr. Wee to America this year, we will of course send you a cable immediately.

We were all greatly disappointed that Mr. Rugh felt he must return to China this fall, for he was just beginning an invaluable promotional service, not only for Yenching, but for the entire group of Colleges. Our Associated Boards extended to him a very urgent invitation to become a regular member of our staff with responsibility for promotional work on the West Coast. As you know, one of the main reasons for Mr. McBrier's trip to the coast in May was to urge Mr. Rugh to accept this position. But we all sympathise with his earnest desire to return to Peiping and carry on the important work in religious education which he is doing there.

We have been able to secure Dr. Paul Buchholz (well known to Mr. Rugh and highly recommended by him) to carry on the work Mr. Rugh began.

The next few weeks will be very busy ones as we will be trying to complete our plans and personnel for the work of the year. We will keep you informed of developments.

Very sincerely yours

BAG:CS

0633

August 26, 1938

President J. Leighton Stuart
Yenching University
Peiping, China

Dear Dr. Stuart:

Since we do not dare send by regular mail any frank statements as to our attitude with regard to Japanese aggression in North China, I am sending this letter to officials of the State Department in Washington with a request that they extend to us the courtesy of sending it to China with mail going to the American Embassy in Peiping.

As you can well imagine, all of our Yenching group here in America has been increasingly stirred by the developments in China during the last thirteen and a half months, and have been eager to express themselves in the most vigorous and effective way. At the same time, we have been reluctant to take any position publicly which might arouse Japanese antagonism and result in retaliatory measures by the Japanese militarists upon the University itself. This same general attitude has been found among the related groups responsible for the interests of each one of the Christian Colleges in the area actually or nominally occupied by Japanese troops.

Last year when the Japanese invasion of China began, all of us were particularly cautious, and took care not to write or say anything publicly critical of the Japanese. But with the passing months we have watched with pride the courageous way in which our colleagues in China have stood their ground, courteously but firmly, and have not hesitated to speak out in condemnation of the tactics the Japanese have employed. We have been more and more eager to give all the support we possibly could here in America.

The only consideration that has kept the leaders in our Yenching group from being the most ardent and outspoken champions of the Chinese cause and the most bitter critics of the American people who have directly or indirectly helped the Japanese, has been this fear that our actions might bring increased danger to the University and to the members of its staff. We gather from many of the statements and suggestions in your letters to the Trustees, that you do not feel that such a position on the part of Yenching supporters in America would add any more danger than you are already encountering. Perhaps a demonstration of the ~~extent~~ influence of American friendship for Yenching and the other Christian Colleges in China would be of positive benefit to them by revealing to the Japanese authorities the amount of further ill-will that would be created in America by any action injurious to these institutions. One reason why our Associated Boards gave as wide publicity as possible to our emergency campaign for \$300,000 was this desire to demonstrate that a large and influential body of men and women in America were actively behind these institutions, and determined to see them carried on.

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August 26, 1938

We would be grateful if you would send us, whenever you can do this safely, your frank opinion and advice on this point. Do you feel that any injury would be done to Yenching if the Yenching group here in America took a positive and public stand on Japanese aggression in China? What are the things we can say and do which would be of the greatest benefit, and what are some of the things we should avoid?

Let me acknowledge receipt of your letters of July 15th and August 3rd.

With your letter of July 15th you enclose a copy of the very important and interesting letter you wrote to President Roosevelt. While we find ourselves in complete accord with the general trend of your letter to the President, there is one thing in the letter that puzzled us somewhat - your recommendation that the United States Government should put into effect the so-called Neutrality Act. During the past year, the general opinion of the warmest friends of China throughout America has been that the enforcement of the Neutrality Act would prove more injurious to China than to Japan. The general line of reasoning has been that the application of the Act would cut off almost entirely such aid as America has been able to extend to China, and would ^{not} limit nearly so much the assistance which the Japanese have been able to secure. Even under the Neutrality Act much if not all of these raw materials, for their supply of which Japan has been looking to America, would continue to flow to Japan in Japanese vessels. This is because, as we understand it and in a most elementary way, if the Neutrality Act were enforced, all goods purchased by both belligerent nations would have to be paid for in cash and transported in their own vessels - possible for Japan but not for China. Our hope has therefore been that some other way can be found by which the American people and the American government can demonstrate more actively their friendship for the Chinese people and their condemnation of the military tactics now being used by the Japanese. There is a growing tide of opinion in America that some means must be found either by voluntary action or by governmental measures, which will halt the flow of raw materials and military supplies to Japan. At the same time many forces are at work increasing the amount of support being provided by China. One dares not speak too authoritatively, but there is no doubt that they are becoming increasingly powerful.

Your letter of July 29th has been sent to the members of the Yenching Board of Trustees and also to a select group of Yenching friends. We have also read with interest the newspaper clippings enclosed, and are circulating them to as many of the Yenching group as we can reach. Your letter's very fine summary of the events of the past year and of the prospects for the months just ahead will make it read with great care by missionary leaders here in New York, and elsewhere throughout the country.

We were delighted to receive yesterday your cablegram stating that apparently the enrollment this fall will reach the utmost capacity. We all realize to some degree the tremendous difficulties under which the University is beginning this new academic year, but we have every confidence that under your leadership you and your colleagues will keep Yenching going forward if it is at all possible to do so.

With all good wishes, I am

Very sincerely yours

BAG:CS

0635

August 27, 1938

Dear Dr. Stuart:

Let me acknowledge receipt of your letters of July 25th and July 29th.

With your letter of the 25th you enclose a copy of a letter to our Yenching Trustees discussing the emergency needs of the University for the year 1938-39. This will be shared with the Trustees, and particularly with the Finance and Executive Committees, at the first opportunity. We will also present it to the Finance and Executive Committees of the Associated Boards.

At the time you wrote, you had not received the minutes of the June 30th meetings of the Associated Boards, at which the amount tentatively taken as the emergency needs of Yenching this year was U.S. \$56,331.95, made up as follows:-

General Administration and Operation	U.S. \$16,728.25
College of Liberal Arts	13,500.00
College of Natural Science	14,024.72
College of Public Affairs	2,035.75
College for Women	3,543.23
Financial Assistance to Needy Students	6,500.00
	<u>\$56,331.95</u>

Of course no rigid requirements would be made by either the Yenching Trustees or the Associated Boards that these emergency funds be expended in exactly the way set forth above. The details, prepared by our Yenching office on the basis of conversations with Mr. Tsai plus the information contained in the Yenching budget, are given chiefly to show the reality of the need. The important question is whether this figure of \$56,331.95 actually represents what Yenching will need during 1938-39, in addition to the regular sources of income, in order to keep its work going forward.

Because of the unavoidable delays in the budget estimates our Yenching Trustees were not able to take final action on their appropriation to the 1938-39 budget before the summer exodus forced the suspension of further committee meetings until after Labor Day. Mr. Evans and I have already been planning to get such action taken at the earliest possible date. I hope that the information Mr. Tsai took with him, together with the minutes and correspondence we have been sending the field, will have made it clear that we are looking to you to give us any revision of the above estimates of emergency needs at the earliest possible moment.

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Dr. Stuart

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so that the Associated Boards committees meeting in September to revise our list of emergency needs for 1938-39 can take any requisite action. Even if no revisions come from you, we will hope that this \$56,331.95 will be adequate to meet all needs we can foresee at this time. It might be added that in its list of needs the Associated Boards has set up a reserve fund of \$33,087.22 to meet, among other things, any special emergencies which might confront any one of our Colleges as a result of shifting conditions during the year just ahead. Such a reserve ought to be available to help Yenching if any of the contingencies you mention should arise suddenly during the year.

Thanks for the suggestion in your letter of the 29th that Phil Gillett might be a possibility for financial work for the A.B.C.C.C. We will follow this up, along with the other leads we are now pursuing.

We will renew your subscription to Harper's, as requested.

Cordially,

BAG/G

0637

September 1, 1938

To the Board of Trustees:

The Hsin Min Hui is the fictitious framework through which the Japanese military make a pretense of putting into effect Chinese popular government in North China. It is controlled by so-called Japanese advisers, and nothing can be carried out until authorized by one of these. Although the Chinese connected with it have but little real power, I felt it would be an additional protection to Yenching in issues that might arise from time to time, if I could come into direct contact with some of the more important of these. An approach through a mutual Chinese friend secured an invitation from the titular head of the organization to have lunch with him in a well-known restaurant. He told me afterwards he selected this place to be quiet. The setting was very picturesque, - an upstairs room overlooking a large expanse of lotus blooms, with the yellow tiles of the Imperial Palace in the distance. He had brought a relative, evidently in order to interpret through English if this became necessary. In view of the man's limitations his services were fortunately not needed. My host, whom I had only known by name before as that of a notorious renegade and opportunist politician, had the unmistakable manners and appearance that only comes in China from a long line of scholarly official ancestors. His grandfather was the famous Viceroy, Chang Chih-tung. A younger brother after studying at Yenching and Dartmouth had been recommended by me to a post under Dr. H. H. Kung in the Central Bank. He had also quite clearly inherited the mental ability of his forefathers.

I began by explaining the non-political character of our University and my hope that we would be able to maintain such relationships with the Chinese officers of the Hsin Min Hui as would avoid embarrassment in any issues that might arise in the future. He soon brushed aside my anxieties by saying that he knew all about Yenching, was in full sympathy with our aims, and that the Hsin Min Hui would protect us in so far as Chinese could. To my surprise, he added quickly that the Japanese controlled everything important in such matters, and that he was quite familiar with their intentions, not only for us, but for all such institutions throughout China; that they would want to suppress all that they regard as subversive thinking, that is, hostile to Japanese domination; that, therefore, higher education, except in certain technical subjects would be stopped, and particularly all European and American influences. He thought that for the first semester this year we would not be disturbed, but that unless there were developments more favorable to China, either from within or through foreign help, than at present seem likely, they would begin to impose restrictions next spring, or at any rate before the beginning of another session. He went on to say that

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by
this would not be any direct orders, but by gradually making conditions so intolerable that we would prefer to give up. There is nothing new in any of this. It could easily be inferred from their actual policy in Korea and Manchuria, and by all that can be observed of the working of their military mind, which is the only one that counts. It was quite startling to me, however, to hear all this told me with an air of quiet assurance by a man who is popularly believed to be entirely pro-Japanese.

He then went on to say that he had asked me to come early in order to have a thorough talk with me about still larger issues. The conversation took a turn that was wholly unexpected. He did most of the talking. I said very little to indicate my attitude as to the Japanese temperament, their program for China, etc., but listened, occasionally replied to his questions, asked some myself, and made brief comments. Not attempting to report it in order, the salient points were briefly as follows. He was in Manchuria at the time of the Mukden incident in an official position. He had hoped that the "Young Marshal", other Chinese military officers in the north, or General Chiang Kai-shek would make military resistance, and was quite confident that the Japanese never intended to accomplish so much all at once and so easily. When, however, it was apparent that they could "get away with it", they would most probably have annexed the region outright had it not been for him and a few others who proposed the erection of Manchoukuo as the only way to salvage the situation. He had been active in this whole development and would have been compelled to become premier after the death of the first incumbent. Meantime he had managed to slip out of that region, but only to be caught here, where he had no other course than to work for them. Manchoukuo had been a disappointment, both to the Japanese and the Chinese. The vast majority of the latter came there as ex-convicts or famine refugees, and had no feeling of patriotism or anything other than the means of existence. The small minority who were more intelligent had either been liquidated or were helpless and hopeless. He felt that the best solution in the future would be for Manchoukuo to have a status not unlike Switzerland, with the guarantee of protection by Japan, Russia, and China, endorsed as far as possible by other powers. If the overwhelming majority of the people were allowed to use and study the Chinese language, it would be a very beneficial concession.

He thought that Hankow would fall in a month or two, and that Chiang Kai-shek and a remnant of his following would retreat somewhere into the mountainous southwest and continue a losing struggle, the Japanese meanwhile attempting constant guerrilla attacks to consolidate their position through sheer military force. He pointed out that they were so constituted that they could not do otherwise. He said that he had often called their attention to the wisdom of the Manchu dynasty in employing and entrusting increasingly high responsibilities to Chinese, but that nothing large or small could be done except with the direct oversight of some Japanese. The world looks upon Japan as a highly-organized and centralized autocracy, whereas actually it is a bizarre kind of democracy, in

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that minor officers do things on the spot with very little reference to their superiors or to general instructions. This leads to a great deal of confusion, and most of the troubles from Japanese administration come from these arrogant, narrow-minded petty officials. There is little, incidentally, that other observers are saying in condemnation of Japan in regard to China and in criticism of Japanese incompetence for this task which this man did not very suavely put into so many words, or at least imply. He expects that about the year 1940 there will be important changes in the international situation. Great Britain and the United States will have then completed their naval programs; most probably the European situation will have become stabilized. Japan will meanwhile have revealed her real intentions in China, both as against the interests of her own people and those of western countries, sufficiently to lead to the conviction which is already more or less crystallizing among the western powers, that there must be a war to restrain Japan from further aggression, even more directly damaging to their interests in their colonies, the Philippines, etc. Russia is of negligible importance as able herself to defeat Japan, but is an important factor to be wisely utilized in a comprehensive plan for maintaining a real peace in Eastern Asia on the basis of China's own rights and those of other countries in relation to her. An understanding between England and Germany more or less supported by France and the United States would seem to him to be the most promising alignment. The Japanese left alone are doomed to go on in their futile effort to accomplish their purpose in China by violence, and are so eager for immediate economic benefits that they revealed unintentionally the crass selfishness of this whole invasion. In helping China, other countries will not only keep their treaty obligations, but will do more to avert a war involving them than in any other way. He said that he had at one time observed hopefully the Kuomintang movement, but had been disillusioned by the graft, extravagance, and incompetence of most of its leaders. He had thought for a time of Communism as the best way out, but now felt clearly that it was not. He wondered if there were other men, without regard to party or past political allegiance, concerned only with the maintenance of the administrative and territorial integrity of the whole country, who could somehow be brought together as the nucleus in a common patriotic purpose, and for preparing to make China worthy of whatever action the nations of the Nine Power Pact or some new grouping would undertake on her behalf.

This interview was wholly unlike what I had expected. The man himself is not only an aristocrat, but talked as a patriot, with a simple dignity and apparent honesty, strangely at variance with the picture I had formed of him. Of course the whole conversation may have had some ulterior purpose in misleading me, but I can scarcely see any sufficient reason for this, and in so far as I am a judge of Chinese character, he at least thought himself to be sincere.

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In any case, two inferences can easily be sustained. One is, his testimony as to the Japanese intentions regarding higher education in all regions under their control, especially that of western origin. There is nothing new in what he said, but it is a rather sobering confirmation. The other is, that even the Chinese who seem to be more highly placed by the Japanese and to have become most subservient, are not necessarily pro-Japanese at heart. There are pitiful hirelings and opportunists who will work with Japanese as they would for anyone else, but of the more important men, I have yet to meet a single one who, when he found he could talk intimately, has not had essentially the attitude revealed in this instance.

To give a slightly dramatic touch, it happened by a pure coincidence that I went directly from the very elaborate and appetizing lunch in that famous old restaurant to an appointment with one of the leaders of the so-called guerrillas, who is directing operations from Peking. He had been ill, has the hunted look of a man who must be in continual hiding, whose life is in danger every moment from any unexpected exposure, but who is none the less enduring all of this and working with keen abilities and apparently selfless patriotism in the struggle for national independence.

These are little side-lights on the conflict in which Chinese resistance, believed in by almost all of them, is made so much more difficult, by the lack of cohesion, of organized efficiency, of mutual trust, and of authoritative leadership.

Very sincerely yours,

J. Leighton Stewart

September 1, 1938

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G. H. H.
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A graduate of Yenching University ten years ago became a teacher in a middle school in the city, then dean, and for the past four years as principal, built up the school with great enthusiasm until it had over 400 pupils and a strong staff of young teachers, largely our own graduates. He had secured the loan of a suitable piece of property from a relative for the use of the school and put in during this period something less than \$20,000 (local currency) of his own money. A Japanese "cultural" agent came recently to him to propose that the Japanese take over the running of the school and let him continue in office as the puppet principal. He refused and there ensued a spirited argument in which he, with much more courage than Chinese usually dare to show under such provocation, expected the specious character of cultural cooperation and of the Japanese attempts to bring about better relations between the two countries through military coercion. He was carried off to the headquarters of the army police and asked to write a memorandum on the subject of how to promote better relations between the two countries. He frankly gave the sort of advice which they should have welcomed, but the only outcome was to have them retort that this was conclusive proof of how anti-Japanese he was, and taunted him with having learned this at Yenching, which was notoriously opposed to them. He is now bereft of position and income, the property generously provided by his relative has been taken over by the Japanese, the creative task into which he had put so much energy and devotion is wrecked, and he will probably be under surveillance with more serious consequences possible at any time. The enrollment has dropped to about 60 children. This incident illustrates what is happening to numberless people in all sorts of enterprises.

September 3, 1938

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學大京燕
YENCHING UNIVERSITY
PEKING, CHINA

September 3, 1938

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
"YENTA"

Dr. B. A. Garside
150 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Garside:

I am sending you herewith some material which may be of interest.
In themselves these incidents are not important, but they have a certain
typical value.

We are in the midst of opening and especially of freshman week.
Everything is going well with fine spirit, smooth functioning, and bright
prospects as far as internal and administrative affairs are concerned.

Very sincerely yours,

Heigton Stewart

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September 15, 1938

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart
Yenching University
Peking, China

Dear Dr. Stuart:

Thanks for your note of August 12th. To this you attach a copy of your letter to the Yenching Board of Trustees discussing the ever-present problems of cooperation among the colleges in China, and among the Boards of Trustees here in North America. This letter was at once mimeographed and distributed among members of the Board of Trustees of the Yenching College Committee.

One of the most constant subjects for study and discussion within the Associated Boards during the past year has been that of how we could best utilize the present crisis in China to speed up the process of cooperation and unification both in China and in the west. Since it has not been possible as yet to reduce these discussions to concrete actions, the various minutes and reports we have been sending you from time to time do not reflect more than a small fraction of the discussions which have been going on. There is, however, a very widespread and earnest conviction on all these matters - but the main problem is still that of how to bring about the results which we all wish to see accomplished.

As always, we have to steer a course between opposite dangers:- The first and most obvious is that we will allow our good intentions to evaporate in mere words and will not secure much concrete progress. But we must not lose sight entirely of the opposite danger that too much impassioned and vigorous criticisms in certain quarters may merely increase our difficulties and slow up the possibilities of progress. During the past fifteen years the cause of greater unity in Christian higher education in China has suffered about as much from the ardor of its advocates as it has from the opposition of those unfriendly to it.

We will put the consideration of your letter of August 11th on the docket of the next meeting of the Executive Committee of the Yenching Board of Trustees.

Very cordially yours,

BAG:MP

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C_O_P_Y

September 27, 1938

Mr. Laurence M. Salisbury
American Embassy
Peking

My dear Mr. Salisbury:

I am writing to ask if you feel yourself in a position to bring to the attention of the Japanese Embassy the case of one of our students as follows. On Thursday, September 15, a representative of the Japanese Military Police visited here, and argued at length that they had evidence that three of our students were involved in an attack on a railway which resulted in the loss of one hundred lives, etc. He wished to take away one whose name he gave and whom he spoke of as less actively involved. I talked with this boy, whose name is Li Chen-chiang (李振江), and from his manner and all that he said about himself, became convinced that his participation in anything of the kind would be extremely unlikely. It would be physically impossible for any of our students to engage in such an attack while studying here. I reminded the visitor of my repeated declaration of complete responsibility that there would be no anti-Japanese activities on this campus and urged that I be supplied with evidence, which, if convincing, would lead to our assistance in dealing with anyone who had been guilty. He pressed for carrying Li to their headquarters on the ground that their procedure required this, and said that in view of our cooperation in a previous instance and in this one, they could not take unfair advantage, and he assured me the boy would probably soon be released if they also were convinced of his innocence. Meanwhile the father had come out from the city and I advised father and son that the latter go with the Japanese officer voluntarily and answer any questions frankly. I pointed out that by so doing we could hope that mutual relationships were such that the University could look forward to fair treatment and an early release. Up to the present, however, the boy has not been released and all our inquiries are met by evasive replies. I need not point out how much more easily it would be for us to cooperate with the authorities in any concrete grievances, if we could feel assured that our willingness to advise students to submit themselves voluntarily to investigation would result in correspondingly prompt and honorably treatment.

Any assistance you can give will be appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,

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學大京燕
YENCHING UNIVERSITY
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

September 29, 1938

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
"YENTA"

Dr. B. A. Garside
150 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Dr. Garside:

Your letter of August 26 reached me a day or two ago, and I am taking advantage of an Embassy pouch leaving to-morrow to send this reply. I have fully understood the caution in all the letters from your office in regard to Japanese encroachments. This has been quite wise. I have also felt confident that all of our Yenching friends were actively in sympathy with China's cause and ready to do whatever would be feasible, if this did not jeopardize us. It is cheering, however, to have your explicit assurance.

In answer to your question, I realize the gravity of advising more active participation in American measures against Japan. Their military leaders have shown themselves brutally ruthless in punishing or intimidating all who stand in the way of their objectives. Evidence has come to me more than once of discussions among their officers in which the determination to destroy us, or at least close us up, was seriously mooted. How close we have come to being the victim of some such barbarity we can only surmise. Under the increasing tension of the long drawn-out struggle they are becoming "jittery", and are even more vindictive in consequence. Tales come to us constantly of a wide swath of villages and all the inhabitants mercilessly wiped out, because of a successful guerrilla raid in the locality, although these country people are usually entirely innocent and helpless. These comments are made to show that what I am about to urge is with full knowledge of possible consequences to us. On the other hand, China is literally fighting a life and death struggle for her national independence. Japanese military success would unquestionably mean the most humiliating and in every other way disastrous serfdom for the Chinese people. North China is the area that they will hold more tenaciously than any other. All who love this country, or who believe in freedom and justice ought to be willing to share in the suffering and loss. I feel this so intensely myself that I would take any consequences affecting my own life and all with which I have to do in China, if there were sufficient benefit to the nation. Fortunately, the moral issue is so clear and so free from the usual mixture of right and wrong that this seems to me to be the only Christian attitude. Even from the standpoint of institutional self-interest, we ought to take this position. If the Japanese really win, and are able to maintain their military domination of this region, we could not possibly carry on here without drastic modification, if at all. If China recovers her independence, our future position will be immensely strengthened by our having unequivocally identified our own interests with that of the nation.

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Because of considerations such as these, I would hope that all our Yenching friends in America will feel no longer any hesitation on our behalf in exerting the utmost influence possible to have our country take a more positive stand against further Japanese attacks. China has proven beyond question her determination, her fighting morale, her willingness to endure incalculable hardship and destruction to preserve her national existence. The Japanese intentions, despite all their specious propaganda and the brutality with which they are trying to accomplish these, have also become equally apparent. Again, even from the standpoint of self-interest, America by helping to put an end to all this vast welter of misery, will be averting further trouble in the Pacific area. There need no longer be any question of what Japan will do elsewhere if she establishes herself in China. China, with her independence recovered, will develop along the lines of our own highest democratic and peace-loving ideals, and will be an immense asset in the cause of international law and order.

From what I have learned since writing as I did to President Roosevelt, it would seem that the most satisfactory form in which we could aid China would be to declare an embargo on all ^{war} shipments, or better still, a complete embargo, until Japan ceases military action in this country. I have always been convinced that this would not involve the slightest danger of war for us in her present weakened condition; and with other threats against her safety, Japan would be less ready than ever to commit this folly. You have doubtless seen Nathaniel Pfeffer's article on the subject in a recent issue of Amerasia. I know of no better summary.

While it seems to me that we ought to be ready to endure any consequences of your more active sharing in such efforts in America, yet if all of you would take your stand as American citizens through existing organizations, or as individuals, there need be no connection with our name in such efforts. The Japanese are already well aware of popular American opinion and of these various movements, so that unless the name of Yenching were made prominent, they would probably feel no special indignation affecting us.

I am writing while the question of war in Europe is keeping the whole world in intense fear. How it will influence American policy you will know better when you read this.

Very sincerely yours,

J. Leighton Stuart

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Summary of a Statement to Mr. S. Matsukata

The occasion for this is explained in the following paragraphs of a letter from Mr. J. D. White, formerly a graduate-student of ours from the University of Missouri, and a teacher in our Department of Journalism, since then local representative in Peiping of the Associated Press:

"There is a young and influential Japanese intellectual here in town for a short time who is anxious to meet you and have a talk with you.

"He is Mr. S. Matsukata, son of Prince Matsukata, and though here officially under the Domei organization, he is a sort of field representative here in North China for Premier Konoye, being one of his close friends.

"His views on the whole situation here are liberal and encouraging. I believe you would enjoy a talk with him.

"I should be very glad to bring him out to Yenching to see you (he says he has long wished to see the place)"

Mr. Matsukata expressed the hope that Peiping would continue to be a cultural and educational centre and that even the government universities might be reopened. He seemed to desire an expression of my views on this matter, with special reference to Yenching, as well as on the relationships in general between China and Japan. He afterwards endorsed throughout what I said and assured me that many others in Japan agreed with him, or would if they knew more about actual conditions in China. There is no need therefore to do more than summarize my remarks as follows:

Yenching University was originally established by Americans and has been supported chiefly by American money, with no slightest thought of political or commercial benefit to the people of the United States, but purely in order to contribute toward the progress of China through the training of students in all that fits them in knowledge and spiritual idealism for the service of their country. It seeks to aid thus in the struggle of the Chinese people toward national unity and independence, economic and social reforms, and all else that enables China to take her rightful place among the nations of the world. It has never been anti-Japanese except in so far as Japanese military aggression prevents the realization of such aims. In fact, the special claims that Japan has for close relations with China - even to the disadvantage of western countries - are cordially recognised and encouraged, provided these are to mutual benefit and free from coercive force. Personally I should like nothing better than to witness the strengthening of such friendly intercourse and to have Yenching do its full share toward its realization, and especially to help in the healing and reconstructive processes which should follow the present disastrous hostilities. As to the continuance of Peiping as a cultural centre, Yenching could

carry on here on two conditions, which would doubtless apply equally to the state institutions and all others. One of these was academic freedom; a university must have freedom to teach and discover truth, unhampered by military or political interference. The other was a political organization in North China that, however friendly to or even under the influence of Japan, was genuinely Chinese, and sufficiently in authority to secure the type of leadership which the people in its own territory and whatever would be the governing body in the rest of China, could respect; the alternative being a puppet regime composed of venal or worthless opportunists and hirelings with oppressive Japanese military domination. No institution of higher learning could survive in such an atmosphere as that of "Manchoukuo". Yenching would welcome additional teaching of Japanese subjects, such as history etc., by Japanese, the presence of Japanese students, and any other contacts that made it more international in character, and more qualified to help especially in creating a better understanding between these two countries. But I should rather see it become defunct or driven into exile elsewhere in China than to relinquish its academic freedom or to submit to the suppression of its ideals and principles because of the conflict between these and Japanese militarism.

As to the present hostilities, it was to have been assumed that with superior organization and modern equipment Japan could win military victories, but that her danger lay in the fallacy of relying on these to change the Chinese attitude. Goodwill would not be generated by wholesale destruction of property and slaughter of persons, nor by the racketeering and traffic in narcotics by the lowest class of Japanese, Koreans and Chinese that invariably followed Japanese conquest, as now was taking place in Peiping and throughout North China. I then referred to the pitiful farce of the enforced celebration of the fall of Paotingfu earlier this week when the shops of this city were compelled each to contribute one dollar to pay for the expenses and one clerk to join the procession herded by the police - themselves also under coercion - to attend the mass meeting where Japanese and their minions made speeches. Nothing could be more stupidly inept, but the feelings of the victims and the lookers-on remained unchanged. Whatever the military outcome, the reduced buying power of the Chinese people and the legacy of embittered resentment with the dream of retaliation some day when strong enough, could not be to the real interest of Japan.

I next alluded to the Japanese fear of Communism. China could never be really communistic because of her traditional social patterns and deepest loyalties. With very few exceptions the so-called communists among them were usually restless radicals or ardent patriots to whom this technique appealed as peculiarly efficient. Even these were first Chinese and then Communists, as had recently been demonstrated by the rapprochement between their armies and the Nanking Government. China might be driven in desperation to turn to Russia for help against her most feared and hated enemy, accepting certain terms as the lesser of two evils. But even so, communism as a philosophy of life would never prevail. It was a curious irony

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that both Chinese Communists and Japanese militarists, so antagonistic to each other, had been at one in opposing the Kuomintang, the failings and misdeeds of which had been largely responsible for these successive wars. But the reform of the Kuomintang could be better achieved by other and more peaceful methods.

In conclusion, I reaffirmed my readiness to assist in working for better understanding between the two countries and for real cooperation. I invited him to write me as there was occasion or to call on me when next in the city. He responded most graciously, and was then escorted by Mr. White on a tour over the grounds.

J. Leighton Stuart

October 1, 1937

0652

October 3, 1938

Mr. Laurence E. Salisbury
American Embassy
Peking

My dear Mr. Salisbury:

I am writing again regarding the case of another student who has been seized by the Japanese military authorities or their agents. His name is Shen Yi Sheng, a senior of this year, who had been sent to the Metropolitan Hospital for medical treatment, and was taken away from his sick bed. I understand that the family were also seized, but released the same day, and that this was true of Dr. Fang, the superintendent of the hospital. In any case, the student is still in custody. I should be very grateful, if, through the good offices of the American and Japanese Embassies, the student would be allowed to come to our own University infirmary, and I shall guarantee that he not leave the campus until his case has been cleared up. This is primarily on humanitarian grounds, in order that a person under suspicion may not suffer greater physical injury, and that a student in his senior year have the opportunity to complete his studies, if, after investigation, the authorities feel that he can be released.

May I take this occasion to appeal through you to the Japanese military authorities regarding their general policy in dealing with our students. Before the opening of the session a year ago this autumn, I sent a communication to the special military bureau in which I took the responsibility that there would be no anti-Japanese activities or Communistic agitations on our campus, and asked that if the military authorities had suspicions regarding any individuals, they would bring the matter directly to me, and I would cooperate in dealing with all such cases. This is now the third case in which a student actually enrolled here has been taken off under suspicion. In the two previous cases I advised the boy to go voluntarily from the campus and to answer all questions courteously and honestly, and assured him that we would do our utmost to help toward a proper settlement. The first of these was kept in custody for ten days, the second, of whom I wrote you recently, is still in custody, and the third case has been described above. I am convinced that none of these three students has ever been a Communist, and has not been engaged in any political activities since the Japanese occupation of this area. I have made careful inquiries of my own regarding each one of them, and am quite satisfied that they are not the kind who would be interested in such issues, even apart from the rigid control we are maintaining over the whole student body. ~~and~~ There could be nothing better cal-

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culated to inflame anti-Japanese resentment throughout the student body than the seizure without warning of suspected cases whom the students believe to be innocent. It makes it more difficult, therefore, for me and my colleagues, not only to observe the promise made, but also to carry it out in spirit. I should be very happy if there could be established a basis of mutual understanding, by which the authorities depended less upon paid informers and evidence secretly secured, and dealt openly with those of us within the University who have accepted responsibility. I feel convinced that this would be to the mutual benefit to all concerned. Any assistance you can give in bringing this matter to their attention will be much appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,

jls c

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Oct. 1938

A Special Form of Constructive Aid to China

This is a request for a special fund which is neither directly for the maintenance of Christian Higher Education in China nor for War Relief in this country but should be effective in utilizing one of these in the service of the other. With very few exceptions our students are eager to engage in some form of patriotic service, but apart from enlistment in the army there are only limited opportunities. The hostilities have been so disruptive of normal administrative processes and have so completely absorbed the attention and resources of the Government that all else has been perforce neglected. Yet the many phases of social reconstruction which already had such promising beginnings are even more urgently needed in view of the wide-spread physical devastation as well as the political and economic disorders consequent upon the conflict. Students are willing as never before to live simply and heroically. They are fully conscious of the importance to their country's future of the vast mass of its peasant population and are increasingly ready to share with them the hardships of their life if only they feel themselves to be engaged in worth while forms of service to them and the nation.

Yenching University has for several years past been conducting training courses in rural reconstruction. These are still maintained, but we are now proposing to mobilize, as it were, the whole institution for fitting our students to devote themselves to these humbler but immensely useful activities rather than the more glamorous careers in which in the past they have been notably successful. Our plan is to have each Department explore the practical applications of its courses to the meeting of immediate human problems and perhaps to extend groupings of these along the lines of existing rural reconstruction courses; to encourage students - beginning with the present senior class - to volunteer for such employment; to make contacts with employing agencies or organizations which could use and supervise students so trained; and to seek a fund which could temporarily support selected students in areas or in types of activity for which local support would be impossible until general conditions become stable again. The University administration would accept the responsibility for training, recommending and keeping in touch with such students as would be approved for this purpose.

It is estimated that on the average a student-worker contributed to a given project would require an annual stipend of Chinese currency \$900.00, which at present exchange rates would be about U.S.\$180.00 and that approximately 20 members of the present graduating class might be selected as worthy of trial. To allow for travel and other expenses, as well as for variations in exchange, it would be safer to estimate U.S.\$200.00 per student.

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The total sum asked for. would thus be U.S.\$4000.00 for the first twelve months beginning July, 1939, The period should perhaps be for two years, subject to the record of the individual and to possible external changes. It would be expected that with satisfactory demonstration and as local conditions improve they would be absorbed into governmental or other organizations requiring the service of specially trained workers. In succeeding years there would be longer time for intensive training and for the strengthening of the program in the light of experience. This would seem to be a supremely practical medium for expressing the sympathy of the American people for China, of making effective the goodwill already enshrined in the Yenching plant and its academic work, and of relating such education to human welfare.

(Signed) J. Leighton Stuart



0656

October 13, 1938

Dear Dr. Stuart:

News reached me last Friday to the effect that both my native town, wherein we have our several generations' accumulation of wealth in two small shops, and my home village were looted repeatedly by irregulars beginning from the middle of last month, and people were traveling all the time on the expected "clearing-up" operations. My family of no less than twenty members has to evacuate and take refuge either in Peking or Tientsin as soon as communications become better. My father asked me to help them, beside my regular support, in their removal to and stay in the city. I can not promise him without securing your help. I hope I may advance two hundred dollars from the University for this urgent need and be permitted to refund partly by my salary at twenty dollars per month beginning from January, and partly through some other arrangements which I hope I can manage during the next semester.

I regret for not being able to avoid bothering you once more on such a personal matter after long, long hesitation, and wish to have a talk with you in these days when time is convenient to both of us.

Sincerely and respectfully yours,

(Signed) Liu Hoh Nshan

0657

October 15, 1938

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
Washington D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

It was exceedingly gracious of you to reply so carefully to my inquiry as to why you had not applied the Neutrality Act to Japan and China in the present conflict. Your letter confirms my confidence in your solicitous concern for China, and, together with the material enclosed, makes it entirely clear that you do not regard this as the most effective method of giving assistance.

May I presume further upon your proven interest in this problem, not again by urging a particular course of action, but by commenting, from the standpoint of one long resident in North China, upon the superlative opportunity you have for influencing the outcome of hostilities, to the advantage not only of China, but ultimately of our own country as well, and of the greater cause of international security.

If I may refer again to that memorable interview with you in the spring of 1933, you made the remark that no time need be wasted over the moral aspects of the issue. This is immeasurably more true now than then. Not only is the invasion of China by Japan wholly indefensible, but the ruthless barbarity with which it is being conducted can scarcely be exaggerated. Suffice it to state that the devastation, looting, raping, and slaughter of civilians which are generally known to have taken place in Nanking have occurred in varying degrees wherever the Japanese troops have gone, with the exception of Peking and a few port cities where they encountered virtually no resistance. Even in these places there is cruel oppression and disregard of elemental human rights.

What is of more practical importance, however, is the evidence we who live here have that the Japanese military leaders will be very tenacious in their control of North China, releasing their iron grip only under irresistible compulsion. They are planning permanent occupation and the exploitation of its resources for their own people, virtually as a colonial possession. Its inhabitants will suffer the fate of those in Korea and Manchuria as rapidly as the customary procedure for repressive measures can be put into effect. The aim and result will be intellectual and economic serfdom. That such an outcome will be accepted by the present officials of the National Government and the people of the unoccupied areas no one who is familiar with their newly-aroused patriotic determination can be made to believe. Even the leaders of the "puppet government", and those who for fear or under economic pressure have taken positions in it, share - with almost negligible exceptions - in this attitude, and it is more true of the common people of this region than ever before perhaps in Chinese history. This means a prolonged struggle, disastrous to all concerned, or at its worst an embittered but impotent submission under military coercion insofar as that can be maintained. There is unmistakable evidence also that all foreign interests that conflict with those of the Japanese or are not amenable to their control will be forcibly eliminated. The fear is widespread among well-informed

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Chinese that Great Britain might be induced to accept a compromise settlement which Japan would withdraw from the rest of China if unthwarted in her designs in these five northern provinces.

You have again rendered a notable service to humanity by your messages to European leaders when, as it would seem, nothing else could have averted war. With the almost unanimous American sympathy for China, could you not give expression to this in some no less significant form? It is not impossible that by the time this reaches you even the Japanese militarists would welcome the proposal of mediation or of a conference, possibly with the intimation that sterner measures might be enforced, if this were not accepted. We who are living close to the conflict cannot conceive any such action as an embargo on the shipment of war materials to Japan as involving the slightest danger of war against the United States. That it would almost certainly mean reprisals against American property in this area, quite possibly also the loss of life, would be a small sacrifice in comparison with the immense gain to this suffering people and to the cause of international justice. Nor should this danger act to the slightest degree as a deterrent. Speaking for myself and the particular American enterprise I represent, we should not ask that any fear for the safety of our lives or this property should deter you in taking such strong action as you may deem wise. I find that other Americans with similar responsibilities here feel as I do.

More constructively, and with a long look into the future, American assistance to China in her present agony and the assertion of our determination to help maintain her sovereignty and administrative and territorial integrity would most probably result in securing her national independence. Delivered at last from the menace of Japanese military domination, this vast and virile population would most naturally develop into a unified democracy sharing our own finest ideals of freedom and of international peace, based on reason and right. China would thus become an enormous asset in the grim struggle to preserve these values against unrestrained aggression growing more arrogant and rapacious with each successful use of the modern science of mechanized slaughter. It is because I covet for you, of whose desire for the welfare of China I am more than ever assured, the leadership in this supremely worth while effort that I have ventured to impose on your patience at such length.

Very respectfully yours,

(Signed) J. Leighton Stuart

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Peking, China
October 15, 1938

Hon. Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

We, the undersigned, appeal to you for a more positive American policy dealing with Japanese aggression in China. We do so with less hesitation because of our personal observation of Japanese aims and methods, and because we believe our conclusions are shared by many of our fellow-countrymen resident in China.

Nothing that we might say would add to your own awareness of the indefensible nature of this invasion and of its cruelty. There could perhaps be no stronger condemnation of Japanese policy than their own explanations taken with the actual behavior of their troops and the all but unanimous resentment and resistance of the Chinese people. Whatever military successes the Japanese may yet achieve, they have completely failed in their effort to convince this nation of their good intentions and of the mutual benefit deriving from so-called cooperation. In the occupied areas they have been able to win surprisingly little Chinese support, even with bribes, and a semblance of submission only at the point of the bayonet. They have accomplished nothing in winning Chinese allegiance which would survive the withdrawal of military coercion. We have no question that they intend to dominate North China, at least, for their own selfish ends, and are doing so as rapidly as conditions permit. They will not relinquish this purpose unless forced to do so, because of their determination to exploit the economic resources of this area, to exclude foreigners, and to prepare for war against Russia. For practical purposes, this will amount to annexation with all of the tyranny and terrorism employed in Korea and Manchuria, and here as there, foreign activities and rights will be relentlessly destroyed; the signs of this are apparent in many ways.

The National Government of China, fully supported by public opinion, will not consent to any settlement which does not restore this region, and preserve the independence and integrity of the whole country. We have reason to believe that the highest Japanese officers stationed here are anxious to secure a speedy settlement, but neither they nor the Chinese in the puppet government they have created have any formula by which to bring this about. In these circumstances only outside assistance or pressure can be effective.

We realize that you and your associates are far better qualified to decide on suitable measures than are we. If any concrete course of action is to be taken, however, we feel that no fear of reprisals against American persons or institutions in China should deter our

our Government and people from action looking toward the early ending of this tragic and exhausting conflict. From intimate knowledge of conditions here we are confident that China, freed from this threat to her national existence, will progress steadily in those social and political reforms which had been hopefully begun, and which renewed under more favorable conditions will make of China a nation worthy of all we can do for her in this hour of her supreme need, a great democracy with her own special contribution toward better international order of which you and other American statesmen have caught the vision.

Very respectfully yours,

(Signed) Henry Houghton, Director, Peking Union
Medical College

William B. Pettus, President, College of
Chinese Studies

J. Leighton Stuart, President,
Yenching University

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學大京燕
YENCHING UNIVERSITY
PEKING, CHINA

October 17, 1938

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
"YENTA"

Oct 17/38

Dr. B. A. Garside
150 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Garside:

I am sending herewith a copy of a letter of mine to President Roosevelt and another signed by Henry Houghton, William B. Pettus, and myself to Secretary Hull. The letter to the President ought to be treated with strictest confidence, and is sent you in order that the Trustees may be informed that I have made this suggestion. The letter to the Secretary of State may be regarded more as indicating how strongly some of us here feel about the inaction of our country. It may be pertinent also to enclose certain paragraphs that were in the first draft of our letter to Mr. Hull, as a suggestion of ways in which America might be of help to China. We decided, however, to leave any such concrete suggestions out of the letter to him. Copies of the letter to Secretary Hull are being sent to Harry Price, E. C. Carter, President Dodds, Mrs. Edgerton Parsons, and Dean Donham, Henry R. Luce.

As it happens, I had a two-hour conference day before yesterday with Dr. Hachiro Yuasa, ex-President of Doshisha University, he having resigned to anticipate ejection by the military leaders of his country. He was thoroughly convinced that the Japanese people would welcome the offer of mediation, but stressed the importance of some method of saving the face of the army leaders. Mediation that took the form, not of dictating terms, but of bringing together representative leaders of both countries - all carried on with the fullest publicity possible - would seem to me, especially after that conversation, to be the ideal procedure.

I am enclosing copies of letters sent by me to our Embassy regarding students seized by the Japanese military police. The Li boy has now been held by them for over four weeks, despite assurances of theirs that our willingness to cooperate by advising the boy to go with them, would be responded to by holding him for as brief a period as possible. The second boy, Shen, is also still in custody. The most vicious aspect of these occurrences is that there is no legal process, the proceedings are all in secret, the victims are subject to being beaten or tortured, or to execution, without the facts being divulged, and that there is, in short, no redress. Last week they tried to arrest a third student who fortunately lives in the British Concession in Tientsin. We were tipped off by a friendly Chinese police officer, and I hurried the boy, under the protection of

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Dr. Wolferz, to the station, advising him to stay at home until we felt it safe for him to come back. These incidents are reported to you, so that you may understand something of the concrete anxieties and problems of our present situation. From careful investigation, I am convinced that these three boys are all entirely innocent of any anti-Japanese activities or even of Communist leanings.

I am also sending you a copy of a letter from Mr. H. H. Liu, the chairman of our Department of Journalism, which again is a specific instance of what is happening to innumerable people in this region.

Very sincerely yours,

Heighensmark

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(Paragraphs from first draft of letter to Secretary Hull, but omitted in the letter sent him)

We realize that you and your associates are far better qualified to decide on any concrete course of action than are we. The most obvious one - if at all practicable - would seem to be to stop the sale of essential war materials to Japan. Whether this could best be done by a government embargo, or by persuading the manufacturers voluntarily to forego their profits from this traffic, we can form no opinion. But from all that we can learn, we feel convinced that neither course would have the slightest danger of involving us in war. That our own and all similar American institutions in Japanese-controlled areas would suffer disastrous reprisals may be assumed, but this would be a relatively insignificant and temporary loss as against the benefits not only to the Chinese people, but to all those higher values, the belief in which has led to the founding of these enterprises. We hope that you would not be deterred from any such action by fear for our personal safety or that of the interests we represent.

Is it beyond the range of possibility that the President be encouraged to use the weight of his great influence to offer his mediation, or to propose the calling of a conference of interested powers, making it plain that refusal would lead to more drastic measures? Even the now harassed Japanese militarists might welcome a solution that took the responsibility out of their control, and all Chinese would welcome it as in harmony with their own distinctive ethical heritage, as against the arbitrament of force.

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學大京燕
YENCHING UNIVERSITY
PEKING, CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

October 20, 1938

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
"YENTA"

Dr. B. A. Garside
150 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

INDEXED

ack 1/17

My dear Dr. Garside:

This letter will deal with the problem centering around the Nash and Price families, as discussed in recent letters from Mr. McBrier and yourself, together with some of the broader issues that are suggested by this correspondence.

To begin with the simplest item, if Harry Price and the Presbyterian Board find his appointment mutually satisfactory, this would most easily ensure his return here. We shall be quite willing to have him complete his studies under this arrangement before coming back to Yenching.

As to Vernon Nash, recent letters from him carry a hint that our insistence on special funds being raised may be an easy way of letting him out on our part, or that this may at least be the surmise of yourself and the Trustees who have dealt with his case. There is perhaps no need for me to reaffirm our very genuine desire to have him and his wife permanently on our faculty, although we could not feel justified in diverting from other more urgently needed uses the relatively large sum for this purpose. Our suggestion that he be used for promotional purposes carries with it the hope that in addition to his immediate value in such work, it would keep him connected with Yenching, and might lead to the securing either of special funds for Journalism or to some such increase of income as made it possible for us to look forward to his return.

In the letters which have come to me, the intention of the Trustees is described as aiming to give us an annual appropriation which we are free to use at our discretion. I fully appreciate the confidence this implies, and the administrative advantages of this procedure. On the other hand, they are well aware of the human trait which prefers a specific object. As a matter of fact, our most devoted Trustees have made their own contributions in this form, virtually without exception, as I recall. The promotional staff will undoubtedly continue to solicit funds more or less on this basis. We should be quite willing to have Nash included in our budget, if the amount secured in America were increased by so much, with a reasonable assurance of its continuance. His case and that of Harry Price illustrate a problem that occasionally develops on the field, in which a staff member would be heartily welcomed by everyone, if undesignated funds were not drawn upon. I should like, therefore, to have the Trustees and ourselves modify the general principle to a slight extent so as to cover relatively few cases of this kind, either because it helped in securing special funds in America, or solved a problem of human relationships here, during a period of racial and other adjustments.

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I should like, however, to raise a larger question for your consideration. Since we now are working under the ABCCC which represents most of the ecclesiastical bodies among whose members all of these institutions seek support, would it not be possible for the American appointees to be all related to, and supported by, one or another of the mission boards. Most of the money comes from their members, and, as hitherto, have been secured independently. Such a policy would bring the boards and the churches behind them more directly in touch with the colleges, as was originally the case. The individual teachers would tend to think of themselves somewhat more positively as missionaries. The financial arrangements, once made, ought to be simpler, and the link between supporters and their representatives could be strengthened according to the practice of the mission boards and their own missionaries.

As a specifically Yenching problem, the schedule we adopted with such enthusiasm, applying to both foreigners and Chinese, has had an immense moral value, and has done much to explain the harmony which is felt by all of us here, and which has been one of the largest factors in enabling us to weather the present crisis. But it has obvious inequalities, and works a hardship, especially to young married couples. If the decision as to appointment continues to be with the institution, I feel rather confident that our Chinese colleagues would see no objection to having all foreign members contributed, as it were, to the University, by the western founding bodies, rather than supported out of cash remittances. An additional gain perhaps would be the flexibility with which such foreign personnel could be transferred from one institution to another, and new appointees be selected.

To return to Nash, could not the ABCCC determine to maintain work in Journalism, the location to be decided on the merits of the case, and Nash to be assigned accordingly.

This letter is not so much urging any special procedure, as attempting to deal with the specific cases about which we have been in correspondence, in the light of revision of general policies. The ideal solution would seem to me to be to have the ABCCC act as a mission board for the churches of North America in the field of higher education, and maintain such foreign teachers as seem to them qualified, subject in each case to approval by the field administration. How this would be related to British societies and personnel, is a matter that your experience will enable you to deal with.

Very sincerely yours,

Lighten Stuart

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UNIVERSITIES
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JOINT OFFICE

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October 26, 1938

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart
Yenching University
Peking, China

Dear Dr. Stuart:

I have received a letter from Mr. P. Tulane Atkinson, Treasurer of the Alumni Association of Hampden-Sydney conveying to you profound appreciation for your check for \$5.00 to cover alumni dues and the subscription to the "Record".

He is also appreciative of our writing at length summarizing the problems facing the University in North China, and he expresses gratitude at the work of Yenching which is being carried on under such efficient and statesmanlike leadership.

Most cordially yours,

C. A. EVANS

CAE/B

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Sturges
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CONFIDENTIAL

To the Board of Trustees:

As there is a chance to send this communication by a friend in the British Embassy, I am writing at once, to report an interview last evening with Mr. (Wang Ke-min who, as you know, is the titular head) of the Peking puppet government.

A few days ago we learned through a friendly Chinese in police headquarters that the Japanese were planning to interfere with our University bus service. We operate cars owned by ourselves on a daily schedule to and from the city as a convenience to our own community and friends. The pretext given was that we interfered with the commercial busses by carrying people who had no connection with us. These other companies are now run by Japanese, as is everything else around here that they can get their hands on. Whether this was a deliberate attempt to embarrass us, or merely part of the general racketeering they are carrying on, we can only speculate; but more probably the latter. Our friend suggested that we agree to certain conditions thus anticipating any formal orders against us. But this would have been quite inconvenient to our constituency, although we are of course willing enough to restrict transportation to people in some way related to us. In fact, we have a statement to this effect, placed conspicuously at the entrance to the cars. Mr. Tsai, our controller, came to me with the problem. I debated going to the American Embassy once more and have them take it up with the Japanese Embassy, but it seemed a relatively small matter. I then thought of going to the present commissioner of police, whom I know personally, and who, like most other decent Chinese, is making the best he can of a bad situation. He has, however, no real authority in matters of this kind, and must take orders from the Japanese. I therefore decided yesterday to request an appointment with Mr. (Wang) and ask for his help. I found him in the stately old building which was once the foreign office of the Chinese government, and which is now both his palace and his prison, as he almost never dares to leave. Immediately after the exchange of civilities, he broke out with comments on the lack of resistance at Canton and the loss of that city with all the damage to the Chinese cause, both in morale and in military strategy. He asked me what I thought of the outlook, and when I replied that if General Chiang and others with him could rally from this terrific shock and maintain their resistance, it seemed to me that quite possibly the loss of Canton, followed so closely by that of Hankow, might be more to the advantage of China than of Japan, in that the Japanese would have one more evidence of the futility of their method of trying to get China under their influence. We discussed China's ability to carry on financially, public morale, etc.

The significance of all this is that I was talking as freely to the nominal head of the Japanese-created regime as I would have to any Chinese patriot, and that he wanted to share his own feelings with someone whom he knew to be sympathetic. This reveals how superficial and insecure is the Japanese hold even upon those whom they induce to work with them. He went on to tell me how confused is the situation among the Japanese themselves. There are two parties among the military. One, which seems to be winning more influential men to its side, has come to advocate: 1. the cessation of hostilities in China, in order to prepare to fight Russia; 2. the restoration of full Chinese administration and control here, including even Manchuria; 3. attempts to secure "economic cooperation" through cultural and other

methods. The notorious Doihara, arch-agent of intrigue for many years, has come out for this program. Its advocacy by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ugaki, led to his ejection from the cabinet a few weeks ago. The other party of extremists argues for carrying on the war in China to a finish. It was this division which led to the attack on Canton. I asked Mr. (Wang) if either group had any policy as to what they would do once either of these solutions was adopted. He shook his head grimly and said that they never had had any policy from the beginning, nor had they any clear idea now what they would do. He added that he was thoroughly unhappy with the whole situation and had determined to retire not later than December 14, the date when he took office a year ago; that the Chinese call him a traitor and the Japanese charged him of not working for them; and that he saw nothing ahead. I of course encouraged him in this decision, although it is doubtful whether the Japanese will allow him to retire.

For some time Mr. (Wang) has been trying to formulate peace terms under the direction, of course, of his masters, but he restates this almost from day to day. I asked him if he thought the time had come for President Roosevelt to offer mediation. He replied it would be better if Germany, or possibly Italy, undertook this first, as that would give the Japanese military more face. The American President might then render his assistance. All this indicates how eager the Japanese are to end the war. They would be quite willing even to make terms with General Chiang and the present government, in spite of all their assertions to the contrary, if they could somehow not lose too much prestige. In fact, Mr. Wang freely said that the more extremist group are compelled to carry on, because they fear the consequences at home of any other course. He pointed out what is recognized by many others, that the army itself, especially the common soldiers, would gladly get out of this mess, and go back home; but it is the ronin, adventurers, and camp-followers generally who are profiteering under the protection of the army, who want to keep this up. Unfortunately, many military officers are grafting in all these various forms of racket and are otherwise involved in trying to hold on to what they have seized. If, as I venture to believe will be the case, the Chinese government has the fortitude, in the face of these latest disasters, to keep up the struggle, they will have the support of nearly all Chinese, and may be able before many months to force the Japanese to terms that can be honorably accepted. The one essential that every patriot and every friend of China should insist on is, in the language of the Nine-Power Pact, the sovereignty and administrative and territorial integrity of China. Whatever American friends can do to advocate this solution will be very helpful, especially since there are disturbing hints that the four nations which recently affected a settlement in Europe at the expense of Czechoslovakia may try to do the same at China's expense, for the benefit of their own trade in this country. America is the one nation that can prove itself the really disinterested friend of China.

Meanwhile the Japanese are trying, by every form of frightfulness and barbarity, to suppress the guerrilla activities in this region, as their next task will be to restore order in rural regions, and they have no other method. For instance, in the villages near here, they are using the device of stringing together about a dozen able-bodied men in a village by a wire running through the nose and mouth of each, and then taking them to the edge of the village and burying them alive. The authority for this particular statement is Rev. John D. Hayes who has just returned from a country district where the Presbyterian Mission has work. From the head, therefore, of the regime, which they boast of as the real government of China, to the hitherto

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ignorant and indifferent rustics, they are winning no one, except in so far as this can be accomplished by fear or by the economic benefits, which to the shame of all decent Chinese, not a few of the worst type are willing to engage in.

Very sincerely yours,

October 28, 1938

J.L.S.

0673

October 29, 1938

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart
Miss Mary Cookingham
Yenching University
Peiping, China

Dear Friends:

I am enclosing herewith the minutes of the meeting of the Executive-Promotion Committees held on October 5th, and the minutes of the Special Committee meeting held on October 7th.

I think the actions are clear in themselves so that further explanation is unnecessary, except in reference to the action regarding Professor Nash.

The proposal from Mr. Higdon and Dr. Shafer of the Foreign Missions Conference was that Mr. Nash be turned over to them for use in their publicity campaign for the post-Madras meetings in America. This was to be done as a donation by Yenching University and the Associated Boards for such of his time as might be used up until January 1st; thereafter the Foreign Missions Conference would take care of his salary for an indeterminate period of from three to six months. The committee, however, felt that any time Mr. Nash had free from his studies at Columbia should be used in our emergency campaign.

May I add just a personal note and tell you of my own satisfaction at having the opportunity of working with you in the Yenching University enterprise. This is my first communication with you since joining the staff, and I am looking forward to an interesting and enjoyable time of service with you.

Sincerely yours,

JIP:PC
Enc.

Assistant Secretary

0674

October 31, 1938

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart
Yenching University
Peking, China

Dear Dr. Stuart:

Your letter addressed to Mr. Garside dated September 29th came to hand last Wednesday, and the order for "Amerasia" was placed immediately. On October 29th, your letter of October 1st addressed to the undersigned came to hand, and we immediately cancelled the order.

Jack wrote me several weeks ago about buying a new car at a cost of around \$600.00, and I asked him if he had explored the possibility of purchasing on time. Car purchases are now being spread over a period of two years and if properly financed carry the normal six per cent carrying charge. He replied that it would be impossible for him to follow such a course as salary was hardly adequate to keep him in living expenses. He did say, however, that he had made arrangements to get through the winter with his present car and that there was no immediate necessity for an outlay of cash for this purpose. Your letter indicates that you wish me to notify him that \$600.00 is available, and I will follow this course.

Incidentally, the investment of \$1,250.00 which you placed in our hands for employment has not been done, and neither was it charged back against the field from where it was originally credited. I have taken the matter up with the Investment Committee and individual members and the conclusion has been that the only thing the Committee would desire to buy would be highest grade bonds yielding around three per cent. Savings bank accounts are now yielding two and one-quarter up to two and three-quarters per cent, but the banks do not take trust accounts except that by withdrawal from the bank by the owner. In other words, the opening of a savings bank account is surrounded with so much red tape when it is not a personal account that one hesitates to take such a step. As matters now stand, the \$1,250.00 has been brought back to our office through a journal entry and credited to your account. We are also crediting \$15.00 which Warren Stuart sent us in the shape of a Davies and Elkin Coupon. That is, we will credit it if it is not returned.

Will let you know later regarding Jack's decision.

With sincerest personal regards, I am

Most cordially yours,

CAB/B

C. A. EVANS

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INDEXED

燕京大學
YENCHING UNIVERSITY
PEKING, CHINA

October 31, 1938

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
"YENTA"

ack 12/15

Dr. E. A. Garside
150 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Dr. Garside:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of our budget as revised and approved by the Faculty Executive Committee. There are a number of rather minor changes mostly by way of increasing the staff because of our large enrollment, or the restoration of items which, in view of our relative stability, financial and otherwise, seemed desirable.

There is quite a discrepancy between the exchange rate used and the current one. As against this, the whole situation is full of uncertainties. There are dire predictions about the Chinese dollar dropping to practically nothing. Whether or not the emergency efforts in America will be successful, cannot be assured. We may have emergency needs which cannot be foretold, or the cost of living may continue to increase. For these and similar reasons it has seemed best to project the budget on the original basis, and I hope this will be agreed to by the Trustees in American promotional efforts. There are probably no details that would be of special interest to the Trustees.

At the exchange rate of 3:1 the revised budget calls for an additional US\$45,333, whereas the Trustees are undertaking to raise \$56,331. If successful, there would be a surplus of about \$11,000. Should we have no necessity to meet requirements such as are indicated in the preceding paragraph, we propose that such a surplus be expended as follows:

1. The complete re-roofing of the Warner Gymnasium. This has leaked from the beginning, and repairs in spots do not seem to correct faulty work in the original construction. \$2500.
2. Improvements and purchase of further equipment in the McKelvey Infirmary in view of the heavy demands for adequate care of the health of our men students. \$2000.
3. The remainder to be used for the liquidation of old construction deficits in order to free funds for current expenses.

Very sincerely yours,

Freightman

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1 revised budget 1938-39 attached

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