Many months ago, when all of us were dreaming of how to get our universities to send us to Winnipeg, I conceived the possibility of a paper that I then called "Hindu Strategies for Change." That is the title you have read, possibly, in the programme of the congress. You are therefore entitled to expect from me that I shall survey the whole development of Indian cultural history, and answer all the questions raised by the official theme of our congress as well. But the clear light of the sun of midsummer, when the paper had to be written, has brought me a little sobriety.

Some oriental Aesop tells of a fox who rose at dawn and stepped out to begin his day's work. Seeing his big shadow, he said, "I shall have a camel for lunch today!" The morning's hunt proceeded and his shadow grew smaller and smaller. At high noon he looked down in an effort to see his shadow on the ground, and said, "A mouse will do."

The mouse in this case will be a handful of words and numbers, and the title is "Hindu Formulas for Innovation." The words and numbers I have in mind appear to have been powerful in the facilitating of change. In a religious tradition presenting very special difficulties to innovators, they were switching-tools by which new directions could be set.

"What new directions?" you may ask, "In Hinduism, what innovations?" Is Hinduism not the perennial philosophy, the eternal religion, ever the same unchanging truth varied only by insubstantial changes in outward expression?
If that is your position, rest in peace: let us talk then about those "changes in outward expression." They are not few. Interpreters of Hinduism of several schools have pictured Hinduism as unchanging, and there is some truth in that generalization, but as a final characterization of Hinduism it will not do. Hinduism has accepted innovations continuously—in doctrine, in religious practice, and in religious experience. My only effort at persuasion shall be a request that you look back upon an academic experience that we all share: your first effort to read through the five volumes of S. N. Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*, and your early attempts to absorb J. N. Farquhar's dense *Outline of the Religious Literature of India*. Can anyone reflect on the stupifying mass of India's succession of schools and scriptures, and still believe that Hinduism actually stopped up the mouth of innovators? If Hinduism changed less than other traditions, the difference is not great.

What is different in Hinduism is not how much it changed, but how it changed. That question of "how?" is the question of this paper. The Hindu innovator had to practice tactics that were different indeed. The unbroken hegemony of a single continuing priestly and literary class was an adamantine fact to which all Hindu reformers had to adapt. When we see how they faced this reality, we shall understand why an *ever*-changing tradition has appeared to be a *never*-changing tradition.

The age of the Vedas ended with a religious revolution: in the 7th century B.C. the Indian world was being turned upside down. No Hindu ecclesiastical history directly says so, however.
Unaided by any internal reporting of great conflicts, scholars read through the chronological strata of Hindu sacred writings, and suddenly they find Upanishads, and suddenly there are āyurvedas and dharmaśāstras and suddenly they find themselves in a new world: new types of religious leaders are cultivating new types of religious experience in the context of new cosmologies and new values. A New social structure has taken shape, governed by a new social ethics. The subversion of the Vedic order was at least as thorough as any transformation wrought by the Protestant reformation or by the rise of Christianity within Judaism.

Hindu theoreticians picture the transition as a serene course of events: a happy succession of śāhitya, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka, Upanishad and so forth, one harmonious line of scriptures revealed to sages of a single spirit. But scholars perceive that the Upanishads were born in tension; reading between the lines they have recovered the usual story of a struggle between old and new. We shall not rehearse here their ingenious account of the processes of this change. Our interest focuses upon the strategy of change: How was the acceptance of these strange new scriptures effected? How did this radical innovation succeed? To answer fully would require, by the standards of occidental church history, a multi-volume work. I believe that something of this problem can be understood if we can perceive all the meaning that lies in two Indic terms that served to bridge the gap between old and new in this first of known Indian revolutions.

The first of these relational words is "Vedānta." It occurs twice in the Upanishads. The Mund. Up. 3:2.6-8
speaks of "the Vedānta knowledge" and the chief points of the content of that vedāntavijñāna are then mentioned. They are the characteristic teachings of the Upanishads. The Āḷvaśvatara Upanishad in the finale of its discourse calls its own message "the supreme secret in the Vedānta," vedānte paramam guhyam, 6:22. "Vedanta" is being used as a designation for the Upanishad tradition." The term stuck.

"Vedānta" is a one-word history of the domestication of an innovation. "Veda-anta," it means, etymologically, the Veda's end—in two senses. The upanishads were the portion of Vedic canon that was last in the sequence of traditional Veda-recitation, and the portion that was last appended in later written compilations. The Upanishads were the end of the Veda positionally. More important, they were the end—i.e. the consummation—of the presentation of Vedic teaching pedagogically. By the time when the word "Vedānta" came into use, the material at the end of any instructional presentation had been given a special function: it was the phase at which the complete and unqualified doctrine of the teacher was at last clearly presented. Such progressive instruction is found for example in Chāndogya Up. 8:7-13 where it is only in the fourth and final stage of indoctrination that Prajāpati tells Indra the full truth about the nature of the soul.* "Vedānta" identifies Upanishad doctrine as the Veda's crowning truth.

*"Vedanta" does not mean "Veda's End" in the sense of "the Veda's purpose." Vedic revelation was conceived as too-imper-sonally given to have had a purpose.
The word "Vedānta" occurs in upanishads that are rather late. Its use reflects, then, long consideration of the problem of the relation between the new light and the old. It reveals the tactic by which the producers of the Upanishads succeeded in giving their religion a status not inferior to that of the more ancient sacrificial tradition. In calling their gospel "Vedānta" the reformers are saying that the appearance of the Upanishads involved no disruption: Vedic teaching, whether in premonition or in consummation, is one continuous process. The rishis of old had insight into this teaching, says the śvetāsватara Upanishad in the passage mentioned: its secret had been "proclaimed in olden time," purākalpe pracoditam. Now the Upanishads bring fully into the light a primeval truth that was the secret essence of the Vedas from the start. No new discovery is involved; no change, really, has occurred, but only the faithful stressing of the essence of old truth.

In the Mahābhārata, "Vedānta" has become the commonplace term for the upanishads, and such it remains until this day. Acceptance of the word continues to involve acceptance of its picture of the relation between śāṁhitā and Upanishad. It bridges a chasm still, connecting to the satisfaction of many the mystical religion of the Upanishads with the sacrificial religion against which it revolted 2500 years ago.

The post-vedic overturn brought changes in more than religious experience. There was equally radical change in Aryan social structure and social ethics. The mobile vedic society composed of classes that were few and flexible.
gave way to a ranked and disciplined society of hereditary occupational groups. The religious ethics that bound this hierarchy of castes and age-groups together was called varṇāśrama dharma. It was formulated in specialized scriptures of a radically-new type. These scriptures—the dharma-sūtras and dharmaśāstras—were also called smṛiti. Smṛiti is the second of our bridge-words, and a concept that facilitated a social innovation of astounding dimension.

A social metamorphosis of the magnitude of the post-vedic change in India is hard to find elsewhere outside the context of a conversion to a new religion. Muslim Arabs look back across a similar gap and call their former condition "the age of ignorance." Christians look back upon the transition from the Law to the Gospel and consider that they entered not only a new religion but a new cosmic age. Hindus look back on as drastic an overturn with no sense of change: they live in the "vedic" society still. And the arch-vedists among the Hindu learned, the karma-mīmāṃsists scholars who are the guardians of the continuing Vedic religion, heartily agree. The karma-mīmāṃsists are the very theorists, in fact, who drew up the orthodox formula by which caste-world became vedic world and varṇāśrama ethics became "vedic" ethics. In a thousand years of literary effort they developed in their handbooks the theory of smṛiti: that the social requirements of the revealed Vedas have been re-stated for our convenience in works called smṛitis, in plain Sanskrit, and in almost all instances they lay down our duties with all the authority of vedic revelation.

Even as early as 200 B.C. we find in the Purva-Mīmāṃsa-sūtras of Jaimini that smṛitis have long been known. No one

Cāganāth Jha, Purva-Mīmāṃsa in Its Sources (Varanasi, Benares Hindu University, 2nd ed. 1954), p. 192.
denies that they are holy books that ought to be obeyed. What
the karma-mīmāṃsists undertake to explain is why the smṛitis are
valid, even though they are the work of human authors and differ
in content from the eternally-revealed Vedas. They explain
that the smṛitis have authority because they were composed by
holy sages of a better time who knew the Vedas in their entirety.
Though the lawbooks of those sages contain very many rules
whose source cannot now be found in any known Veda, we must
not assume that they have no vedic base and no vedic force.
The authors of the smṛitīs were trusty persons, and a much more
extensive vedic literature was available to them, including
texts that have been lost—or rather, scattered in unknown
places.¹ Those Vedic texts that are no longer available
are the invisible source of almost all those smṛiti rules whose
authentication cannot be found in the Vedas that we still
possess. We may reject commands found in dharmasastras only
when they contradict a plain Vedic text, or when their patent
source is the self-interest of a smṛiti-writer. Otherwise
they are the authentic and advantageous current guides to
religious living for those who belong to the vedic tradition.
They are equivalent to Vedas: vedatulyā hi smṛiti.²

In its own realm of social thought, the word smṛiti,
like the word vedānta minimized the contrast between ages and
extended the sanctity of the old to the radically new. Smṛiti
made the new society somehow a "Vedic" society, made new moral

¹P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra vol. III (Poona,
into restatements of eternal regulations, and made the post-Vedic social change into non-change in the Hindu mind.

In time, epics and purāṇas also were acknowledged to be smṛiti, and even later innovations were clothed in a derivative sanctity by scarcely-conscious extension of this principle of re-statement. As a matter of fact, any religious writing could gain acceptance in the "vedic" tradition if it expressed the doctrinal and moral consensus of its time, if it was issued under the nominal authorship of some ancient sage, and if it had the nihil obstat, interested or disinterested, of a few approving brahmans. Thus a people who were bound, in theory, to every syllable of a supernatural and infallible scripture, became in fact permissive of change, and uninhibited participants in radical transitions. In the new—seen through the spectacles of the smṛiti concept—the old truth was present still.

So far we have been studying famous old formulas. Let me elaborate now on the Hindu approach to change as seen in less familiar devices that reveal the same attitudes. A cabala of numerology is involved, and an irenic technique for the introducing of the new that I shall call, in English, the Device of Just-One-More. Indian theorists have not explained it. Neither have its practitioners discussed it. The Just-one-more strategem becomes null when talked about. It has no definitive name. An expert now in the art of authenticizing, I cooked up for Just-One-More a hoary-sounding Sanskrit name. It shall be known as ekottaropaya, the device of one more (counting finger).

The preceptor of the art of ekottaropaya counsels his radical young disciples thus: "When you must present a
teaching that is a recent fabrication, acknowledge only such degree of novelty as is absolutely unconcealable. Attach your new doctrine to the sequence of an unimpeachable old formula. Speak well of that old formula. Do not suggest that its author knew little, but that you know a little more. Present your addendum as something that completes rather than contradicts—the fullness, always implied, of the waxing moon. Invite your hearer to move forward with the rhythm of your impeccable counting: ask him to take only one short leap, a leap irresistible in its naturalness and totally faithful to the old direction of his logic."

I shall cite several examples of the use of the Just-One-More technique, from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. The numbers 4, 5, 17, and 34 have been used by its author to introduce important new ideas with minimum shock and with a maximum of conventionality.

In several passages the Śatapatha Brahmana pronounces in a most solemn manner that Prajāpati, the divine "Lord of Progeny," is the Thirty-Fourth. The declaration is weighty, but its import is not very clear to the uninitiated. A study of the context reveals that the puzzling numerical assertion is made in connection with a matter that is not insignificant. The passages constitute one of Hinduism's earliest expositions of a monotheistic theory of the universe. Rigveda 10:129 had suggested only in passing the possibility of a God before the gods. Vishnu and Śiva in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa have not yet begun to become foci of monotheistic thought. The great deity of this Brāhmaṇa is Prajāpati.

and the first serious effort to produce the fabric of a mono-
theistic cosmology are centering upon him. Prajāpati is said to be sacrifice personified; he possesses all the productive powers of the sacrifice, and thus of the whole Vedic pantheon. He is all-progenitor, the source of all that is and the being of all that is. He was the creator of the gods. It is this newly-postulated One God of the universe who is also declared to be The Thirty-fourth! To an adherent of the Biblical tradition this seems a peculiar way of reinforcing one's theological position. What is the logic of this statement?

The significance of Prajāpati's status as The Thirty-fourth lies in the fact that, by general agreement since Indo-Iranian times, the gods of the Aryan pantheon are properly thirty-three. The early Buddhists were familiar with this statistic of the celestialia census: the Buddha descends to earth from Trayastriṃśa, the Heaven of the Thirty-three. The Satapatha Brāhmaṇa itself gives lists in which the roster of the gods is made somehow to add up to that total. Thirty-three is the total of the gods of earth, atmosphere and heaven—all the gods there are. It is in that context that it makes sense to say that Prajāpati is Thirty-fourth. The statement has a double significance.

First, there is an aggressiveness here, negative toward teaching of the past. If Prajāpati is 34th, he is not one of the familiar old ṛgvas, the nature-gods. The ṛgvas are only thirty-three. Prajāpati belongs to a new order and probably to a superior order. He is a different kind of divinity.

its stress on the differentness of Prajāpati, in a similar arithmetic claim. It is a cryptic statement, in this case, that Prajāpati is The Fourth. His Fourthness is in relation to the three lokas. These are the three strata of the natural world—earth, atmosphere, and heaven—in one or another of which each of the 33 devas is said to reside. Prajāpati's abode, we are to understand, is in none of these regions of nature, but in a loftier, transcendant realm. He is not in nature, but above nature.

Transcendence of another kind is asserted in an esoteric statement, elsewhere, that the number of Prajāpati is Seventeen. What is transcended in this enumeration is the aggregate of the 16 tattvas or metaphysical elements in the composition of the human psyche. As Seventeenth, Prajāpati is beyond the competence of human understanding, he is not mentally penetrable. Neither is he, as 17th, further factorable or measurable. He is explicable only in terms of himself.*

Whether proclaiming a God who is 17th, or 4th, or 34th, the proclaimer of Prajāpati announces an unprecedented kind of God who is not included nor comprehended by the natural world, who in some way surpasses the category of the known gods. Something of the historic offensiveness of the world's original monotheistic proclamations is found also here.

Yet all of these figures, in a second unfolding of their meaning, soften the shock of the proclamation of the new God's Otherness. A God who is really 34th could not be so if 33 gods do not exist, or if the 33 belong to an utterly unrelated genus, a non-comparable order of being. Prajāpati

surpasses but he does not contradict the nature of the devas, nor does he require their elimination. The Śatapatha proposes a monotheism that should be intelligible and acceptable because it goes only one step beyond conceptions of deity that have long been familiar. What the author asks is an extension, not a reversal, of the old understanding of the sacred. Just one more insight is required.

Such accommodation to polytheism has been characteristic of Indian monotheism. We may contrast Isaiah's "I am the Lord and there is no other; besides Me there is no God." (45:5). We should remember also the Occident's thousand years of battle between polytheism and monotheism, from Zarathustra to Muhammad. But our undertaking today is not to evaluate Hindu strategy but to depict its tendency: India's nascent monotheism, like all else new in India, gained a place for itself by a policy of minimizing the difference of the new.

Hindu monotheists in a later and different confrontation used the ekottara device in proclaiming their Lord to be the Twenty-sixth. Their audience in that case were not worshippers of 33 gods but of none—the adherents of the atheistic Sāṃkhya system. In their metaphysics these thinkers acknowledged 24 material realities, one spiritual category to which individual souls belonged: 25 in total, and that is all. This Sāṃkhya analysis had its supporting Upanishad texts, and it was a useful analysis of the psyche that enjoyed wide acceptance. The Indian evangelists of monotheism embraced the doctrine as far as it went, and proclaimed that, beyond it, there is a Twenty-Sixth Reality. It is Iśvara, the Lord who presides over all these twenty-five, and is the giver of salvation. In their approach to believers in the Sāṃkhya these monotheists continued the familiar old Indian method of One-upsmanship.

The most audacious of all operations of One-Upsmanship has been the attempt to add to the number of the Vedas. The first campaign of this kind appears to have been successful. In the earliest period of our knowledge the vedic wisdom is a *trayī vidyā* and the number of the Vedas is three. They are known as three in early Buddhist literature,¹ and there are brahmans in South India still who recognize no more.² But in Mundaka Upanishad 1.1.5 the priests called Atharvans have already "made it" with some high-placed persons: their hymns are mentioned as constituting an Atharva-veda. In the Mahābhārata that acceptance has become general: the Vedas when numbered are accounted to be four. The trick had been done.

And if done once, why not again? If there could be a fourth Veda, why not a fifth? New Vedas could not be written, of course, for all true Vedas must have existed from eternity. But Vedas now unknown could be newly discovered; or among old books of unknown origin, some might be newly discovered to be Vedas. Old Vedas have been lost, as we have seen, and as eternal books they could not have been destroyed. They are in existence somewhere, and why should someone not find them?³

Not surprisingly, some were found. No sooner had the Atharvan collection obtained secure vedic status than writers began to push the candidacy of others. Many Mahābhārata readings claim vedic status for the Mahābhārata itself.⁴

¹M. Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, I (University of Calcutta, 1927), p. 110.
²Maurice Bloomfield, Hymns of the Atharvaveda, 1897; (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1964), pp. xxix n. 2.
The theologian Madhva in the thirteenth century calls the epics, purānas and the Vaishāvya sāphitās a fifth veda for the lower castes.¹

But the really daring Hindu claim to Vedahood was made on behalf of the Tantra literature that began to appear about the middle of the first millenium A.D. If Tantraism was not a revolution against the Vedic tradition, the tradition has not known one. Just here, where the challenge to Vedic ideals was greatest, the claim to vedic status is made with special persistence. Some Tātric writers are content to have the Tantras viewed, like the smṛitis, as no more than the practical equivalent of Vedas—restatements and adaptations of archaic codes, remade to suit the capacity of weak humanity in the evil Kali age. But the Niruttara Tantra and the Meru Tantra include the Tantras in the Vedas themselves. The Niruttara says they are a fifth Veda. Others tantras elaborate on the claim, saying that the tantras were revealed from the lips of the fifth face of Śiva, just as the familiar ones issued from the other four. Because Śiva himself was the utterer of the Tantras, they are of course fully revealed and fully equivalent to the other four, and absolutely independent sources of higher truth.²

Was a more audacious legitimation ever proposed?

Well, perhaps. The most dashing attempt to promote a scripture by adding it to the Vedas may have been a Christian one. The notion of a lost Veda was sufficiently alive in South India in the 17th century to attract the attention of the

sharp-minded Jesuit missionary, Roberto di Nobili. In a letter from Madurai, sent to the chief of his order on December 24th, 1608, he says:

The local brahmans acknowledge three Vedas or codes, and they admit that none of the three offers access to eternal salvation. They say that they possessed, once upon a time, a fourth Veda, a scripture through which salvation had been possible; but the greater part of that saving Veda has been lost, and its few remnants lie entangled and confused in the other three.

Nobili explains his tactic for getting a respectful hearing for his Christian teaching. Just as the Apostle Paul spoke to the philosophers of Athens about their unknown god, he too accommodates to the conceptions of the country. He tells the brahmans that he has come from a far country for the express purpose of bringing to them the saving law that they believe to have been lost. If they wish to know that Veda and have salvation, they need only to come to him for instruction, for he brings the forgotten teaching that they long to hear.¹

It appears that the brahman establishment of Madurai did not hasten to adjoin the New Testament to the canon of the Vedas. But neither were they outraged. The attempt was polite, and graced with a certain learning. In a few years' stay in India, Nobili had learned how to make a good case for acceptance of a new teaching.

I have now expended all my little hoard of change-facilitating Hindu slogans. They are mere flecks of evidence.

regarding the nature of culture-absorbing struggles for change about which we know very little. They provide a base, however, for a few generalizations about the operating principles of traditional Hindu innovation.

Hindu innovation was not confrontational. It never confessed that radical displacement was its purpose. Its departures from current views were not admitted to be new. They were a rehabilitation of the teaching of the sages of the teachers of ideal former times; or they the final articulation of what is implicit in established truths.

Is there anything peculiar to Hinduism in such irenic tactics? It is for comparativists to utter the last word on that question. But a first word, made of pure surmise, is as usual not repressible.

The reformers of all traditions, I believe, have rested their proposals when possible upon the ancient values of their cultures, and have stressed the continuity of their proposals with the honored past. In many societies, however, the utility of this approach has been limited by the existence of an effective historiography. The floating of interested interpretations of the past is often curbed by substantial information about the actualities of the past. The western reformer, for instance, has often been compelled to label the new as new, because his hearers knew very well that it was new. The reformer had no alternative—he had to argue that even the new can be true. To justify such an evaluation of the new, the innovating thinkers of western culture developed an array
of theologies of revolution: revelation is progressive, and time makes ancient good uncouth. The Kingdom of God is coming in power, and the codes of former ages have lapsed and are of no effect. Evolution bears us ever onward and upward into increasing light. Thesis, antithesis and synthesis are the process of realization. Confrontation and the elimination of the old is the pathway to truth.

Not even western religion, of course, holds that the new is necessarily true just because it is new; but we approach that position in the secular religion of western academia, where the goddess Nova is the principal object of worship. The Apostle Paul found the philosophers of Athens spending their time "in nothing except telling or hearing something new." When we decided to come and present something at Winnipeg, we realized that our offering would have to seem new, or it would not do. You smiled knowingly, I hope, if you read the abstract in which I did my best to persuade you that the findings of this paper would be positively revolutionary. You are tolerant, because you know my necessities. Slanting material to make it seem worthy of a hearing has been a vital game in both east and west.

But the direction of the slant has often differed in the two cultures. The western reformer can slant his message either way, according to the main chance: he can say, "I speak the truth because what I say is very old," or he can if necessary say, "I speak the truth because what I say is utterly unprecedented." The Hindu reformer had no such option: his credit rested entirely on the primeval nature of his proclamation.
The Hindu strategists of change were different, then, not in the tactics used, but in the tactics that they never used. They could not propose that the good and the true lie in the future rather than in the past. They could not justify the deliberate destruction of tradition. They could not use newness itself as a measure of truth.