

PLEASE DESTROY THIS SHEET AFTER MAKING ANY CAUTIOUS NOTES
YOU MAY DESIRE TO KEEP.

The materials sent you herewith arise from a visit of M. S. Bates to Japan in the first months of 1936. He went entirely in a private capacity, though at the instance of Christian groups interested in better relations and in better understanding of immediate problems. His opportunities and activities in Japan were affected by his academic position in history and international relations, especially his study in Russian and in Japanese problems.

The significance and interest of particular incidents, quotations, and personalities cannot easily be transmitted. The following information is given merely to add some sense of life to the necessarily generalized report. Official interviews were not wrought, though at the instance of a highly placed Japanese, Mr. Bates was sent to the newly appointed Ambassador to China. (Arata, later made Minister of Foreign Affairs). Other conversations included editors of the Nichi-Nichi and of the Asahi, as well as of the Japan Chronicle; foreign correspondents such as Hugh Byas and W. H. Chamberlin; important Japanese and foreign businessmen; diplomats; the radical leaders mentioned in the report; university professors, especially those concerned with constitutional law and with national ethics; peers; officers and directors of international societies; Christian workers of many sorts; educational administrators; officers of women's leagues; students. Nine days were spent in Tokyo, with shorter visits in Nagasaki, Kobe, Osaka, and Kyoto. The intensive program was made possible only by the generous and even strenuous efforts of excellent friends in Japan. There was careful talk with 34 Japanese, usually in private interviews of an hour or more; acquaintance with 14 others; association in some useful degree with 46 missionaries individually or in home groups; interviews with 9 other foreigners; addresses or talks followed by questions before 9 meetings arranged by invitation--half of those attending were Japanese.

As to constructive program, suggestions and criticisms from you are heartily desired. Let us know of any experience or project along these lines. If we can be of assistance in suggesting persons or institutions with whom you can helpfully communicate, please give us the facts that would enable us to reply most appropriately. Our purpose is not centralization or uniformity, but mutual aid and the pooling of both thought and experience. Address: M. S. Bates, University of Nanking, Nanking; alternatively, Miss A. E. Moffet, Presbyterian Mission, Nanking. From us you can secure names and addresses of persons in Japan interested and competent in arranging for constructive use of serviceable visitors there. Lists will also be in the hands of Rev. R. Rees, 169 Yuen Ming Yuen Road, Shanghai; Y. T. Wu or E. E. Barnett, National Council, Y.M.C.A., Museum Road, Shanghai; C. S. Miao or E. H. Cressy, China Christian Educational Association, 169 Yuen Ming Yuen Road, Shanghai.

REPORT ON PRESENT DAY JAPAN:

With Particular Reference to Policy Toward China

Introductory Statement: (March 1936, with changes of a few words in August 1936)

This material was gathered early in 1936 with the help of some sixty Japanese and Western friends who gave information themselves or provided introductions for interviews with people of many classes and types. There were included a number of business men, professors, diplomats, editors, foreign correspondents, educational administrators, Christian workers, peers, leaders in social movements, officers and directors of international societies. In interviews and in various group meetings privately arranged, I was usually asked to make some statement regarding Japanese activities in North China, and other conditions in this country which have a bearing upon the relations of the two nations. I found that the most needed and most effective information was a review of the extension of Japanese control and influence since 1932. No Japanese with whom I talked was aware of the urgency and seriousness of the problem of the five provinces with their 100,000,000 people. Likewise even the liberals seldom had a clear picture of the results which a separation of North China would bring to the rest of the country, and its effects upon public finance, national culture and economic life. It was necessary to make plain that for three years there has been no real anti-Japanese movement and that the recent student demonstrations were normally patriotic in character, rather than part of a well organized anti-Japanese undertaking: also that the "autonomous government" in North China rests upon no popular movement but rather upon military pressure from Japan. I found great ignorance and misinformation in regard to the communist armies, the silver question, financial reform, the relationship of Canton and Nanking, the relations of China with Russia, and the activities of Great Britain in China.

In general, I was happily surprised at the openness of mind shown by the selected groups and individuals with whom I had contact. They again and again expressed their desire for information; and some took the initiative in sending me on to other people, often men of importance. On the whole, the Christian groups were well ahead of the general public in their breadth of outlook and their appreciation of the interests of the Chinese people. Genuinely patriotic, they were reasonable and humane.

- A. The report will be arbitrarily divided for ease in presentation. First, phases of the situation that are on the whole discouraging.

I. A Critical Era.

Again and again I heard the expression, "These are abnormal times." One man said: "Anything can happen now. We do not know to what situation we shall awake tomorrow morning." The Japanese speak of a new phase of national life since the events of 1931. They also frequently say, "After May 15," referring to the assassinations of

Premier Inukai and the financier Baron Dan by the so-called "Blood Brotherhood" of young military men on May 15, 1932. Many consider the present non-party government to be an emergency expedient that should be displaced as soon as possible. We are familiar with the famous Minobe case, which pivoted upon the charge that a professor of Constitutional Law considered the Emperor as an organ of the state. This innocent and long standing statement was the center of partisan combats, in which the ultra-nationalistic army group took such a strong position that compromise became impossible. The result of the case has been greatly to hinder free discussion of fundamental principles of government, and to support a "high" view of the imperial authority, redounding to the advantage of the army.

Far broader and deeper in its strains is the current trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa for the assassination of Lieutenant-General Nagata in July 1935. Aizawa maintains that his aim was to break the unholy association between high military servants of the Emperor and mere bureaucrats and Genro. This blow at the reputation and position of the highest civil dignitaries, obviously shakes to its foundations the Japanese state. Aizawa is supported by a vast array of military talent, and the court has received hundreds of letters from army men, some of them written in blood, insisting that Aizawa has acted for Heaven and for the Emperor. The President of Meiji University is the leading counsel for the defense. He has continually maintained that his client's guilt cannot be judged by the law because he has acted in high realms of the spirit to carry out a commission of Heaven. General Nagata was a leader of the moderate senior officers of the army and was known to have exercised restraint over the radical juniors. For weeks the chief Japanese newspapers carried several columns of detailed reports of this trial and its intensely emotional testimony. At length such high figures have been summoned as witnesses by the defence, that the Government has put the trial in camera, revising its former stand that publicity must be maintained to lessen nation-shaking rumors and suspicions. Colonel Aizawa frequently spoke of his ~~dying~~^{living} for the "Showa Restoration", a conception which is again expressed in the present revolt in Tokyo. By the "Restoration" he meant the abolition of the constitutional and parliamentary systems which hamper direct and exclusive relations between the Emperor and the army.

Also since 1931 there is a strong sense of international strain, however, its cause may be explained. The Japanese feel that they have made their way in world economics and in Manchuria against the united nations. To the more intelligent this implies risks and dangers which increase their anxieties and sensitivities; to the great nationalistic body, it is a challenge to military preparation and to further successes.

II. Extreme Nationalism.

There is great pressure of extreme nationalism upon the minds and lives of the whole people. This can be understood only in concrete cases, most of which will be taken from Christian sources.

Christian workers from many parts of Japan report that inquirers and new converts are strongly urged to break their connections with a non-Japanese and international religion. This pressure is particularly strong in schools, and it is often expressed through local officials in combination with Buddhist and Shinto priests who emphasize the national character of their religions. An extreme case is that of a certain school where the military instructor, a vigorous Shintoist, has so intimidated the staff and students that for four years no Christian work has been possible.

In Korea the shrine problem is so critical as to involve the very existence of a large body of mission schools. Recently the number of Shinto shrines has been increased, and various old local compromises have been cast aside by newly appointed officials. The principals are required not only to take the students to the shrines for ceremonies, but to participate themselves as leaders in rites that seem to many of them religious. In the Doshisha, a small Shinto tablet was placed in a building during the night. The school authorities removed it as a matter of course, but in so doing aroused a strenuous reaction among certain students and the official army instructors. Negotiation through influential friends failed to produce any settlement of the dispute, because the army people withdrew instruction from the University, thus placing the students and future graduates under serious disabilities in conscription and in other matters of public status. Eventually, a special meeting of the Board of Directors felt it necessary to yield to the authorities; and the tablet is honorably encased in its original position. It is noteworthy that Kagawa was disappointed in the failure of the Doshisha to carry on the struggle. He himself has on several occasions informed his associates that he is unable at this time to express his views on peace and internationalism, because such expression would mean a disastrous end to his social work. However, a few months ago Kagawa in his own magazine published the direct statement that the Emperor is not a god but only a man. Apparently he was able to escape prosecution only because the police are instructed to be liberal with a character so widely respected.

Many schools are troubled by the great expense and difficult requirements in the prescribed care for official pictures of the Emperor, and for the ceremonial reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education. In some regions the schools are so cowed and anxious that they expect almost anything to happen. In one large city, the newspapers reported that the Minister of Education had forbidden any kind of religious teaching or activity associated with schools. Even the leaders of Christian Schools were prepared to accept this report as correct, but upon investigation as to its details they found no basis for it. In a certain prefecture the governor recently forbade the teaching of English as an unnatural influence, but upon general protest from the schools, he held the order in abeyance.

From a certain Christian university, several tens of students have been arrested and many of them held for weeks or months in prison; at least one was continually tortured by suspension from the wrists.

No true charges were made against the students, but they were pressed to declare that they were communists or had received communistic instruction in the university. Seemingly the purpose of the police was to incriminate a group of teachers interested in social improvement from religious motives. In Tokyo, a Japanese Christian is in prison because he answered the question of a child in Sunday School by saying that Jesus is greater than the Emperor. In Osaka, a Christian layman has been imprisoned because in the course of street preaching he declared that the present imperial family is not directly descended from the Sun Goddess. The valuable international paper called "The Christian Graphic" has been forced to suspend publication because of the action of the authorities over an article in English on the subject "Nationalism in Japan." It said merely what many think, but what was unwise to print, namely that the imperial institution is anachronistic and half-mythological.

Many among the several hundred Japanese-Americans (second generation Japanese from California) now in Tokyo, frankly express the shocks which they continually feel over the extreme of nationalism all about them. Not only have a number of important officials been assassinated in recent years, on ultra-patriotic grounds, but there have been many brutal attacks upon newspaper editors and owners who are thought to be too moderate, and there have been frequent threats of violence against Christians and liberals suspected of internationalism.

Fortunately, there is a little evidence of humor that can maintain sanity in such an atmosphere. When the late Education Minister died in January, he left a reputation based upon public statements that Japanese children should no longer use the foreign expression "papa". But as the new Minister was appointed, a reporter of the liberal newspaper "Asahi" inquired what would be the policy in regard to "papa". The Minister laughingly replied that his policy could not be freely chosen, since he had a four-year old boy who always called him by that name.

III. Controlled Minds.

The mind of the Japanese people is marked by a high degree of conformity to prevailing opinion. The sense of discipline and of control by instruction is strong throughout the nation. A teacher of social sciences in a college reported that one question per day from students was the average reward for much effort to stimulate initiative on their part. This temper of conformity is closely connected with the strictly managed news services, and censorship of the press. Information in regard to China is both inadequate and unreliable. A newspaper editor frankly admitted that the Government news services from China were so bad that they required constant checking from private sources. He also stated that even telegrams from private correspondents were subjected to three phases of censorship before they came to the newspaper's home office, and that many of them were marked "not for publication." Intelligent and independent minds continually declare their desire for more accurate and complete information upon China. Indeed one of the most frequent experiences of the journey was

the interest and concern exhibited over the reports that I was able to give, which were welcomed as light upon problems concealed in darkness, even when the light was uncomfortable.

IV. Unsatisfactory Attitudes toward China.

In the common thought and attitudes of ordinary people, there has been built up a most unfortunate picture of China and the Chinese. They generally feel that the Chinese people are disorderly, untrustworthy, ignorant, scheming to injure their neighbors. It is the common feeling that only force has worked in dealing with China; and they consider that the show of friendly policy in the time of Baron Shidehara resulted in a violent outburst of Chinese nationalism with obvious threats to legitimate Japanese interests. A further misfortune is that practically no Japanese have personal friends among the Chinese with whom critical questions can be talked over, and who could steady emotional attitudes in time of crisis. A valued associate in Japan attempted to discover among a considerable number of able and broad-minded Japanese, whether they had such friends in China, and could ^{not} learn of one that did. The contrast with the thousands of personal connections that have helped to lessen animosities and misjudgments between Japan and the United States is obvious.

V. Japan's Hostility to Others Affects Her Policy in China.

It seems impossible for Japanese minds to consider their relations with China as a distinct issue subject to moral considerations or to mutual national interests. Their view of China is affected by their combined fear and hostility toward Russia; on the other hand, by their desire to extend their interests in vigorous advance over against the superior position of the white race, especially the British and the Americans. There is heard frequently, even in moderate circles, a cry against the dog-in-the-manger policy of Americans, who are thought to control the whole economic life of Latin America; and likewise against the British, who are felt to monopolize the resources of Australia, Africa, and important parts of Asia. Thus the Japanese consider that they have a right to make their way in China, and that any attempt to bar them is unnatural selfishness on the part of western powers. The result is a competitive stimulus to Japanese activities in China, and a view of China as an open field of operations for Japanese policy against an unjust world.

VI. The Rise of Imperial Confidence.

All keen observers in Japan report a strong tide of national confidence. The people feel that despite lack of resources and despite discrimination on the part of other nations, they have made good both economically in world markets and politically in their extension upon the mainland. Japan is on the rise, and no opposition can stop her. They have pride in mechanical invention, satisfaction in the world position of their navy, a feeling that they are making good on an imperial scale. There is much consideration of the islands

of the South Seas from an economic viewpoint, and a rapid growth in study of economic opportunities in Africa, South America, and other parts of the world. In a new sense Japan has become a world power and realizes it.

VII. The Influence of the Army.

The popularity of the army among the great masses of the people is enormous. Not only does the army skilfully maintain its old claim to represent the Emperor in a unique way and thus to have a higher responsibility than that given to the Government: but also the army has presented Manchuria to the Emperor, and carries for the benefit of the nation the burden of administration and extension upon the mainland. The radical younger officers of the army win favor from the peasants and less fortunate classes in general, by their criticism of industrial capitalism and their professed sympathy with the over-burdened masses. Furthermore, the army officers are generally felt to be honorable, loyal, devoted to duty, by contrast with the partisanship, lack of cooperation, and doubtful character among the political chiefs. Even people tinged with liberalism often feel that they must defend the Constitution and the Diet as systems or principles rather than by actual comparison of their personnel with the army officers. The army maintains its own publicity services and distributes large editions of pamphlets to explain its ideas upon public policy, particularly through the agency of the Ex-Service Men's League with an active membership of 3,000,000.

VIII. Economics and Expansion.

Japan's policy is supported by basic economic drives. The familiar population problem and lack of natural resources have now taken a new form because of the accumulation of capital and the great technical advance of Japanese industries. They are sending goods to all countries; and therefore upon this new plane of achievement require greater resources in raw material and greater assurance of protected or controlled markets. Thus, the needs of Japan have become more dangerous with prosperity. Nevertheless, it seems that in actual direction of policy in Manchuria and in China, economic interests are secondary to those of national prestige and of strategy. There is general dissatisfaction with the returns from Manchuria. Thus far the company organized by the South Manchurian Railway with Government funds to exploit North China, has been unable to secure significant participation of private industries. Important businessmen freely criticize in private the hasty and ambitious policy of the military officers. They realize the relative poverty of North China and the vast masses who would complicate labor and social questions for Japan. A January report of the research committee of the Tokyo banks upon the investment outlook, indicated plainly that banks and industrial capital in general were expecting to be called into service in North China following upon political changes. The attitude reflected in this statement has been confirmed from many sources: that economic interests use new political opportunities, but do not initiate them.

IX. Liberalism Bows to Nationalism.

There is an extensive body of moderate opinion among well educated persons and among commercial groups. Nevertheless, putting aside a few extreme secular liberals, the more alert in Christian groups, and the Social Masses Party, it must be said that liberalism in Japan is far more nationalistic and further to the "right" than in other countries. An experienced friend said that he had never known a period when it was so difficult to find thoroughly liberal persons prepared to talk freely about national and international questions. The position is well illustrated by a responsible man in a semi-official organization, who vigorously stated the views of upper class people upon Chinese issues, concluding with a statement: "We must admit that some of the things done by our generals in North China are not right. But all the same our nation as a whole is well satisfied with the results of their work." Again two publicists, respected for experience and free judgment, concluded long reviews of liberal and moderate sentiment in Japan with almost identical statements to this effect: after all, the difference between the military view of policy in China and the so-called civilian view is mainly one of speed and of manner rather than of goal. It must be considered therefore that the Japanese public in the large is prepared to support expansion.

X. The Course of Policy.

Naturally Japanese acquaintances are not prepared to give specific predictions as to policy: but from the interviews and information recently secured, it is fair to draw the inference that Japan is going ahead to secure complete strategic and economic control of North China, which necessarily involves political management. Furthermore, they will go on so far as is necessary to block any Russian or Western activity in China which they consider threatening or even significantly competitive with their interests. Their frequent declarations about the pacification of Eastern Asia are defined by their own public men as meaning direct Japanese control of this portion of the world, "the extension of the Imperial Virtue," in General Araki's language. Moreover, when they speak of a Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia, they mean more than the term connotes to American minds: for even intelligent Japanese make open charges that by the Monroe Doctrine, the United States maintains a thorough-going and essentially monopolistic direction of the production and the trade of Latin America.

At the same time I am fully convinced that the Japanese program has not been agreed upon in detail. Whenever high Japanese military officers return to Japan from China, they engage in open activity among the government officials, attempting to secure backing for quick advances. Yet the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the cooperation of other government officials interested in financial and economic problems, continueally arranges schemes that are intended to hold down the restless generals. A reasonable guess is that real steps forward will be taken in this present year, which has been so extensively advertised as a year of crisis for Japan.

The relationships with China are not fully separable from those with Russia, for geographical and political reasons. From many interviews and discussions, there remains the impression that the Japanese government has not decided upon a war with Russia, but that there is real risk of such a war. The increasing friction along the Mongolian border, which involves larger and larger bodies of men, may, with the connivance of over-eager local officers, lead to a war not deliberately determined upon in high quarters. The Japanese profess great anxiety over the Russian military establishment in Siberia, and deep resentment over the Russian attitude on border questions; likewise anxiety over the successful Russian espionage system, which secures complete information on the Japanese military and naval organizations. It is possible that this Japanese attitude has been artificially developed; but the attitude is strongly formed, and is a fact of importance. The other danger of war is the possibility of a German attack upon Russia, which would almost certainly be too great a temptation for the Japanese army; if, indeed there were not already by that time a satisfactory understanding between the generals in Berlin and those in Tokyo.

B. Yet these gloomy reports are not the whole story. There are forces and activities which indicate at least some moderation of the extremist policies, and which over a period of years may temper fundamentally the direction of Japanese affairs.

I. The Parliamentary System.

The February election aroused considerable interest because it was felt there was at stake a necessary step toward the restoration of normal conditions for the parliamentary system. The non-party cabinet and the rightist party, the Seiyukai, were severely criticized by independent opinion. A real compliment to the power of the Diet to control appropriations, and therefore to influence policies, was paid by the Ex-Service Men's League. The League for the first time took an active part in an election and sent to every one of its 3,000,000 members a pamphlet blacklisting those members of the previous Diet who were known to oppose an increase in military expenditure. The growth of the Social Masses Party and the revival of the Minseito were both encouraging as against the conservative Seiyukai. There is an increasing concern among intelligent persons that the constitutional and parliamentary system must be maintained against violent action or any fascist tendency.

II. Concern Regarding Militarism.

In the past two years there is a freshening anxiety among an independent minority over the growth of military extremism. Remarkably bold criticisms of militarism have been made even in the Diet, and occasional items in the newspapers have boldly shown hostility to excesses of the army. Takahashi was the hero of journalists and of liberals generally, for his fight against increasing armament expenditures. An important educator said that he did not know any person of real culture in the country who approved the things done by army officers in recent years. Others concerned over national stability stated boldly their conviction that the fate of Japan was involved as critically as the fate of China. Even a relatively conservative

man in higher circles spoke plainly of the narrow training of the military men, and of the danger that their mentality was bringing to the whole nation.

III. Checks to Fascism.

It was felt by many of moderate mind that the movements of 1931 and 1932 toward military fascism had received serious checks. The present trial of Aizawa results from the restraining policy followed by his honorable victim, Nagata. Another indication is the difficulty found by the extreme nationalistic group in attempting to organize the students of the Imperial University at Tokyo. They were able to secure only 80 members out of 5,000 regular undergraduates, and so practically gave up the effort. Many consider that the extreme military movement is something of a reaction against the poor standing that the army enjoyed from the Washington Conference to the Manchurian incident. They feel that the present reaction is running its course, and that such violent moves as do occur are an indication of despair as much as of strength. It will be interesting to see whether these views must be revised as a result of the recent coup.

IV. The Foreign Office.

The position of the Tokyo Foreign Office is most remarkable, even pitiable. It is continually embarrassed by the Japanese generals in North China, who make their own insolent declarations of policy and who freely overturn not only the statements but even the tentative agreements prepared by the regular diplomatic representatives. Moreover, the Foreign Minister's burdens in Tokyo consist in no small measure of perpetual efforts to secure what is called a "unified policy"; in other words, to get the army to say in advance just what it will do, and thus provide a basis for consistent explanations. In general the Foreign Office and the Japanese diplomats are what might be called moderate nationalists. They are prepared to advance the interests of Japan, but at the same time are cautious of their problem in defending the army against the criticism and the possible retaliation of other countries.

A most interesting instance of the diplomatic attitude fell into my hands almost by chance. I was able to see in the hands of an editor, a telegraphic report of a draft treaty presented by Vice-Minister Tang Yu-jen to Mr. Suma on November 30, some three weeks before Tang's assassination. These proposals included an acceptance of Hirota's three principles, providing for cooperation with Japan and Manchoukuo economically and politically, plus joint action against communists. They likewise sanctioned an autonomous government in North China having no military or financial connection with Nanking. But this draft was accompanied by unfavorable comment on the part of Ambassador Ariyoshi, and a similar expression by the Foreign Office. Ariyoshi said that the draft went too far, and that even the possibility of such independence was arousing much anxiety among financial circles in Shanghai.

V. Economic Drags.

There are a number of economic influences which work for restraint. The judgment is widely held that the returns from Manchuria have thus far been disappointing. Further investment there is unlikely until the rewards are greater. Important industrial interests from their own experience and expert knowledge in North China are convinced that there is no easy money to be had, as the military wish to think. The progress of Japan in world trade has led certain manufacturing and banking groups to feel that the economic future depends more upon good attitudes and cooperative relationships with other countries than it does upon any sudden stroke in China. Moreover it is frequently said among intelligent leaders that nothing should be done in China that would require the raising of large funds for non-productive purposes. This last attitude is still more specific in regard to war with Russia, which it is feared would wreck the Japanese financial structure.

VI. Radicalism.

Communism as an organized movement has been considerably weakened by the economic upturn, heavy police pressure, and by the intensification of national feeling. Nevertheless, there is a certain amount of underground communistic propaganda, mainly oral. The policy of the Government has become increasingly liberal in regard to Marxian philosophy and socialistic classics, even including the writings of Lenin and Trotsky. The line is drawn at the application of radical principles to anything in Japanese conditions today. There are significant radical groups in the Social Masses Party which are definitely increasing in strength. One section of the labor unions numbering more than 40,000 men, has for several years carried on a definite educational enterprise against military expansion and excessive expenditure on armies. The leader of this group was prominent in the recent election. Again there is a member of the previous Diet who has used his personal fortune to organize considerable bodies of farmers against military taxes. Moderately radical opinion is present in most of the universities. One unit in the Buddhist Federation is consciously following an active Marxist.

VII. Liberalization in Education.

There is real concern not merely among liberals but also among moderate conservatives, in regard to the narrowness of military education and also over the wider problem of a mechanical and materialistic popular education that does not develop individual judgment. More than one significant leader declared that unless they were able to make further reforms in education, the country could not overcome the dangers of militarism and of crowd excesses in nationalism. Recently there have been two or three remarkable indications of a new direction. The Ministry of Education during 1935 sent an instruction to all schools to keep vigorously free from any restrictions upon, or interference with authorized religious and moral instruction. This action was on the basis of encouragement for individual conscience and

independent character. The Ministry likewise sent to colleges, universities, and high schools a deputation consisting of a leading Shintoist, a Buddhist, and a Christian, whose duty it was to give active encouragement to religious movements in the institutions concerned. Near the end of the year the Ministry ordered all schools of primary grade to introduce more teaching based upon heroes of social and cultural progress, and to lessen the tendency to excessive emphasis upon military heroes.

VIII. International Societies.

The International Association of Japan has been organized by the Government to combine the activities of the former League of Nations Association, the Japan Peace Society, the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and other societies in this field. The Association receives some Government aid, of course, accompanied by supervision. At present it has 11,000 members, chiefly among the professional classes and in educational institutions. Under existing conditions, the work of the Association is to provide information about other countries, chiefly in relation to foreign trade opportunities for Japan. This information was criticized by some as being definitely nationalistic in tone. Nevertheless one is not inclined to be hard on an organization which comprises many respected men of broad mind, some of whom risked assault and persecution in critical periods.

There is likewise a new association, The Society for International Cultural Relations, which has public funds at its disposal to make known abroad the attractive elements of Japanese culture. Thus far, the work seems to have a genuine scholarly basis in its particular units, propagandist though the general aim may be. They are building up a valuable library, are ready to render service to all types of museums and exhibitions abroad, and to supply expert consultation for any inquiry in the field of culture and education. There are many smaller organizations, concerned with a particular foreign country or with academic objects.

IX. Christian Influence on Leading Persons.

In Christian circles there are many evidences of the effectiveness of personal appeal and influence upon important leaders. The late Minister Takahashi, who was one of the most genuine liberal forces in Japan, had regularly in his home a Christian service, and encouraged members of his family in Christian connections. Similar influences have been at work in the homes of other cabinet ministers and high administrative officials. Furthermore Christian groups have frequently led deputations to present critical information or petitions to high officers on problems of social morality and even of international bearing. The protected narcotic trade in China is one example of their targets. It is not possible to report names and details, but it is necessary to testify to significant efforts of this kind.

X. Some Enterprises of Women.

Various organizations of Christian women have been particularly effective in educational work and in the exercise of personal and group influence upon government officers. One of them has 4,000 regular members. There are important groups who have given themselves mainly to efforts for peace, and have built up a useful body of contacts within Japan and in America and other Western countries. One instance of their activities is the holding among high school students of essay and speaking contests upon subjects related to peace. Such contests make possible the public presentation before important audiences, of ideas which the police would not permit adults to express. One organization has performed valuable service for Chinese students in Tokyo. Others maintain extensive correspondence with Christian women in Western countries, and thus keep open windows to the outer world in helpful attitudes. They are also responsible for large-scale correspondence and exchange programs in Japanese girls' schools, directed toward good international attitudes. Their genuineness of purpose is fully clear, and their leaders have undergone real risks in the effort to improve patriotism by fair consideration for other countries.