

*This should be read first*

UNIVERSITY OF NANKING

Nanking, China.

March 3, 1938.

Dear Timperley:-

Mail closes today for the "Oahu".

You surely received the radio message through Mrs. Bates, indicating our preference for your earlier proposal over that contained in your letter of February 17th. We note that this was made just after you looked over Boynton's Nanking files, and was "subject to further study". That was the result of the first careful conference I could arrange with Smythe and Mills. It is extraordinarily difficult to get thorough consideration for anything beyond what has to be done today, since the demands upon these men are so manifold.

Here are some of our thoughts. For purpose of impressing a distant public with the brutality of warfare waged as this one has been waged, it seems much more effective to have a base wider than that of one city. It so easy for any one at a distance to feel that after all Nanking was exceptional -- political hatred centered on that name, accidents of time and personnel, and so on. But if similar stories come over a period of months from Shanghai, Sungkiang, Soochow, Wusih, Huchow, Hangchow, the total effect is far more massive and convincing.

Moreover anxiety about personal or institutional retaliation is multiplied if you come to down to one city, with accounts based rather largely on our documents. That means pretty much Smythe as Secretary, Mills as Vice-Chairman (now really Chairman since Rabe has gone), and myself as the most strenuous reporter from the University. I wonder if you realize the venom with which the Japanese officers and even the diplomats now regard the Committee. They continually press the Self-Government to demand that they shall not in any way let us be connected with this or that enterprise (an interesting set-off to their ridiculous formula of "cooperation" which they publicly require from us; actually we do cooperate just as much the Self-Government Committee dares to risk under subterfuges and downright lying to the Japanese). The chief officer of the Embassy formally referred to me as "anti-Japanese"; and previously asked others if I were "nervous" -- much to their amusement. The latter term came after I argued with him one afternoon in refusing to accept his patient formula; the military are doing all in their power to remedy the situation, and therefore there is no grounds for complaint. He thought I was excited or afraid, because I insisted on the facts of disorder



and danger. Some of the foreign group here have continually besought me (and to a lesser extent Smythe and Mills) -- Fitch also when he was here -- to cease the thorough reporting and protesting and indirect publicity, lest all missionaries be excluded from Nanking. This is put in here merely to suggest that for a while there is some reason to be cautious. Fitch and I were formally cited to the Ambassador, who defended us at least in a code radio to Allison (all this to be kept under your hat, for I really do not know its significance). There has been a steady stream of lying charges against the University in the Sin Shun Pao, the propagandist organ widely distributed in Shanghai and East China generally. I want to stand to my guns, and yet not damage the future of the University and of mission interests generally by any error or judgment of method. I've spoken for myself simply because my case is more "personalized" than that of others. But there is not a day passing without some dig at the International Committee by some Japanese. I enclose a translation of a Domei item that illustrates fairly their whole attitude, not stated extremely in this particular instance. Please note carefully the implication of exclusiveness which marks everything they do here, with little regard to truth in concrete matters, as you are well aware.

Also, our group here is inclined to think that the story of Japanese methods and the story of the International Committee are two different things, not necessarily benefitted by combination. The former would seem to be by far the more important for the present. No doubt you can arrange now some contacts for the Soochow-Hangchow regions which will get you stories from there. Smythe's full "case-list" now reaches 460 items, and will shortly be available in complete form for you in Shanghai. We can make some supplements to it, and elaborate some stories if you wish. Also, Wuhu information should be available through Dr. Brown, Mr. Gale, and others. Yangchow likewise, I believe, and possibly Chinkiang.

As for the Safety Zone, Mills has the idea of a small book, say a hundred pages. But neither he nor others of us would feel that the documents could be fully published in the near future without imperilling necessary relief work in this region, and endangering the possibilities of foreign service in say Hankow. I also have thought of an article for International Conciliation (or some other medium if you suggest) which might encourage minds in the west to think of the whole problem of civilian survival in the coming wars. This experience cannot be transferred, but it might encourage others to look for possibilities in their particular situations. These are not mentioned to inhibit you, but to seek your counsel.

Indeed, the main set is favourable for you to employ any facts you want from our material, trusting your purpose and methods and experience, and greatly interested in how you do it.



Probably others have called to your attention the small error in your interesting and useful letter to Hornbeck of February 16th. Magee is an American. Unfortunately there was no Britisher in the city until your rather cautious and subdued diplomats arrived. We are, however, appreciative of Prideaux-Brune's and Jeffrey's good qualities and their aid in several matters. Williams is now a passable aid to Jeffrey, while P.B. has left for Home.

I enclose some economic notes requested by Allison for the Ambassador. They assume knowledge of the general destruction and stoppage. Also plans of two inquiries which are being launched this week under fearsome cover of the Self-Government Committee. Smythe set up the agricultural one with our Chinese, and I am starting the city show with plenty of consultation. We want a sound basis for our relief policy and will try to boost the Self-Government Committee at the same time -- a feeble and corrupt lot, but approachable and with some elements of good intentions. Probably can send you soon a memo of information desired by Allison on them and their work.

With hearty good wishes,

SEARLE BATES.

P.S. - These messages all go to and from Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping, Washington, Tokio. So I don't know the origin or primary destination of the citation and of Johnson's response.